Six months in Kursk: the problems facing Ukraine's defence forces

On 6 August 2024, amid all the other regular news during the third year of the full-scale war, such as the Iskander strike on Kharkiv, explosions at a military plant in Russia, the Air Force report on how many Shahed attack drones were shot down overnight, and the General Staff's report on the previous day, there was one unusual news item. 

The headline in UP was "Russian authorities claim attack on Russia's Kursk and Belgorod oblasts", and it went almost unnoticed.

This news item, in which Russian governors and local Telegram channels spoke about a large-scale drone attack that caused damage to homes, meant something completely new in the history of Ukraine and the world. 

That morning, the elite of Ukrainian forces, the Air Assault units, installed their "dragon's teeth", went behind enemy lines, took control of the Yunakivka-Sudzha border crossing checkpoint and captured dozens of Russian conscripts. That morning, after 10 years of war, the Ukrainians brought combat operations to Russian territory. 

The myth of a nuclear power’s inviolability was dispelled. 

The perception of Russia as an invincible country was proved wrong, its image of strength covered in cracks. 

Russian Civilians who lived near the border with Ukraine’s Sumy Oblast and had long been turning a blind eye to the war, pretending they weren't hearing the aerial bombs that were targeting Ukraine all this time, now experienced war for the first time.

Over the following weeks, Ukraine’s defence forces seized almost 1,300 square kilometres of Russian territory and more than 100 settlements. They also inflicted considerable losses on Russia: according to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, 6,000 Russian soldiers were killed and wounded. 

Every Ukrainian soldier Ukrainska Pravda spoke to in the first weeks of the Kursk operation was happy that the fighting had moved to enemy territory and believed that it could change the course of the war.

One of the wounded paratroopers who goes by the call sign Shen and whom we met in Sumy during the second week of the offensive, told us: "When you're on the razor's edge, riding high, you make waves."

These "waves" began to calm down around mid-September 2024, when the Russians, having brought in their stronger units, including marines, began their attempt to take back the territories of Kursk Oblast captured by Ukraine.

According to Ukrainian OSINT experts DeepState, in February 2025, six months after the start of the Kursk operation, the defence forces controlled just under 400 square kilometres of Kursk Oblast. This is a third of the territory captured at the beginning of the operation.

Logistics has become the key problem for the Ukrainians in Kursk Oblast over the past six months. 

In this article by Ukrainska Pravda, you will read how the Kursk front differs from other fronts, how the participation of North Korean soldiers affected the battlefield, why Ukraine needs Russia's Kursk Oblast, and the key question: what caused the problematic situation in which the Ukrainians find themselves now?

What is special about the Kursk front

If you asked an average Ukrainian soldier on the Kursk front how they feel about fighting on Russian territory, you would likely get a shrug and a response such as "like everywhere else". Until recently. 

"Everything is almost the same", a Ukrainian soldier who holds a command position told Ukrainska Pravda. "If we are going to make an assault there, we first prepare the area, fire at it, launch attack UAVs, monitor the group's actions, and so on. The only difference is that the support from the HIMARS is more stable here."

Russia’s Kursk Oblast has a remarkably similar climate and terrain to Ukraine’s Sumy, Kharkiv or Donetsk oblasts. It has the same fields, forests, and sometimes swamps.

However, several things, partly obvious and partly less noticeable, still distinguish the Kursk front from others. One of the obvious ones, for instance, is the regular supply of ammunition due to the political priority of the front.

"Throughout September, October, November, and December, we fired as much ammunition as we wanted. Two guns [Soviet self-propelled artillery systems] could use 60, 80, 90 shells a day. The last time I spent that much was during the defence of Bakhmut when the Russians were attacking very intensively", says an artillery officer of the 17th Separate Mechanised Brigade.

Another obvious peculiarity of the Kursk front is the problems the defence forces have with communications. Not all Starlink terminals, which are the key means of communication in the defence forces, work in Russia. Those terminals that can pick up satellite signals are installed mainly at critical points for the units' work – at the positions of UAV operators, at stabilisation posts, etc. All others use LTE antennas that boost signal reception from mobile phone towers, walkie-talkies or have no connection at all.

