Staunch US support for Ukraine, not rapprochement with Putin, is crucial to addressing the challenge of China

As the US grapples with the rise of China, a ‘China First’ national security policy has gained traction in some quarters in Washington. The main aspect of the policy is already well-understood in terms of prioritizing US defence assets for the Indo-Pacific region and shifting the primary burden of European defence to Europeans themselves. Less often articulated, but advocated for in multiple articles from ‘China Firsters,’ is the complementary hope of emulating the triangular diplomacy of President Richard Nixon and his secretary of state Henry Kissinger during the Cold War, this time aiming for a US rapprochement with Russia to counterbalance China. While prioritizing US assets for the Indo-Pacific is feasible if managed in conjunction with European re-armament, a US rapprochement with Russia under Vladimir Putin is fundamentally unrealistic, unwise and unimaginative.  

Despite being political opponents in the 1990s, Putin has always been an admirer of former Russian foreign minister, Yevgeny Primakov. Already in his first term as president Putin began following Primakov’s doctrine by aligning Moscow with Beijing in order to shore up security on Russia’s eastern flank and collaboratively undermine Washington’s hegemony. Putin’s interest in integrating Russia into Western political, economic and even security structures, mistakenly assumed that Russia would be accepted as an equal partner to the US and retain a sphere of influence over its former imperial subjects. That assumption was naïve given Russia’s diminished post-Soviet stature and unproven democracy, and anathema to its former imperial subjects who feared Moscow’s wholly authoritarian history. 

The Chinese model of authoritarian capitalism has always appealed to Putin, who believes that liberal democracy is fundamentally incompatible with holding together the rump of the Russo-Soviet empire that is the Russian Federation, while stability and prosperity from the Chinese model might actually make the federation strong enough to regain lost parts of the empire. The Chinese model also undermines the basis of US influence globally, which corresponds to Russia’s strategic interests. It is therefore unrealistic to think that Putin might abandon his alignment with China in order to strengthen the US vis-à-vis China. 

In reality, the only hope for co-opting Russia to balance against China depends on there being different leadership in Moscow. Russian and comparable imperial histories show that it is the unsustainable costs of trying to maintain empires that compel self-reflection, new policies, and often new leadership, in their metropoles. Denying Putin gains from his invasion of Ukraine that he can justify to elites and ordinary Russians as being worth the costs will significantly contribute to that process in Russia. Putin’s aging clan is working hard to transmit its grievances about imperial decline to younger Russians, therefore the sooner his generation is out of power, the better.

A China First policy that entails rapid reduction of US support for Ukraine before European states have re-armed to fill the gap is the thing most likely to allow Putin gains he can use to justify the costs of his invasion. A successful land grab in Ukraine would also embolden China in relation to Taiwan and leave European allies distracted, weakened and disinclined to assist the US in the Indo-Pacific theatre in future, either militarily or economically. Shifting the primary burden for European security from the US to Europeans themselves must therefore be managed without allowing Putin justifiable gains in Ukraine.

Moreover, Putin already owes a significant debt to China for enabling him to continue his invasion of Ukraine. It would be unwise to leave him secure enough and with spare capacity to discharge that debt if called in to assist China in future. Indeed, several Chinese scholars have noted that it is essential Ukraine does not deny Russia its objectives, thereby making the world more dangerous for autocratic regimes, such as China’s. That sentiment alone should be enough to give China Firsters pause for thought. 

Hoping for a US rapprochement with Putin is also unimaginative from a geopolitical perspective. A new leadership in Moscow compelled to abandon its imperial ambitions following unjustifiable losses in Ukraine would most likely feel compelled to re-establish economic ties with the Euro-Atlantic community and balance against China strategically. That, in turn, would force Beijing to divert attention to its northern border and would limit its access to cheap Russian resources. Further afield, it would leave Iran isolated and facilitate resource-rich Central Asian states’ desire for greater engagement with the West in order to reduce their exposure to Chinese influence.

Staunch support for Ukraine has already resulted in the depletion of a very significant portion of Russia’s deployable ground equipment, 30-40% of its Black Sea fleet, and staggering casualties such that it cannot concomitantly invade other European states or significantly aid China. This should not be surprising if one has in mind, as Putin always has, that more than 30% of the Soviet military-industrial complex was based in Ukraine, and a disproportionately large number of Soviet successes in World War 2 were achieved by marshals and generals with Ukrainian names. It is a strong, independent Ukraine, therefore, which will allow the US safely to prioritize its assets for the Indo-Pacific, and may also pave the way to a strategically beneficial rapprochement with a very different iteration of Russia in future.

Richard Cashman is a Non-Resident Fellow at the Centre for Defence Strategies