"Hell" for the Russians. How Ukraine was creating a super-drone and ended up with a cruise missile
Ukraine set out to narrow the gap with Russia in long-range weaponry by developing a next-level kamikaze drone. However, at one point, things took an unexpected turn and Ukraine ended up with a fully-fledged missile.
President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has ordered that 3,000 cruise missiles be produced in 2025. Although the Ukrainian defence industry has successfully completed this year's super-task – producing one million First-Person View (FPV) drones – well ahead of schedule, the target for cruise missiles appears, at first glance, to be entirely unrealistic.
Even during Soviet times, Ukrainian plants did not excel in producing large cruise missiles, except for the Kharkiv Aviation Plant, which has long since lost this technology. Ukraine has developed the Neptune cruise missile, which is being worked on by the Luch design bureau, though large-scale production is not happening at the moment.
It is, in fact, possible to produce 3,000 missiles next year. The only caveat is that they would be small in size.
While the Russians are increasing the size of their missiles, producing the notorious Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missiles, Ukraine is continuing to advance long-range drone technology, enhancing their speed, accuracy and power.
Ukrainian engineers conceived the idea of improving kamikaze drones and created a hybrid of drones and missiles. The new weapon occupies the niche of long-range drones, but its jet engine and advanced guidance system earn it the right to be called a missile.
Ukrainian companies are already mass-producing them and preparing to scale up production significantly.
A drone or a missile
The question of what to call small cruise missiles is debated not only in Ukraine. "But is it a missile or a drone?" asks an article in the American magazine The Warzone, which explores the concept of small, cheap missiles capable of hitting targets hundreds of miles away.
Ukraine has come to refer to such products as "drone-missiles," a term used by the Ukrainian president when he unveiled the Palianytsia turbojet drone missile system on Ukraine's Independence Day, 24 August, this year. ["Palianytsia", a type of bread, is a Ukrainian word that Russians find difficult to pronounce properly. Since the full-scale Russian invasion started, Ukrainians have used the word as a means to identify Russian military or saboteurs – ed.]
Information from open sources suggests that the Palianytsia has a warhead weighing about 100 kg, which is four times lighter than the Russian Kalibr cruise missile. At the same time, this is 2 to 4 times heavier than the warheads typically carried by Ukrainian long-range drones.
Another missile, the Peklo (Hell), was unveiled in early December. It has a much smaller warhead than the Palianytsia, making it resemble a kamikaze drone. However, it can reach speeds of up to 700 km/h [approx. 430 mph], while conventional drones typically fly at 150-200 km/h [roughly 90-120 mph]. According to one of Peklo's developers, technically speaking, the drone qualifies as a cruise missile due to the presence of a jet engine.
In a way, the term "drone-missiles" can be considered fair. When it comes to cruise missiles, Ukrainians typically think of Russian missiles, which carry warheads weighing 400 kg or more, travel at speeds of around 1000 km/h and feature multiple targeting systems.
In contrast, kamikaze drones are slower, carry warheads that are ten times smaller, and have less advanced navigation systems. Small cruise missiles, however, fall somewhere in between.
Why does Ukraine need small missiles?
Small cruise missiles mark a new chapter in drone warfare. Since the end of 2022, Ukraine and Russia have exchanged thousands of long-range drone strikes, continuously improving their technology in the process.
The Russians are working to mass-produce drones and make them more cost-effective. They use Shahed and Gerbera loitering munitions to deplete Ukrainian air defences before launching strikes with larger missiles. With a limited stock of large missiles, drones remain Kyiv's primary means of attacking targets behind enemy lines.
At one point, it became routine for Ukrainian drones to strike Russian targets several hundred kilometres from the border, but the Russians are learning quickly and are increasingly shooting down Ukrainian drones. As a result, Ukrainian engineers began to focus on improving UAV design to continue destroying military and oil depots in Russia.
Ukrainian plants have several challenges to meet at once.
The first is increasing the likelihood of a drone crossing multiple defence lines across the war zone, which is heavily fortified with Russian air defence units. Ukrainian kamikaze drones, powered by electric motors or internal combustion engines, move slowly, so the Russians have learnt to shoot them down with small arms or anti-aircraft guns.
The second is improving accuracy. Unable to deploy heavy payloads, drone operators are forced to target vulnerabilities in Russian facilities: transformers, warehouses containing components and primary oil refineries. Hitting these targets accurately is a challenge.
The third is increasing the strike force. A standard 20-50 kg warhead is often insufficient to breach the protection of targets and inflict significant damage on Russian forces.
To achieve these objectives, Ukrainian engineers need to equip drones with jet engines and alternative guidance systems and increase the size of the warhead.
Drone improvements are ongoing, but the drone platform is gradually reaching its capability limits. In parallel, Ukrainian designers have started developing new products – small cruise missiles – that could elevate Ukraine's long-range weapons to a new technological level.
The birth of the Peklo missile
Ekonomichna Pravda talked to the developers of the Peklo missile. For security reasons, the name of the company will not be disclosed.
The idea to develop the missile emerged after discussions with the Ukrainian military. UAV operators asked for a cost-effective weapon with a small warhead, capable of striking targets several hundred kilometres behind enemy lines.
