Russia increases its advance pace and continues to capture all of Donetsk Oblast – ISW

Analysts at the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) say that Russian invaders have recently been advancing much faster than in the whole of 2023 and are not giving up their intention to capture all of Donetsk Oblast.

Source: ISW

Details: Russian forces' recent confirmed gains near Vuhledar and Velyka Novosilka indicate that the war in Ukraine has not reached a stalemate. The line of contact in Donetsk Oblast is becoming increasingly dynamic, with Russian forces advancing at a much faster pace than during all of 2023. 

Advances in southeastern Ukraine are largely driven by the detection and exploitation of weaknesses in Ukraine's defensive lines. 

Russian forces have been making incremental advances in southeastern Ukraine since autumn 2024. However, they have not regained the operational mobility seen during the initial months of the invasion. Despite their current tactical gains being faster than the largely static warfare of 2023 and early 2024, they remain far below the rate of advance achieved in March 2022.

Russian forces have leveraged the capture of Vuhledar for further offensives in western Donetsk Oblast, contrary to a prior ISW assessment. ISW outlines several potential courses of action (COAs) that the Russian military command may pursue based on recent advances.

Progress on the Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, Vuhledar, and Velyka Novosilka fronts presents Russian command with multiple COAs for the coming weeks and months. 

The Russian command appears to be simultaneously working to encircle Velyka Novosilka while creating pockets around Ukrainian forces north and south of Kurakhove. Additionally, Russian forces are employing supporting COAs to improve battlefield positioning in southern Donetsk Oblast and mitigate threats to their flanks.

ISW identifies the following COAs, which are not mutually exclusive and could complement each other:

1. Advancing southwest, east and northeast of Velyka Novosilka to flank the settlement, avoiding areas directly south of Velyka Novosilka.
2. Advancing towards Andriivka (along the H15 road, west of Kurakhove) from the south to close Ukrainian pockets near Kurakhove and level the front line.
3. Advancing west and southwest from Selydove along the Pustynka-Sontsivka line towards Andriivka to breach Ukrainian positions north of Kurakhove and threaten their withdrawal routes.

It remains uncertain which COA the Russian command will prioritise, if any. The primary Russian objective in Donetsk Oblast as of late 2024 was the capture of Pokrovsk, an effort abandoned due to strong Ukrainian resistance on Pokrovsk's outskirts. 

The extent of Russian preparatory efforts to exploit these opportunities is unclear, as is the resistance Ukrainian forces might provide as Russia advances. Ukrainian forces notably halted Russian offensives near Chasiv Yar and Pokrovsk in 2024.

The Russian military command likely intends to advance into southeastern Dnipropetrovsk Oblast to support its goal of capturing all of Donetsk Oblast. 

Potential Russian efforts to achieve the Kremlin's goal of fully capturing Donetsk Oblast by occupying parts of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast align with Russia's broader objective of forcing Ukraine into total surrender and undermining its independence and sovereignty. 

While the Russian military command seems to be devising more sophisticated operations, Russian forces have not yet regained operational manoeuvre capabilities on the battlefield. Instead, they are continuing to rely on identifying and exploiting weaknesses in Ukrainian defensive positions to achieve slow and incremental tactical progress.

To quote the ISW’s Key Takeaways on 24 November:

• Russian forces’ recent confirmed battlefield gains near Vuhledar and Velyka Novosilka demonstrate that the war in Ukraine is not stalemated. The front line in Donetsk Oblast is becoming increasingly fluid as Russian forces recently have been advancing at a significantly quicker rate than they did in the entirety of 2023.
• Russian advances in the Pokrovsk, Kurakhove, Vuhledar, and Velyka Novosilka directions present the Russian military command with several courses of action (COAs) that the Russian command may attempt in the coming weeks and months.
• COA 1: Russian forces advance southwest, east, and northeast of Velyka Novosilka to envelop the settlement from its flanks, bypassing the area immediately south of Velyka Novosilka.
• COA 2: Russian forces advance to Andriivka (along the H15 highway and west of Kurakhove) from the south to support Russian efforts to close the Ukrainian pockets near Kurakhove and level the front line.
• COA 3: Russian forces advance west and southwest from Selydove along the Pustynka-Sontsivka line in the direction of Andriivka to collapse the Ukrainian pocket north of Kurakhove and threaten Ukrainian egress routes.
• The Russian military command is likely planning on how to advance into the southeasternmost part of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast in support of Russia's longstanding objective to seize all of Donetsk Oblast.
• Elements of the Russian Central, Eastern, and Southern military districts (CMD, EMD, and SMD) are conducting simultaneous, mutually supportive offensive operations in Donetsk Oblast and have recently made relatively rapid tactical advances. The Russian military command may be learning from some battlefield mistakes after three years of war, but the extent of this learning is currently unclear.
• The Russian military command appears to be planning more complex operations, but Russian forces have yet to be able to restore operational manoeuvre to the battlefield and are instead still relying on their ability to identify and exploit vulnerabilities in the Ukrainian defensive lines to make gradual, tactical advances.
• Ukrainian forces struck a Russian S-400 air defence system radar in an unspecified area in Kursk Oblast on the night of 23-24 November.
• Russia reportedly recruited hundreds of Yemeni nationals to fight in the Russian military amid growing cooperation between Russia, Iran, and the Iran-backed Houthi movement.
• Ukrainian and Russian forces recently advanced in the main Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Kupyansk, Pokrovsk, Vuhledar, and Velyka Novosilka.

Support UP or become our patron!