ISW explains where Russia is likely to aim its new offensive

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) has said that Russia is planning an offensive most likely aimed at Luhansk Oblast, though it could also occur in the Vuhledar area in the western part of Donetsk Oblast. 

Source: ISW report from 27 January 2023

Details: Anonymous Kremlin sources reportedly told Bloomberg that Putin sought to conduct a new major offensive as early as February or March 2023

The ISW believes that recent limited Russian ground attacks in Zaporizhzhia Oblast may be intended to disperse Ukrainian forces and set conditions for an offensive in Luhansk Oblast.

In addition, Russia is redeploying elements of the 2nd Motorised Rifle Division from Belarus to Luhansk Oblast.

The ISW analysts suggested this recent development indicates that the planned Russian offensive mentioned in the Bloomberg report is most likely aimed at Luhansk Oblast, though it could also occur in the Vuhledar area in the western part of Donetsk Oblast.

This new offensive is extremely unlikely to target northern Ukraine from Belarus, according to the ISW.

Meanwhile, the Kremlin confirmed that Russian President Vladimir Putin was issuing preemptive pardons for convicts who serve in Russian operations in Ukraine.

The ISW previously assessed that these preemptive presidential pardons may be driving further recruitment within Russian prisons and will likely empower the Wagner Group to operate with greater impunity.

The ISW also reported that a visual investigation by a Russian opposition outlet confirmed that Russian authorities were deporting children from occupied Kherson Oblast to occupied Crimea.

Russian officials denied the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) report of explosions at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) on 26 January.

The Russian military command is likely attempting to restrict military bloggers’ frontline coverage to regain control over the Russian information space ahead of a possible new offensive.

The Russian military command may also be attempting to resurrect its previously unsuccessful censorship efforts targeting the critical community of military bloggers.

The effort to restrict embedded military bloggers in conventional units will not silence all criticism online, however, the ISW said.

"The Russian MoD’s tactic to suppress information from the frontlines would create a vacuum in the information space for Wagner-affiliated milbloggers, who have a significantly stronger distaste for the Russian MoD, to fill. Russia’s use of unconventional military formations will also undermine the effectiveness of such regulations," the ISW concluded.

Key Takeaways from the ISW report:

• Kremlin insiders reportedly told Bloomberg that Russian President Vladimir Putin was preparing a new offensive to regain the initiative; it may begin as early as February or March 2023.
• The Kremlin confirmed that Russian President Vladimir Putin is issuing preemptive pardons for convicts who serve in Russian operations in Ukraine.  
• A visual investigation by a Russian opposition outlet confirmed that Russian authorities were deporting children from occupied Kherson Oblast to occupied Crimea.
• Russian officials denied reported explosions near the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) on 26 January.
• The Russian military command is likely attempting to restrict military bloggers’ frontline coverage to regain control over the Russian information space ahead of the new offensive. These restrictions – if planned – are likely a part of the Chief of the Russian General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov’s efforts to professionalise the Russian Armed Forces.
• Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near Kreminna on 26 and 27 January.
• Russian forces continued ground attacks around Bakhmut, on the western outskirts of Donetsk City, and in western Donetsk Oblast.
• Russian sources did not report that Russian forces continued localised offensive operations in Zaporizhzhia Oblast on 27 January.
• Russian officials claimed that the conscription age would not change in the upcoming 2023 spring conscription cycle.
• Russian occupation authorities are continuing to intensify efforts to integrate occupied territories into the Russian legal and administrative structures.

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