Taras Chmut: We have chaos in the military command

Taras Chmut, head of the Come Back Alive Foundation, a Ukrainian non-governmental military charity, knows a lot about the serious problems on the front lines.

In his latest interview with Ukrainska Pravda, Chmut repeatedly emphasises that the government needs to urgently make difficult and unpopular decisions to remedy the situation on the battlefield.

"By delaying the mobilisation law, making poor staffing decisions, supporting certain officers’ ambitions to lead larger units, and repeatedly making mistakes, we have created chaos in the military's command structure," the volunteer explains, trying to hold back his emotions.

In this new interview with Ukrainska Pravda, Taras Chmut explains why Russia is able to mount such active offensives. He assesses the threats to Kherson, Dnipro, Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhia and talks about the fear military officers have of telling their superiors the truth.

Chmut criticises NATO countries for being weak, warns of the dangers of a frozen conflict, and suggests that next year could see the start of negotiations to end the Russo-Ukrainian war.

This is an abridged version of our conversation with Chmut. The full interview is available on video in Ukrainian.

"We're still retreating, and no one can stop it due to the chaos in the command structure"

With the change of government in the United States at the start of next year, along with the shift in rhetoric from Ukrainian authorities and some European leaders, expectations for 2025 are varied. Do you think we are moving towards the end of the war?

Year after year, we all hope that next year things will somehow improve. To be specific, we need to make it through to spring with heat, electricity, and a front that hasn't fallen apart.

In November you said the situation on the front line was "the worst it’s been since spring 2022, the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion". Is the situation getting worse now, or is it slowly improving?

The situation is dire. Take the Donetsk Operational Tactical Group, for example – this is a front where we've been retreating all year. We lost around 100 sq km of territory there in June. By September, that number had grown to 400 sq km, and by November it had reached 610 sq km.

Everyone from the president to the battalion commanders acknowledges that this is the priority and the most active combat zone. Yet the retreat continues and no one seems able to change it.

How is Russia able to advance so actively?

The Russians scale up their strong points, while the Ukrainian defence forces are struggling to address their weak points.

The Russians pound us with guided aerial bombs. Sadly, there is no obvious solution to that problem. The Russians are pumping infantry in, they’re using infiltration tactics, and they’re successfully using armoured vehicles to scale up this infiltration.

What does this mean? Small groups of infantry, three to five people with a minimum of equipment: one radio, water, an assault rifle, no protection.

The task is simple: reach a Ukrainian position or settlement, hide in a basement and do nothing. We kill some of them, but one or two get through. They accumulate, and eventually, they begin attacking from both the front and the rear. In some areas, we repel them; in others, we lose and regain our positions; in some cases, we are forced to retreat. Slowly, metre by metre, foothold by foothold, village by village, the Russians are pushing us out.

If we’re talking about Donetsk Oblast, how serious is the threat of the Russians advancing to Dnipropetrovsk Oblast?

(Pauses.) There are barely two dozen kilometres left to the oblast border. (Interview recorded on 19 December – UP.)

Let’s put it this way: does the enemy have the potential to attempt to take control of cities like Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, Dnipro and Kharkiv?

Let’s go through each of them.

Regarding Kherson: there is a big water barrier there – the Dnipro River. In recent months, there’s been a lot of discussion about them [Russian troops] preparing for a possible river landing. [The Ukrainian attempt to establish a bridgehead in] Krynky is a controversial episode in this war. But at the same time, the Russians have studied it well and drawn conclusions.

If you consider their warfare strategy, in which human life has no value, this could be a potential success for them. Why? Because the mirror image of Krynky would tie down significant resources of the [Ukrainian] Armed Forces, which are already in short supply. And the losses the Russians would suffer there are entirely acceptable for them [the Russian military leadership].

I'm not referring to the capture of all of Kherson. The point is that on the one hand, preparations for a possible river landing now and six months ago manifest differently, and it seems more likely now.

On the other hand, the Russians are turning Kherson into a desert, destroying civilian infrastructure, logistics, minibuses and ambulances, and dropping explosives from Mavics [drones] on people right on the street. Their task is to turn it [Kherson] into a dead city. That's what they are doing now. And sadly, the loss of the islands on the Dnipro River, the shift of the contact line closer to the right [west] bank, means that they can launch Mavics and First-Person View drones into the city from the islands.

Zaporizhzhia?

If we’re talking about Zaporizhzhia, the city is under constant fire, and the Russians are attempting to advance towards the city.

This is not the main front, although we were expecting major offensive actions a few months ago – it’s no secret, half the [Ukrainian] army was there. The Russians are saying openly that they want to reach it, but it’s not as easy as it seems, because the distances are significant. However, just like Kherson, under fire, they are turning the city into a desert.

Dnipro and Kharkiv?

The situation with Dnipro is slightly better due to the greater distance. But it’s a similar story. The same applies to Kharkiv.

Currently, the Russians clearly lack the capacity to seize any of these four cities outright. 

