Russians not demonstrating ability to conduct large-scale mechanised manoeuvres near Kupiansk – ISW

Analysts at the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) have said that as part of the winter-spring 2024 offensive, Russians are unlikely to be able to turn their likely tactical gains near Kupiansk into the wider mechanised manoeuvres needed for an operationally significant advance. 

Source: Institute for the Study of War (ISW) 

Details: The review notes that Russian forces have recently made tactical gains southeast of Kupiansk along the critical P07 Kupiansk-Svatove road near Krokhmalne and appear to be intensifying attacks northwest and west of Krokhmalne towards the Oskil River. 

The analysts assess that Russian forces are likely to gain some tactical advantages near Kupiansk but are unlikely to be able to translate them into the broader mechanised manoeuvres needed for an operationally significant advance capable of capturing more territory in Kharkiv Oblast and pushing towards the administrative borders of Luhansk and Donetsk Oblasts. 

ISW stated that units of the Western Military District’s 1st Guards Tank Army and 6th Combined Arms Army of the Russian Federation are active on the Kupiansk front and are capable of conducting infantry-led frontal attacks but have not demonstrated the ability to conduct large-scale mechanised manoeuvres since their deployment in this area over a year ago. 

The report also states that Russia's expected winter-spring 2024 offensive is underway in the border area of Kharkiv and Luhansk Oblasts. 

Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov, the head of Defence Intelligence of Ukraine, said on 30 January that the Russian offensive in Ukraine is currently underway and that Russian troops are aiming to reach the Zherebets River (on the border of Kharkiv and Luhansk Oblasts) and the administrative borders of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts. 

Budanov predicted that Russian troops would not be able to achieve these goals but would likely be "completely exhausted" by early spring. 

Experts point out that Budanov's statements are consistent with ISW's observations that Russian troops have intensified offensive operations on this front since early January 2024.

To quote the ISW’s Key Takeaways on 30 January:

• The anticipated Russian 2024 winter-spring offensive effort is underway in the Kharkiv-Luhansk Oblast border area.
• Ukrainian officials continued to deny rumours about the purported dismissal of Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Valerii Zaluzhnyi.
• Russian forces appear to be continuing to violate the Chemical Weapons Convention to which Russia is signatory.
• Russian Army General Alexander Dvornikov was reportedly appointed the new chairperson of the Russian Volunteer Society for Assistance to the Army, Aviation, and Navy of Russia (DOSAAF).
• Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev made offensive and inflammatory comments about Japan while asserting Russia’s rights to the disputed Kuril Islands, likely as part of wider Kremlin efforts to demonstrate Russia’s support of China against the US alliance system in the Indo-Pacific.
• Senior Russian officials may be intensifying their attempts to frame and justify Russia’s long-term war effort in Ukraine as an existential geopolitical confrontation with the West by explicitly equating the US with the Nazis.
• Russian opposition sources suggested that widespread internet outages in Russia on 30 January may be the result of Russian efforts to establish the "sovereign internet" system.
• The Kremlin has been intensifying efforts to consolidate control over the Russian information space in advance of the March 2024 Russian presidential election, and these efforts support the development of the "sovereign internet" system.
• Russian forces recently made confirmed advances near Bakhmut and Horlivka amid continued positional engagements along the entire line of contact on 30 January.
• The UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) reported that the Russian defence industrial base (DIB) can produce at least 100 main battle tanks per month and is, therefore, able to replace battlefield losses, allowing Russian forces to continue their current tempo of operations "for the foreseeable future."
• Russian authorities are planning to increase the deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia in 2024.

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