Reaching Moscow: how Ukrainian drones are making oil facility strikes possible and wiping out Shahed operators
Hardly a day passes without Russian oil refineries, military-industrial complex plants and logistics hubs catching fire.
Media reports often focus on the operators of long-range drones, who inflict most of the damage, but rarely mention those who clear the way by destroying Russian air defence systems and radars.
The line of contact has the highest concentration of Russian air defence and electronic warfare systems. It is while crossing this line that Kyiv loses the largest proportion of its long-range drones, known in Ukraine as deep strike drones, on their way to critical Russian assets.
To increase the chances of success for Ukrainian drones, fighters from the 1st Separate Unmanned Systems Centre, a formation in the Unmanned Systems Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, have begun clearing corridors for long-range drones by destroying Russian air defences, electronic warfare systems and other infrastructure used to counter Ukrainian UAVs.
Putting part of the enemy's territory under the constant threat of attack and securing air superiority there is an extremely complex task that requires meticulous planning, technical expertise and creativity from troops on the ground.
Ukrainska Pravda has spoken to Falco, an officer from the 1st Separate Centre. Read on to find out how the Unmanned Systems Forces are relentlessly destroying Russian radars and air defence systems in Bryansk Oblast and have established the ability to strike targets at Donetsk airport at will. The airport, which is temporarily occupied by Russian forces, is used to launch Shahed loitering munitions in near-daily attacks on Ukrainian cities and communities.
Clearing the way to Moscow
Russia's Bryansk Oblast, a key corridor for Ukrainian long-range drone operations, had long been one of the most challenging stretches for Ukraine's deep-strike missions. A network of Russian radars would detect long-range drones at an early stage, which enabled Russian forces to coordinate efforts to intercept them. The area was also used to launch Shahed drones towards Ukraine.
It was in this very area that fighters from the 1st Separate Centre had launched an operation codenamed Polyphemus.
The main targets for the Ukrainian military were small Russian radars used in the Airspace Surveillance and Control System (ASCS). These devices resemble Starlink terminals, consume little power, are easy to camouflage and can be deployed at civilian or military sites. They enabled Russian forces to create a continuous low-altitude radar coverage network. This allowed them not only to cue air defence systems against Ukrainian drones but also to determine their launch sites.
Remarkably, the 1st Separate Centre deployed just a single strike team, "Roni", consisting of six fighters, to dismantle this radar network.
Using a small team of fighters was a deliberate choice. A large-scale, complex operation to destroy this equipment would have prompted the Russians to deploy extensive countermeasures. Instead, they were unable to detect a pattern in the small-scale, precision strikes for a long time.
Serafym "Falco" Hordiienko, an officer from the 1st Separate Centre, told Ukrainska Pravda: "Our team's mission was to physically and functionally destroy these radars in order to blind the enemy and ensure safer passage for our deep-strike assets in the area.
We wouldn't be talking about this operation if it had involved an entire company of troops – that wouldn't have been technically difficult. What makes this mission unique is that we succeeded with a record-low level of resources, which proved to be entirely sufficient."
The strike plan for the Ukrainian drones was drawn up using both open-source and classified intelligence on the deployment and technical specifications of Russian radars. Without precise information on their operating range and fields of view, organising the strikes would have been extremely difficult.
Over the course of several months, Ukrainian drone operators destroyed around 20 ASCS radars. The Russians tried to counter the campaign by deploying electronic warfare systems near the radars, launching Geran and Lancet drones against Ukrainian UAV launch sites and replacing destroyed radars with new ones. The measures proved largely ineffective, as Ukrainian pilots repeatedly disabled the radars.
With minimal resources, Ukraine's drone forces established and maintained an air corridor in Bryansk Oblast. Russian forces lost control of the skies in this sector for an extended period, allowing Ukrainian long-range drones to strike deep into Russian rear positions.
"What matters is that the effect was sustained over several months rather than being limited to a single sortie a week," Falco said. "We anticipated every countermeasure the enemy might take, particularly how they would replace these radars. We were able to counter those efforts effectively and achieve all our objectives without committing significant resources. The key was using minimal forces in a highly sophisticated way."
Falco suggests that the Russians' fear of reporting losses up the chain of command may have contributed to the operation's success:
"If you look at the situation from the perspective of military psychology, the Russian commander responsible for this sector finds himself in a trap," Falco said. "The enemy is destroying his radars and by all indications, it's being done by just one or a handful of crews – in other words, relatively small forces. But he clearly lacks the resources to stop them.
But would such a commander ask higher command or neighbouring units for help? Probably not, because the leadership would see the threat as too small. If two companies were operating there, they could simply report: 'We're up against a large force and can't cope.' But if you go up the chain of command and say your radars are being taken out by a single crew, the obvious response will be: 'Comrade, how is it possible that you can't deal with a single crew? Are you even competent?'"
A fighter using the alias Tuco said in a video released by the 1st Separate Centre that the destruction of these radars has significantly eased the operations of Ukraine's deep-strike units. At the end of the video, he strongly implied that without the operation, there would likely not have been any strikes on St Petersburg or the Ust-Luga oil terminal.
Hunting the Russians at Donetsk airport
Securing an air corridor through Bryansk Oblast is far from the only significant operation carried out by the 1st Separate Centre. The unit's fighters have also conducted a sustained campaign targeting Donetsk airport, widely known in Ukraine by the acronym DAP.
As early as 2024, Russian forces began converting occupied DAP into a launch site for Shahed-type attack drones.