One of the lesser-known aspects of the Kursk front is the much faster pace of fighting than in Ukraine’s east or south.

In Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, battles for a village or even a city can last for months, and sometimes even years. The lines of contact move in predictable ways there. In Kursk Oblast, however, everything is very dynamic: there are regular assault operations from the Ukrainian side and then from the Russian side; there's sudden semi-encirclement and encirclement for several days.

"The pace of the war is much faster in Kursk Oblast, in particular, due to the fact that powerful [Ukrainian] brigades are working there", the soldier explains. "This is a small area where active manoeuvres and one- to two-day encirclements are constantly taking place." 

The officer of the 17th Mechanised Brigade gives another example of the rapid pace of combat particular to the fighting in Kursk Oblast. In September, when the Russians launched a counteroffensive, his subordinates were forced to withdraw from their position at midday, in the full danger of daylight, and retreat 5-6 kilometres to the border. By late afternoon,  Russian infantry had already entered the Ukrainians' positions.

Another less visible feature of the Kursk front is the sheer volume of Russian weaponry involved. The Russians use aerial bombs, FPV (first-person view) drones and fibre-optic FPV drones, which cannot be jammed by electronic warfare, in huge numbers here. In addition, the Russians are also using their rare Orion reconnaissance and strike drones. The Defence Express military portal, describing the use of Orions in Kursk Oblast, suggests that Russia is using this front to test these drones and their operators.

"A completely different war was waiting for us in Sumy Oblast [close to Kursk Oblast]", says a former reconnaissance soldier and now a combat medic of one of the air assault brigades who goes by the call sign Psikh (Psycho).

"Here, aerial bombs are flying everywhere as if they were launched from a mortar. Even if you're sitting 300-500 metres away from the explosion, you still jump from your seat. In Donetsk Oblast, we knew we needed electronic warfare, even though it didn't always work. Whereas here, we can state that electronic warfare is definitely dead because the Russians are very active in flying fibre optics."

The timeline of key events on the Kursk front:

• The morning of 6 August 2024: The start of the defence forces' offensive in Russia’s Kursk Oblast.
• 6- 20 August 2024: The successful advance of the defence forces into Russia by 25-35 kilometres in three directions: Kursk, Lgov and Korenevo. The capture of Guevo, Plekhovo, Sudzha, Kazachya Loknya, Malaya Loknya, Lyubymovka, etc. – a total of 1,300 square kilometres of territory.

• Mid- to late August 2024: Tthe defence forces moved in a fourth direction in Kursk Oblast – towards Snagost and Glushkovo – and tried to set themselves up along the Seym River. Around 18 August, Ukrainian forces captured Snagost, crossed the railway, and came close to the Seym River near Krasnooktyabrskoye.

Meanwhile, Ukraine destroyed one of the logistical routes of the Russian group in Kursk Oblast, namely bridges and crossings over the Seym River near Glushkovo.

• Around 10 September: The Russians, having pulled up their strongest units, launch a counteroffensive in Kursk Oblast.
• 10 September - end of October: The Russians cut off the left flank of Ukrainian forces, driving them out of Snagost, Lyubimovka, Olgovka and other nearby settlements. 

According to Ukrainska Pravda, the key reason the defence forces lost positions in Kursk Oblast was the weakness of the Ground Forces brigades, which acted as reinforcement units.

• 10 October 2024: For the first time, the Russians executed Ukrainian soldiers who were forced to surrender in Kursk Oblast en masse. Nine Ukrainian soldiers were killed.
• End of October 2024: The Korean People's Army, North Korean soldiers, enter the war on the Russian side.
• 5 January 2025: Ukrainian paratroopers conducted a spot offensive in the vicinity of Bolshoye Soldatskoye.
• 11 January 2025: Ukrainian forces captured the first North Korean soldiers.
• 7 February 2025: Ukrainian paratroopers slightly expanded their left flank, pushing the Russians back a couple of kilometres from Sudzha and Makhovka. 
• January - February 2025: The Russians used FPV drones to target Ukrainian forces' vehicles on the Sumy-Yunakivka-Sudzha motorway.
• 19 February 2025: The Russians drove the defence forces out of Sverdlikovo, a small Russian village near the border, and attempted to enter Ukrainian territory to move closer to the Sumy-Yunakivka-Sudzha motorway.
• Approximately 20-25 February 2025: The Russians crossed the border, entering Ukrainian territory north of the village of Novenke. The General Staff stated that they had been driven out of Ukrainian-held territory.

