ISW analyses how Russians might use expansion of bridgehead near Lyman in Donetsk Oblast

Analysts at the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) have identified possible places where the Russians might advance near the town of Lyman in Donetsk Oblast. 

Source: ISW

Quote: "Russian forces are expanding their bridgehead northeast of Lyman as part of a mutually reinforcing effort to create conditions for the seizure of Borova and Lyman in the coming months."

Details: It was noted that footage posted on 28 March and geolocated on 1 April showed that Russian troops had recently advanced northwest of Novoliubivka (northeast of Lyman) and might have captured the village.

Russian troops recently advanced southeast of Nove (west of Novoliubivka), and Ukrainian military observer Kostiantyn Mashovets stated on 31 March that Russian troops had advanced to the southern outskirts of Katerynivka (northwest of Novoliubivka).

Quote: "Russian forces advanced across the Zherebets River onto the west (right) bank in early January 2025 and have slowly expanded their bridgehead on the right bank over the last three months. 

Russian forces began efforts to push Ukrainian forces from their positions on the east (left) bank of the Zherebets River in late 2023 and have only recently established a relatively stable bridgehead from which Russian forces can launch further offensive operations.

Russian forces appear to be leveraging a significant manpower advantage to make advances in the area."

Details: Experts speculated that Russian troops could exploit their extended bridgehead northeast of Lyman in order to seize Borova or Lyman in the coming months.

Furthermore, the Russians may be attempting to combine these footholds to provide a stable springboard for attacks southeast of Borova.

Quote: "Russian forces have recently struggled to advance east and southeast of Borova after advancing northeast of the settlement in January 2025, and the Russian forces may be creating the salient northeast of Lyman to support future offensive operations against the southern tip of the Novoserhiivka-Druzheliubivka-Novyi Myr line (east to southeast of Borova).

The Russian military command may attempt to outflank Ukrainian defences in these settlements in order to force Ukrainian troops to withdraw and enable Russian advances east of and into Borova in the coming months."

More details: It was also stressed that the Russians might try to use the expansion of the bridgehead on the west bank of the Zherebets River near Ivanivka to support future Russian operations and capture Lyman.

They could try to advance on Karlivka from Nove and on Drobysheve from Kolodiazi to establish defensible positions on the Karlivka-Shandryholove-Drobysheve line (on the eastern bank of the Oskil River).

Russian troops might try to use this progress along the Oskil River to challenge Ukrainian positions in Lyman from the northeast.

Meanwhile, they could also try to intensify their offensive near Torske (east of Lyman) to push on Lyman from the east.

Quote: "Further Russian advances towards Borova and Lyman are part of an enduring Russian effort to push Ukrainian forces from positions on the east bank of the Oskil River and attack further into western Kharkiv Oblast and set conditions to attack the Ukrainian fortress belt in Donetsk Oblast from the north."

Details: Analysts said that Russian troops could also use their bridgehead northeast of Lyman to seize the remaining 1% of Luhansk Oblast that is under Ukrainian control, completing Russia's long-standing goal of capturing the whole of Luhansk Oblast.

Russian troops have been trying to seize the last 1% of Luhansk Oblast (about 266 square kilometres) since late November 2024. Russian forces first seized the whole of Luhansk Oblast on 3 July 2022, but Ukrainian forces later pushed them back.

Experts said that the Kremlin was likely to use the recapture and retention of Luhansk Oblast to gain leverage during ceasefire negotiations and future peace talks.

Quote: "ISW continues to assess that Russian officials are intentionally stalling the ceasefire and peace negotiations in hopes of gaining more territory to leverage during future peace negotiations."

To quote the ISW’s Key Takeaways on 1 April: 

• Russian forces are reportedly continuing to shell Ukrainian energy infrastructure amid ongoing negotiations over details of the ceasefire agreement on energy infrastructure strikes, indicating that Russia may be exploiting the ceasefire’s vague or unfinalised terms to strike Ukrainian energy infrastructure with shorter-range artillery but not longer-range cruise missiles or one-way strike drones.
• Senior Russian officials continue to reiterate the Russian demand for the elimination of the "root causes" of the war in Ukraine as a precondition for a peace agreement – a reference to Russia's initial war demands that directly contradict US President Donald Trump's goal to achieve lasting peace in Ukraine.
• Russian forces are expanding their bridgehead northeast of Lyman as part of a mutually reinforcing effort to create conditions for the seizure of Borova and Lyman in the coming months.
• Russian forces can leverage their expanded bridgehead northeast of Lyman to support the seizure of Borova or Lyman in the coming months.
• Russian forces may also leverage their bridgehead northeast of Lyman to seize the remaining one percent of Luhansk Oblast under Ukrainian control and complete Russia's long-standing goal of seizing the entirety of Luhansk Oblast.
• Russian ruler Vladimir Putin signed a decree on 1 April to raise salaries for Russian governors starting January 2026, aligning the pay with that of Russia's deputy prime ministers.
• Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk and Belgorod oblasts and on the Lyman, Pokrovsk, and Kurakhove fronts.

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