Preparations at Donetsk airport for strikes against Ukraine were no secret. OSINT analysts from the CyberBoroshno community publicly reported on the work as early as August 2025, citing satellite imagery that showed enclosed drone storage areas under construction near the ruined terminal. The runway was being prepared, and manual ground control stations, munitions unloading areas, air surveillance posts and decoys were also being set up.
The airfield was used by Rubicon, Russia's most advanced drone unit. The Russians chose Donetsk airport because of its robust infrastructure, underground facilities and proximity to the front line. It took drone crews just 10-15 minutes to reach their launch positions from the temporarily occupied city of Donetsk. The airport accounted for a significant share of all Shahed launches.
The short distance to the line of contact reduced flight times to frontline targets and allowed drones to be launched simultaneously in dense swarms to overwhelm Ukrainian air defences.
About six months ago, the 1st Separate Centre launched an operation to gradually disable this airfield hub and place it under the constant threat of drone strikes.
A video of a strike on Donetsk airport
The Centre's first strike was carried out on the night of 29-30 December 2025. Ukrainian operators targeted a logistics hub, a pre-flight preparation and maintenance centre, a central munitions depot, a drone storage facility and a staging area for personnel and technical staff preparing Geran and Gerbera UAVs for launch. Satellite imagery from 17 January shows the damage inflicted on the drone storage facilities.
Subsequently, the destruction of infrastructure at Donetsk airport was carried out along three lines of effort:
- First level: wiping out offensive assets. Precision strikes were aimed at launchers, transport and reloading vehicles and Shahed crews on the runway as they prepared drones for take-off. The Unmanned Systems Forces carried out the attacks at night, when it was hardest for the Russians to detect Ukrainian drones.
- Second level: destroying air defences. Ukrainian drone operators hunted mobile fire groups around the airfield perimeter, identified vulnerabilities in the airfield's defences and destroyed the groups' pick-up trucks despite anti-drone nets and their dense deployment.
- Third level: destroying infrastructure. The Ukrainian forces struck fuel tankers, supply depots and construction cranes used by the occupying forces to build new launch sites.
In early June this year, the Ukrainian military command announced that it has established the ability to strike targets at Donetsk airport at will. This means Russian equipment and logistics in the area are under constant attack, preventing the Russians from moving safely around the airport.
The constant presence of Ukrainian UAVs around Donetsk airport had long prevented the enemy from carrying out routine operations and disrupted the coordination of Russian air raids. The occupiers were forced to reroute their logistics and launch UAVs intermittently from more remote locations inside Russia. This gave Ukrainian air defence units more time to prepare for attacks and successfully intercept the drones one by one.
Despite heavy damage to the hub and especially its fixed launchers, the Russians continue to launch drones from mobile launch systems. On 24 June 2026, Ukraine's 28th Separate Mechanised Brigade released footage of a launcher mounted on a pick-up truck being destroyed on the runway at Donetsk airport.
Russian assets being destroyed at Donetsk airport, a video released in June 2026.
Inside Donetsk airport itself, Russian forces are attempting to adapt to the constant strikes. According to a satellite image dated 2 June, four concrete UAV storage bunkers have already been built at the airfield, and a new air defence position also appears to be under construction.
Maintaining constant pressure on Russian positions is difficult: despite UAV strikes and air raids by the Ukrainian Air Force, Russian forces continue building depots for attack drones and launch sites for jet-powered Geran-3 drones. However, in an interview with Militarnyi, a Ukrainian military news outlet, the Centre's founder said that similar operations to consistently destroy infrastructure are already being planned and carried out at other Russian drone hubs within the unit's operational depth.
Decentralised command is the key to success
The Ukrainian military considers the command-and-control model the key factor behind the success of both operations. Small Ukrainian units are defeating better-equipped and larger Russian Armed Forces units, such as Rubicon, largely due to differences in command-and-control structures.
Falco noted that the operations in Russia's Bryansk Oblast and at Donetsk airport relied on the autonomy of lower-level units combined with centralised planning at headquarters.
The Russian military still relies on a Soviet-era hierarchical structure. By the time information about developments near a radar or runway travels up and down the chain of command, to headquarters and back, the conditions on the ground have already changed, and Ukrainian drones have been able to destroy additional assets.
The Unmanned Systems Forces model takes a different approach. Headquarters provide planning, logistics, and data analysis but do not stifle the initiative of frontline units; instead, they trust troops in the field.
"Most of our current commanders in the field have worked their way up from ordinary pilots," Falco said. "We know that those on the ground have a better grasp of the finer details: exactly where electronic warfare is applying pressure at any given moment, how long it takes to deploy and from which direction it is best to approach a target. You always have a better view from the ground."
The combination of headquarters coordination and crew autonomy enabled Ukrainian forces to operate in unconventional ways. Pilots on the ground were able to adjust plans instantly, change UAV operating frequencies, bypass anti-drone nets and alter routes in real time.
"In operations of this kind, constant interaction with headquarters on target designation, continuous monitoring of all actions and the overall military command structure are of paramount importance," Falco concludes. "In our centre, this is organised in a very organic way and geared towards high motivation and operational effectiveness.
I say this as someone who has progressed from soldier-pilot to an officer in direct command, so I understand very well that motivation is a key factor in missions like these. If it is lacking, no technical means can compensate for it.
The high level of motivation among both crew members and staff officers overseeing the operation became one of the main factors working strongly in our favour. For that, I am very grateful to everyone involved."
By Sviatoslav Nakonechnyi
Translated by Artem Yakymyshyn
Edited by Zechariah Polevoi and Susan McDonald