ISW predicts how Lukashenko will take advantage of the "de-escalation" of Prigozhin's rebellion

Analysts from the Institute for the Study of War have reported that Belarusian dictator Alexander Lukashenko will use mediation in resolving Yevgeny Prigozhin’s rebellion, delay the formalisation of the Union State of Russia and Belarus or prevent Putin from using Belarusian forces in Ukraine.

Source: ISW

Details: The review analysed the situation with the Wagner Private Military Company (PMC) rebellion.

The analysts pointed out that late on 24 June, the Kremlin announced that Belarusian dictator Alexander Lukashenko had agreed that Wagner financier Yevgeny Prigozhin would leave for Belarus without being prosecuted in Russia; some Wagner fighters would sign contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defence; and none of the Wagner fighters would be charged for their participation in the armed uprising.

Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov announced that the Russian authorities would close the criminal case against Prigozhin, who will go to Belarus, and thanked Lukashenko for his role in mediating the deal with the "higher goal of avoiding bloodshed".

Earlier, Lukashenko's press service reported that he had held talks with Prigozhin and claimed that Lukashenko and Putin had agreed on "bilateral actions" to resolve the conflict. Lukashenko stressed the importance of avoiding a "bloody massacre" and providing security guarantees for the Wagner fighters.

Following the first Belarusian report, Prigozhin released an audio message in which he stated that his 'march for justice' had achieved its goal and that he had ordered the Wagner fighters to return to their positions to prevent the situation from escalating into a bloody massacre.

In his statement, Prigozhin did not mention Lukashenko's involvement in the conflict or the details of the agreement reached as a result of the negotiations.

The report notes that Prigozhin’s rebellion has demonstrated that Russian forces lack reserves in many rear areas and almost certainly will deteriorate the morale of Russian personnel in Ukraine, which Ukrainian troops could use to adjust attempts to break through Russian defences.

According to the analysts, the Lukashenko-mediated agreement is likely to eliminate the Wagner PMC as an independent player led by Prigozhin in its current form, although some elements of the group may continue to exist under the Russian Defence Ministry.

Analysts point out that it is not clear how the Kremlin will define Wagner personnel as not having participated in the rebellion, and Peskov’s statement does not specify the fate of Wagner personnel who participated in it, other than receiving pardons. 

It is also noted that Prigozhin almost certainly planned the rebellion in advance, given the coordination and speed of Wagner's movement, but the ISW cannot confirm this hypothesis.

In addition, the review says that Prigozhin's armed rebellion may have further undermined Wagner's support by forcing regional authorities and recruitment organisations associated with it to condemn Prigozhin's actions.

It is also noted that it is not clear whether Prigozhin secured the support of Wagner's commanders or rank-and-file before making the deal, and many Wagner members are likely to be unhappy about having to sign contracts with the Russian MoD, demobilise or relocate outside Ukraine.

Experts also suggest that Lukashenko is likely to try to use the de-escalation of the armed rebellion to achieve his goals, such as delaying the formalisation of the Union State of Russia and Belarus or preventing Putin from using Belarusian forces in Ukraine.

Analysts point out that the Kremlin is now in a state of deep instability. A deal with Lukashenko is a short-term rather than a long-term solution, and Prigozhin's rebellion has exposed weaknesses in the Kremlin and the Russian MoD.

According to experts, assumptions that Prigozhin's rebellion, the Kremlin's reaction and Lukashenko's mediation were staged by the Kremlin are absurd.

They also note that Prigozhin's rebellion and the outcome of the events of 23-24 June, although this is not necessarily the struggle of Prigozhin and the Kremlin in full, are likely to cause significant damage to Putin's power and the Russian war effort in Ukraine.

To quote the ISW’s Key Takeaways on 24 June:

• The Kremlin announced late on 24 June that Belarusian dictator Alexander Lukashenko negotiated a deal under which Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin will travel to Belarus without facing criminal charges in Russia; some portion of Wagner Group fighters will sign contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD); and no Wagner personnel will be charged for their involvement in an armed rebellion.
• The Wagner Group encircled the Russian Southern Military District (SMD)’s headquarters in Rostov-on-Don and drove to within 330 kilometres of Moscow City prior to the announcement of the deal. Wagner forces will reportedly begin withdrawing to their bases soon, and footage reportedly depicts Prigozhin departing Rostov-on-Don.
• The Kremlin struggled to cohere an effective rapid response to Wagner’s advances, highlighting internal security weaknesses likely due to surprise and the impact of heavy losses in Ukraine.
• Putin unsurprisingly elected to back the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and its ongoing efforts to centralise control of Russian irregular forces (including Wagner) over Prigozhin.
• The Lukashenko-brokered agreement will very likely eliminate Wagner Group as a Prigozhin-led independent actor in its current form, although elements of the organisation may endure under existing and new capacities.
• Prigozhin likely gambled that his only avenue to retain Wagner Group as an independent force was to march against the Russian MoD, likely intending to secure defections in the Russian military but overestimating his own prospects.
• The optics of Belarusian President Lukashenko playing a direct role in halting a military advance on Moscow are humiliating to Putin and may have secured Lukashenko other benefits.
• The Kremlin now faces a deeply unstable equilibrium. The Lukashenko-negotiated deal is a short-term fix, not a long-term solution, and Prigozhin’s rebellion exposed severe weaknesses in the Kremlin and Russian MoD.
• Russian forces launched their largest series of missile strikes against Ukraine in recent months on 24 June, despite the armed rebellion within Russia.
• Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations on at least two sectors of the front and reportedly made advances on 24 June, and regular fighting continued on other sectors of the line.

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