The military never specifically requested a jet engine; its inclusion was an initiative by the designers themselves. In August 2023, the company developed its terms of reference and created the first sketches. From that point, a complex process of development and testing began.
The development programme lasted one year, was self-funded by the manufacturer, and cost several million dollars.
One of the designers explained that the first task was to get the missile airborne: before it could reach the enemy, it needed an initial thrust. Ukrainian drones are typically launched from a catapult or runway, though this is not feasible for cruise missiles due to their technical characteristics. Cruise missiles are usually launched from aircraft, ships or specialised ground launchers.
The method of launching the Peklo missile is currently withheld for security reasons. However, as development progresses, the company plans to enable launches from various platforms.
The next challenge for the designers was to ensure the missile could hit its target and, before that, teach it to navigate in space. The Peklo is equipped with at least two guidance systems: an inertial system and GPS.
An inertial system works by having a computer independently calculate the missile's position and determine how it needs to adjust its movement to hit the target using installed sensors and indicators. This method does not guarantee high hit accuracy, especially at long distances. Therefore, it is complemented by other navigation methods.
GPS guidance works by receiving missile location data from satellites. Its main weakness is the potential for interference from Russian electronic warfare, which can spoof the satellite signal. The only way to safeguard against this is by using controlled reception pattern antennas (CRPA), which block external interference. These antennas are both manufactured in Ukraine and imported.
The developer has not disclosed information about other existing or potential guidance systems but mentions that various missile variants are currently in development. "We’ve got to surprise the Russians," said one of the project managers.
Once the engine, electronics, and other components had been selected, the missile was sent for testing. Due to the weapon's long-range capability, testing often had to start at one Ukrainian test site and finish at another.
To save costs on prototype production, the company temporarily added the ability for the missile to land by parachute. However, up to seven missiles were lost during testing, which resulted in significant financial losses for the developer.
When the product was nearly ready, it was showcased to the military at a test site. President Zelenskyy was invited to one of the demonstrations, and Ekonomichna Pravda has learned that it was he who suggested the name "Peklo," as the weapon evoked the relevant associations.
The warhead's size is relatively small, comparable to that of a conventional long-range kamikaze drone. But, as the developer says, the missile gets the job done.
Ekonomichna Pravda has learned that since development began, the Peklo missile has been used in combat at least five times, one of which resulted in the destruction of a costly Russian military asset.
The Peklo in mass production
Once the development and codification of the Peklo missile were completed, it was swiftly put into mass production. There was no shortage of buyers, as the very same units within Ukraine's defence forces that operate long-range drones signed contracts with the company.
Over the past three months, the developer has produced approximately 100 missiles and is now ramping up production capacity. The exact cost of a single missile cannot be disclosed, though it is expected to be lower than the price of the Ukrainian-made kamikaze drone Liutyi (Fierce) [approx. US$200,000, according to Militarnyi, a Ukrainian military news outlet].
The developer states that the missile is made up of 70% Ukrainian components sourced from both state and private companies. Mass production experiences some bottlenecks, but these are being mitigated through the interchangeability of components. For example, the missile can be equipped with different engines, depending on their availability on the market.
The future of the missile in mass production will depend on its performance against the Russians. This will reveal how well the technology meets the demands of war and which areas will need further improvement.
Palianytsia, Ruta and others
Three Ukrainian cruise missiles, Palianytsia, Peklo and Ruta, were unveiled in 2024. The first two are in mass production, while the third is being tested. In fact, there are more drone- missile models, but not all of them have been publicly disclosed by the authorities.
The Palianytsia and Ruta have a larger explosive payload than the Peklo, so each of these weapons will likely be used against different types of targets.
The number of missiles produced in 2025 will depend not only on factory capacity but also on available funding. However, since the president himself publicly set the task of producing 3,000 missiles, the participants in the missile programme will not be left without contracts.
In addition, Ukraine has been using a mechanism to raise money for arms production from its Western partners for several months now. Lithuania agreed to allocate €10 million for the production of the Palianytsia missile for the needs of the Ukrainian defence forces. This could be a signal to other countries.
It is now possible to say that a market for small cruise missiles is beginning to take shape, much like the earlier development of the long-range drone market.
There will be large missiles
Drone-missiles will remain a specialised weapon, unable to fully replace large cruise missiles. Nevertheless, the experience of developing small missiles in the future may become an impetus for cooperation between defence companies for the production of longer-range weapons.
The development of large cruise missiles is a much more challenging task and will require much more time, money and expertise. All the problems that developers encountered when working with small missiles will be felt many times more acutely.
A project of this complexity requires support from the state and the military, which will be able to encourage companies to cooperate, develop precise terms of reference, find funding and components, and facilitate the introduction of this technology into the Armed Forces.
Ukraine has one key development in this category – the Neptune anti-ship missile. It is mass-produced, continuously upgraded and has recently been deployed to strike Russian ground targets. Additionally, work is continuing on a ballistic missile, likely the Sapsan, which successfully passed tests earlier this year.
The missile programme is one of the most secretive areas of Ukraine's defence sector, meaning not all projects are made public. In 2025, Russians may see new Ukrainian missiles in the sky, whether it's a Sapsan, a longer-range Neptune, or something else, just as they did with the Palianytsia and Peklo this year.
Translation: Artem Yakymyshyn
Editing: Susan McDonald