What is going on in Kursk Oblast right now?

"Previously, everyone, both the military and the press, went to Sudzha to take photos near Pyatуrochka" (a Russian convenience store and a well-known destination for taking photos in Sudzha), a soldier says. "But now it doesn't happen any more. It's too dangerous". 

The situation in Kursk Oblast has gradually worsened for Ukrainian forces since the beginning of January 2025. The Russians began putting more effort into gaining control of the main supply road for the Russian defence forces: Sumy–Yunakivka–Sudzha.

This problem is at the heart of the story of the Kursk operation. We will explore it in detail and find that it should have been prevented.

Firstly, most of the Sumy-Yunakivka-Sudzha road, about 15-20 kilometres from the village of Stetskivka and almost to the border, was in terrible condition even before the operation began. 

While covering the Kursk operation in August 2024, we often drove along this road and saw how the Ukrainian military had to slow down, and crowd and later had to repair their pickups more often. Even then, this road was like the surface of the moon.

On 21 October 2024, at the request of the servicemen of the 61st Mechanized Brigade and 80th Air Assault Brigade, Ukrainska Pravda appealed to the State Agency for Infrastructure Recovery and Development and the Ministry of Community and Territory Development, asking whether repairs to this part of the road were planned. We received a response from the State Agency for Infrastructure Recovery and Development, which noted that funds for repairing this road in 2025 are "not foreseen".

Secondly, during the Kursk operation, the Sumy-Yunakivka-Sudzha road was and still is the main one for the movement of heavy equipment – armour, self-propelled artillery, tanks and pickups. 

This heavy equipment further destroyed the remnants of the asphalt surface. The worse the road is, the slower vehicles can move and the higher the probability that Russian FPV may attack. The Russians know that this is the only route. 

Of course, there were and still are routes over fields on a certain section of the road from Sumy to the border. However, they can only be used in cold, dry, or warm weather. 

"When the rainy season comes, I do not know what we will do", says an artillery officer from the 17th Brigade. You literally drive and cry. The road is a huge problem for us." 

"One of our key problems in Kursk Oblast has become logistics, and building a chain of resourcing routes", explains an  officer of the 47th Brigade. Dividing the road into separate parts for tanks and wheeled vehicles would have been the correct way. Instead, we allowed everyone to use the same road. If there were more roads, we would have more sections that don't come under Russian FPVs. We lost a lot of vehicles this way".

"Basically, we needed to build not only more roads but also more border crossings. We had the same situation on the Zaporizhzhia front: You use three roads, and the Russians know them all", added the officer of the 47th Brigade.

The Russians began actively using FPV drones to target vehicles of the defence forces on the Sumy-Yunakivka-Sudzha road from the Ukrainian village of Pysarivka to the Ukrainian-Russian border in January 2025. This is more than 10 kilometres deep into Ukrainian territory.

On some days the number of vehicles attacked by Russian FPV drones reached 10-20.  

"The biggest problem right now is crossing the border. There are only N ways [number redacted for security reasons – Ukrainska Pravda] to reach Sudzha and beyond. And they are controlled by FPVs. Getting in and out is a huge lottery. We're no longer even talking about driving there with armour; it's already very difficult to bring people even in a pickup", says the artillery officer from the 17th Brigade.

Since February 2025, the Russians have gone further. They have begun to move towards the Ukrainian troops' key road. On 19 February, the Russians drove them out of the Russian border village of Sverdlikovo and then, after crossing the border, began to move to the Ukrainian village of Novenke. First, the Russians operated with their own sabotage and reconnaissance groups, then with infantry.