However, the chaos in Ukraine’s military command structure could lead to a situation in which the defence forces are spread thinly across the front, so that it won’t be individual positions or small distances, but across brigade defence zones spanning tens of kilometres.

A year ago, what’s happening now might have been dismissed as "You’re overreacting." Today, everyone looks at the map and wonders: "What’s going on? Why isn’t anyone doing anything?" It’s not that no one wants to act – they just aren’t able to.

​​Why can’t they act?

The chaos in the command structure is the result of decisions made in previous years.

We created this chaos in the military command structure by delaying the adoption of the mobilisation law, postponing appropriate personnel appointments, and encouraging the ambitions of certain young officers to lead larger units.

For example, one of the brigades we work with has 24 attached units. This means that the brigade commander, while managing their designated section of the defensive line, also has to oversee 24 different units in their area of responsibility. Can this be done effectively? No way. Is it possible to conduct combat operations efficiently – even defensive ones – in such chaotic conditions, with so many people, units and capabilities? No.

(Pauses.) We plug holes on the front line with these attached units, exhausting those soldiers. Meanwhile, we find replacements somewhere, mobilise them, train them, pull others out of recovery, and plug the same gaps all over again. The problem is that strategically, the problem of command and control remains unresolved.

On paper, there are plenty of troops, weapons, equipment and ammunition along the front line – yet the front is collapsing. It’s not because the soldiers aren’t fighting. It’s because of the chaos in the command structure.

Who should resolve this?

The entire chain of command responsible for managing the war: the president, the defence minister, the commander-in-chief, the chief of the General Staff, branch and service commanders, operational and tactical unit commanders – all the way down the line.

We must address this issue.

"Officers are afraid of upsetting their superiors – they tell them what they want to hear"

First and foremost, the chaos in the command structure, which we’ve already discussed.

Next is the quality of training and preparation for personnel – this is a major area where we need to improve our internal efficiency. Ammunition of all types, shortages of equipment and supplies – vehicles, communication systems, Starlinks, Mavics – everything the defence forces need.

Another issue is the unjustified expansion of structures and personnel.

Let me explain what I mean. Strike drone companies were established, they started working effectively and getting results – so someone said, "Let’s create strike drone companies in every brigade." They did that. Then it was "Let’s form battalions." They formed battalions – "Now let’s form regiments." They formed regiments, and now brigades are starting to appear.

Are all these military units fully staffed and equipped with technology, ammunition and supplies? Have we unlocked their full potential? Obviously not. But the organisational structures exist, some partially staffed, with people in various positions doing something. And the state is allocating resources for all of this.

The result is that we have an overwhelming number of different units on paper, but there are significant concerns about their actual combat readiness.

Unfortunately, we continue to multiply these structures instead of shifting from quantity to quality within the forces, instead of eliminating duplications. We must clearly define each unit’s area of responsibility, provide them with sufficient resources, and demand results.

Has Soviet-style thinking in the military increased or decreased during the full-scale war?

It hasn’t increased or decreased, but the ecosystem of the army has changed.

Why? Because incredible individuals from the civilian sector have joined – people who had never considered the Armed Forces as a career option before. They’re achieving extraordinary things there.

On the other hand, in some places, the opposite has happened – older personnel have returned, bringing back the culture they were once accustomed to. This is the old military mindset, where having a tag is more important than its substance and keeping a combat training log takes precedence over actual combat training.

Unfortunately there are many such individuals. And unfortunately they often end up in leadership positions.

Lies and widespread distrust. Why is this still so common in the military today?
Because officers are afraid of upsetting their superiors and they tell them what they want to hear, rather than the truth.

This happens because those in leadership positions often prefer to hear positive reports rather than face reality. Anyone who brings bad news, regardless of how objective it is, risks losing their position. This creates a vicious circle of distorted information, leading to losses of territory, personnel, equipment and other resources. This is partly why we’re facing the situation we have on the battlefield today.

At every level, it’s common practice to report up the chain that everything’s fine, the positions are holding and everything is under control, when in reality that isn’t the case. There are very few people in the military who have the courage to tell the commander-in-chief or other officers the truth. Kyrylo Veres is one of those rare individuals.

The media is constantly looking for a game-changer. At one point they pinned their hopes on Western armoured vehicles, then advanced drones, and later F-16 fighter jets. But the silver bullet still hasn’t been found. Is a real game-changer even possible in modern warfare?

It is possible, and it’s called people. We’re focused on technology, but we need to focus on people. People determine the outcome of a war, people fight, and people utilise technology – everything comes down to them.

We need to make radical changes in training and preparation, conduct a major overhaul of personnel, and transform the defence forces. We have to stop hoping for miracle technologies and start investing resources in exceptional individuals – people who stay motivated and can deliver extraordinary results both on the battlefield and in the larger strategic conflict.

We asked former Commander-in-Chief Valerii Zaluzhnyi about a potential game-changer in the war. He responded: "As of today, artificial intelligence will be key in this confrontation." How close are we to a point where robots, not people, will be fighting?

