Russia relocates several units from Pokrovsk front to Kursk Oblast – ISW

Analysts at the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) have pointed out that the Ukrainian defence forces' operation in Kursk Oblast has put pressure on Russian operations in every sector of the combat zone and that Russia has likely relocated reserve units from the Pokrovsk front to Kursk Oblast.

Source: Institute for the Study of War (ISW)

Quote from ISW: "The Russian military command may have redeployed limited elements intended to reinforce Russia's priority offensive operation in the Pokrovsk direction to defend against the Ukrainian incursion in Kursk Oblast – suggesting that operational pressures from the Ukrainian incursion in Kursk Oblast are impacting Russian operations in every sector throughout the theatre."

Details: The ISW recalls that Russian sources, including social media users, claimed on 14 and 17 August that at least a company of the Russian 15th Motorised Rifle Brigade (2 Combined Arms Army, Russian Central Military District) had moved from Pokrovsk to Kursk Oblast.

Some Russian and Ukrainian open sources also claimed that unspecified elements of the 15th Motorised Rifle Brigade had been redeployed to Kursk Oblast. At the same time, elements of the Russian 15th Motorised Rifle Brigade have been involved in Russian offensive operations on the Pokrovsk front.

ISW has noted reports that elements of this brigade have been operating east of Pokrovsk since mid-August to date.

On 19 August, a volunteer-led OSINT organisation, Evocation.info, stated that Russia had also moved elements of the 1st Slavic Motorised Rifle Brigade (1st Army Corps of the so-called Donetsk People's Republic) from the Donetsk front to Kursk Oblast. In late July and August 2024, ISW recorded statements that elements of this brigade were operating on the Toretsk and Pokrovsk fronts.

Quote from ISW: "ISW has observed no indications that these redeployed elements were previously engaged in frontline combat in Russia's assessed priority Toretsk and Pokrovsk direction, and the Russian military command likely remains extremely averse to pulling combat effective units from frontline areas in these directions. The redeployed units were likely reserve units that the Russian military command intended to use to reinforce the Russian grouping in these directions and stave off the threat of pre-mature operational culmination, however.

The Russian military command's decision to redeploy limited elements to Kursk Oblast instead of committing the elements to the operation to seize Pokrovsk or Toretsk suggests that the Russian military command has not been able to fully insulate its priority offensive operations in Donetsk Oblast from the manpower demands brought about by the Ukrainian incursion in Kursk Oblast."

Details: Analysts note that the Russian military command has so far avoided redeploying forces intended for offensive operations in the Toretsk or Pokrovsk fronts to participate in defensive operations in Kursk Oblast and has so far mainly relocated forces from lower priority areas – the northern part of Kharkiv Oblast, the Kupiansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, and the western part of Zaporizhzhia Oblast.

The relocation of limited elements of the 15th and 1st Motorised Rifle Brigades will not immediately impact the situation on the Pokrovsk or Toretsk front, as these are small forces. It remains unclear whether the Russian military command has already deployed or will deploy additional reserve forces intended for Russian offensive operations on the Pokrovsk and Toretsk fronts to counter the Ukrainian operation in Kursk Oblast.

To quote the ISW’s Key Takeaways on 1 September:

• The Russian military command may have redeployed limited elements intended to reinforce Russia's priority offensive operation on the Pokrovsk front to defend against the Ukrainian incursion in Kursk Oblast – suggesting that operational pressures from the Ukrainian incursion in Kursk Oblast are impacting Russian operations in every sector throughout the theatre.
• Ukrainian forces continued to conduct assaults in Kursk Oblast on 31 August, but there were no confirmed or claimed Ukrainian advances.
• Ukrainian Defense Minister Rustem Umierov reported on 30 August that Russian forces continue to use airfields in Russia within Ukrainian ATACMS range – further highlighting how US restrictions against Ukraine's use of US-provided weapons to strike military targets in Russia are allowing Russia to leverage sanctuary space in deep rear areas to support military operations against Ukraine.
• The Russian military command reportedly reorganised the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics’ (DNR and LNR) 1st and 2nd army corps (AC) to create two new combined arms armies (CAA): the 51st CAA and 3rd CAA, respectively.
• The Kremlin continues efforts to define Russia's traditional and cultural values as part of ongoing efforts to codify a Russian state ideology.
• The Ukrainian Armed Forces Center for Strategic Communications (StratCom) announced on 31 August that Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi officially appointed Captain First Rank Roman Hladkyi as the Chief of Staff of the newly created Unmanned Systems Forces.
• Russian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk, and the city of Donetsk.
• Russian forces are reportedly unable to fight in Ukraine at full strength due to manpower and equipment shortages that resulted from the Kremlin’s ineffective wartime policies.

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