This is exactly what Putin said on 19 February, commenting on "entering enemy territory". 

Ukrainian forces reported that after Putin's statement, the number of Russians entering Novenke gradually increased. On 25 February, there were 5 of them, and on 28 February, almost 40. Every time the defence forces spotted the Russians, they destroyed them.  

On 28 February, Ukraine's General Staff confirmed the movement of Russians in the direction of Novenke by two mechanised departments (20-25 people).

20,000 Russians killed

Russia has lost more than 48,000 soldiers in the six months of the Kursk operation, according to a recent report by Oleksandr Syrskyi, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Close to half of them, around 20,000, were killed. 

To understand how significant this figure of 20,000 killed is, let's compare it with the Russian losses in the battle for Bakhmut. Oleksandr Syrskyi and Oleksii Danilov, the former head of the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine, said that they amounted to almost 23,000 soldiers killed. 

So, in six months of fighting in Kursk Oblast, the Russian army lost almost as many of its soldiers as in ten months of daily assaults in Bakhmut.

The losses of Ukraine's defence forces in Kursk Oblast are kept secret. Having spoken to several commanders of different levels to write this article, we found out that some units suffered fewer losses in Kursk Oblast than on previous fronts due to lower Russian artillery activity and less intense assaults. But some said the opposite. 

For example, Ukrainska Pravda is aware of 147 Ukrainians from one of the battalions fighting in Kursk Oblast for three months who have been killed there. This is almost three times the number – 56 – killed fighting for the same battalion over four months on another of war's most active fronts. 

"I used to think front N [unknown] was the bloodiest one I've ever seen, but no. We have suffered great losses here", says Ukrainska Pravda's source in the battalion.

The source said that the reason for such losses was not the Russian offensive, but rather the poor planning of combat operations at the brigade level – poor planning, the repeated deployment of people to hold unfavourable positions, and a lack of communication with allied companies resulting in cases of friendly fire.

For the sake of completeness, of all the people from the brigade we spoke to for this article, this source was the only person to criticise the brigade command. Most soldiers noted the high quality of the operation by the Air Assault Forces, which took over command of the troops in Kursk Oblast in autumn, and the interaction with the Airborne Brigades, which are the core of the operation.

Ukrainska Pravda is also aware of the exact number of wounded in another defence forces battalion, which has already been withdrawn from the Kursk Oblast. As of the beginning of the operation, 380 people out of about 500 (76%) were wounded. The exact number killed in this battalion is still unknown. 

Most of the injuries in Kursk Oblast are now caused by the FPV drone strikes, explains "Psycho", the combat medic.. We are talking about shrapnel injuries, traumatic amputations, burns. In some areas, soldiers can only be evacuated on an ATV (all-terrain vehicle). The evacuation time to the first point of medical aid ranges from 1-2 to 12-24 hours.

The commander of another artillery platoon confirmed to Ukrainska Pravda that his unit's losses in Kursk Oblast were indeed higher than on other fronts. However, he did not give exact figures. 

"We definitely have more losses here. More people refuse to complete tasks here. It was strange for us because we are artillery, working at a certain distance from the front, and the infantry would say 'They're not doing anything at all.' 

"Now, people often refuse to work here because of the unstable nature of defence. You get up in the morning and go to work, and then you get disrupted and quickly change your location because of the threat of encirclement. People feel very uncomfortable in situations like this. Also, everyone is afraid of KABs (guided aerial bombs). We have never seen so many of them before."

"North Koreans would die for Kim Jong Un three times if they could"

North Korea entered the Russo-Ukrainian war on the side of Russia in the autumn of 2024. 

The New York Times reported that in mid-September, British researchers had identified Russia's use of  Hwasong-11, the North Korean short-range missile, for an attack on Kyiv. On 23 October, Ukrainian Defence Intelligence recorded the presence of the North Korean Armed Forces in Kursk Oblast for the first time. Before that, the North Koreans had undergone combat training at Russian training grounds.

"The soldiers sent by Pyongyang are equipped with ammunition, bedclothes, winter clothing, shoes and hygiene supplies. Moscow will provide each North Korean with 50 metres of toilet paper and 300 grams of soap every month, as per the established norms", Ukraine's Defence Intelligence reported at the time.