We’re not close at all. Once again, this war is happening here and now. While we’re talking, people are dying, people are fighting at this very moment.

The technologies Zaluzhnyi referred to are complex. They’re not going to significantly impact the battlefield tomorrow, next month, in February, or even by June. And during all this time, we have to go on fighting. The US experience shows that. They had the best weapons, the most advanced technology and the biggest budgets, but they didn’t win in either Iraq or Afghanistan. So is Ukraine, a small and relatively poor country, supposed to invent something and overcome a large and wealthy Russia technologically?

We must turn towards the people. That’s what Valery Zaluzhnyi said after he took over as Ukraine’s Commander-in-Chief. Years have gone by, and we must once again put people first on the battlefield and in the Armed Forces system.

"The main guarantor of Ukraine’s security is a united society based on a strong economy and a combat-ready army"

Keith Kellogg, the future US Special Envoy for Russia and Ukraine, has stated that Kyiv and Moscow are ready to talk peace. What are your thoughts?

If we’re talking about the here and now, I believe Moscow is willing to accept our defeat, but Ukraine is not ready to surrender.

If you look at the situation as it stands, what cards would we have up our sleeve if we were to sit down at the negotiating table? 

Wow (surprised). A tough question (pauses). Our trump card is that we are good and fighting for what’s right. And good must always triumph over evil.

Russia isn’t fighting for particular districts in oblasts that no one will ever find on a world map. Russia is at war with the collective West over changing the world order and determining whether the future will be guided by force or by the rule of law. If Ukraine loses, that type of global security framework will cease to exist. This means that all governments must move towards militarisation, nuclear weapons, and other types of self-defence.

Because in that case, all the treaties and international law won’t be worth anything. It will be a complete shift in the world order.

If the West wants to pay a much higher price and refuses to back us, eventually it will be at war itself. As long as Ukraine is at war, democracy around the world remains intact.

Do the US and Europe have the strength to bring Putin to the negotiating table on terms that are acceptable to us?

There’s enough strength, but there’s no courage. Their governments and societies are weak. Years of comfortable living have made them fear war. That’s normal.

But they fear it so much that they refuse to acknowledge the reality that we have already entered: that at some point they may lose everything.

They have money, they have technology, they have weapons, they have people. But for everything we get from them, we have to spend months, if not years, wrestling, struggling and begging our way through a convoluted bureaucracy, even though they could do it all quickly right now.

Volodymyr Zelenskyy often emphasises to partners that Ukraine must join NATO. Would Ukraine's NATO accession offer a genuine guarantee that Russia will not attack?

I have nothing against NATO, and I have nothing against anyone who is working hard to bring Ukraine into NATO.

But in my opinion, the most important source of security for Ukraine is a united Ukrainian society based on a robust economy and a combat-ready army.

So if I understand you correctly, you believe Ukraine's expectations of NATO are overblown?

I believe it's a parallel track. If we want to join NATO, we should. However, in the interim, we must recognise that our security guarantees are society, the economy, and the Armed Forces.

"Russia would f**k us over"

What does victory look like for us under the current circumstances?

(A long pause.) The preservation of Ukrainian statehood, independence, and an autonomous vision of future development. 

So what is defeat? What are the parameters indicating our loss?

Loss of statehood, loss of the country's territories, and loss of independence in deciding which direction to move in and how.

Would freezing the war be a defeat?

That would be a pretty awful scenario for us. Russia would f**k us over.

No matter how painful it is for us, we must push on. Because on the second day after the ceasefire, we’ll start arguing amongst ourselves: who fought more, who volunteered more, and who’s more of a patriot; we’ll start forming political parties and scrambling for power. And all the while, Russia will continue to rearm itself.

Some time will pass, and Russia will attack again. And it won’t make the same mistakes it made in 2022.

The day after the ceasefire, we as a country will have to start preparing for the next war. And I'm concerned we won't draw the conclusion we should have drawn in 2015. We bought ourselves time, but we didn’t make good use of it. Russia bought itself time and took advantage of it. But it made several big mistakes, and we pushed through. Russia underestimated our society and overestimated itself.

You don't think the war will end next year? 

I think the negotiation process may be stopped and restarted. Why? Because of America's strong position, Ukraine’s fatigue, and Russia’s desires.

But the conditions are different for each one. 

For America it may be "at any price". But we are not willing to pay any price. And Russia may still play for time.

So this is a game with numerous inputs, each of which influences the end result.

You asked me about the trump cards we might hold in the negotiations. We need a large number of them. This should be the strategic aim for the Commander-in-Chief, not holding onto some patch of forest.  

Kursk is a strategic victory for the country. Africa is a strategic victory. The shadow fleet is a strategic victory.

As long as we focus all our attention on patches of forest and individual positions, and dismissing brigade commanders – not the worst ones, and sometimes even the best of them – for losing them, nothing will result.

Roman Kravets, Ukrainska Pravda

Translation: Sofiia Kohut, Anastasiia Yankina, Theodore Holmes

Editing: Teresa Pearce