The initial estimates of Ukrainian intelligence officers indicated that North Korea had sent approximately 12,000 military personnel to Kursk Oblast. Among them, 500 were officers and 3 were generals. By Ukrainian standards, this amounts to two fully staffed brigades of Ground Forces. However, calculated by generals rather than soldiers, the number of brigades is three.

This is a huge figure, especially given that these 12,000 "fresh" soldiers are advancing on Ukraine’s exhausted infantry, as all North Koreans are serving specifically as assault troops.

"They're not like our old men with a bunch of chronic diseases", a mortar unit commander who recently withdrew from Kursk Oblast for recovery told UP. "Although with the amount they are being deployed, they don’t even need to be given weapons – they could just throw hats at us, and that’s it. Their advantage in manpower is about 20 to 1. Neither our drones nor our artillery could handle such pressure. The Russians simply have more people. And the North Korean army is Putin’s ace up his sleeve." 

UP sources who engaged in combat clashes with North Koreans, or commanded units that did so, describe them as absolutely fearless, physically strong and resilient men aged 25 to 35.

The only factor that has worked in Ukraine’s favour is the North Koreans’ lack of real combat experience. They often advance in a straight line toward positions, cluster together, and fail to take cover from drones, making them easy targets for Ukrainian UAV operators and artillery.

"They’re not really afraid of anything", summarised one battalion commander currently fighting in Kursk Oblast in a conversation with UP.

"The Koreans are highly motivated brainwashed zombies who don’t yet know how to fight but are learning fast", said a Special Operations Forces (SOF) soldier who fought in Kursk Oblast. 

"Besides motivation, their physical fitness is insane!" said another SOF fighter. "They all look so fit that I’d say they’re all between 25 and 35 years old. And as for their brainwashing: they would die for Kim Jong Un three times over if they could. We captured some of their notebooks and decrypted them – they write that [the Russo-Ukrainian war] is a sacred training exercise before a war with South Korea. They also refuse to surrender, blowing themselves up instead. They hold a grenade to their head, shout something like 'For Kim!' and blow themselves up. A soldier who isn’t afraid to die is a good soldier."

This is supported by the fact that Ukraine’s defence forces managed to capture the first two North Koreans only three months after their arrival in Kursk Oblast – in mid-January. Both had served in the North Korean army for several years: one, a reconnaissance sniper, since 2016, and the other, a rifleman, since 2021. And just like the first Russian POWs, the Koreans claimed they had been sent for "training" rather than a war against Ukraine.

However, after recovering from his wounds, one of them – Ri, a 26-year-old reconnaissance sniper – shared a different version. He claimed he believed he was fighting not only Ukrainians but also South Koreans.

"Each battalion had one or two security officers from the Ministry of State Security [of North Korea]. They monitored both our duties and our ideology. Before the battle, one of them told me that all the drone operators in Ukraine’s military were South Korean soldiers", Ri told South Korean journalists.

Ukrainian troops on their experience fighting soldiers of the Korean People's Army in Kursk Oblast

Paratrooper "Brown" (a professional soldier who was wounded in battle with North Koreans in December 2024):

"Our fight with the Koreans lasted about 50 minutes. We had 5–6 people on our side, and on theirs… well, we definitely shot at least 10–15. We were in adjacent forested areas across a ravine; they approached us after breaking through a neighbouring position and killing two men there. Then came the firefight, during which they constantly tried to flank us. At one point, I turned around – there was a Korean behind me. Someone shot him. I turned again – another one!

Here’s how they operate: first, they send in inexperienced, poorly armed fighters to scout the position and number of its defenders. Then, they deploy a stronger force. To me, they’re just Russians with narrow eyes who speak a different language."

Combat medic "Psycho" (evacuated wounded comrades after battles with North Koreans):

"The Koreans advance in roughly three lines. The first is meant to bypass our forward position and divert its attention. The second immediately rushes in to attack. The third 'cleans up' – finishing off wounded troops and retrieving their own casualties.

There’s definitely a language barrier between them and Russian commanders, as well as conflicts with other Russian units. And it's not just minor disputes – like when fighters of Chechen Akhmat units clashed with the Koreans – it turns into full-scale firefights lasting a couple of hours."

A foreign volunteer from an airborne brigade (fighting for Ukraine since 2022):

"When I fought them [North Koreans – ed.], I was shocked by their tactics and their willingness to attack. They were significantly better trained than Russian soldiers and never retreated. I had hoped that the deployment of North Koreans would motivate the West to get more involved [in helping Ukraine – ed. ] and realise that this isn’t just a war between Ukraine and Russia – it’s a war that concerns the whole world. But, unfortunately, that didn’t happen."

The cost of Kursk Oblast

From the first days of the Kursk operation, Ukrainian military and political leadership faced criticism: why is Ukraine fighting on foreign territory when it can’t even hold its own?

Officially, these concerns were ignored as usual. Unofficially, military personnel – particularly in UP reports – explained that the army couldn’t remain on the defensive forever, as eventually, the defence would collapse. They added that trained assault units must assault, not sit in trenches. But that explanation wasn’t enough.

The only thing that somewhat eased the backlash – both among the public and within the military – was a noticeable rise in morale. A belief that the Ukrainian army could go on the offensive. And a growing understanding that seized Russian territory could later be traded for Ukraine’s own.

"It’s like chess: I advance more pieces onto the opponent's side to gain an advantage on my own. I think we want to make an exchange. And for that, we need to secure a strong position", paratrooper Shen told UP during the second week of the Kursk operation. 

Recently, Shen sustained his second injury in Kursk Oblast and is now in rehabilitation.

Another UP source, an experienced officer who joined the operation with his unit in the autumn, recalled a briefing with Ukraine’s Commander-in-Chief Syrskyi. At the time, Syrskyi was familiarising himself with new units entering Kursk Oblast, listening to their proposals on assault operations, and addressing questions – including whether it was legal to fight on Russian soil.

"Syrskyi responded: 'And was it legal for them to attack us?' Then he added, 'Don’t worry, we’ll trade that land [in Kursk Oblast] later for Donbas'", the officer said.

In early February, in an interview with The Guardian, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy publicly confirmed that Ukraine plans to exchange Kursk Oblast for its own occupied territories. But it won’t be about Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts.

According to UP sources in the Ukrainian government, the focus will likely be on critical assets like the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) in the city of Enerhodar and the Kinburn Spit in Mykolaiv Oblast.

"If the front line stops where it is now – I am saying this in the context of the negotiations we are heading towards, not in the context of whether this is good or bad, whether I like it or not – there are key territories that Ukraine needs to regain", says Roman Kostenko, a Ukrainian MP and member of the Parliamentary Committee on National Security, Defence and Intelligence. 

"These include, for example, Enerhodar and the nuclear power plant, as well as the Kinburn Spit, because these are ports, access to the sea, and we are a country with 70% of GDP coming from the sea. Also, from what I see: to ensure the operation of the plant [Zaporizhzhia NPP in Enerhodar], we will need the city of Nova Kakhovka. The NPP was cooled using the Kakhovka Reservoir, but now it has been drained. Therefore, as far as I know, the plant does not have a systematic cooling system. And here, either a new cooling system must be built, or the dam must be restored."

***

"Holding Kursk Oblast gives our politicians leverage in negotiations", one of the servicemen featured in this report told UP.

This is a pragmatic and accurate conclusion – especially given the stance of the new US administration, which prioritises business deals over democratic values.

Seizing part of a nuclear state’s territory is not only a long-awaited military success for Ukraine’s defence forces but also, to use Trump’s words, the "card" that Ukraine will try to play to its maximum advantage.

The Russians understand this too, as they continue their attempts to narrow the Ukrainian front in Kursk Oblast and cut off its main supply route. But so far, they have not succeeded.

Author: Olha Kyrylenko

Translation: Myroslava Zavadska, Yuliia Kravchenko and Anna Kybukevych 

Editing: Shoël Stadlen