What really happened in Krynky. The untold story of the marines' landing on the left bank of the Dnipro River

"I don't want to make it sound like we were thrown to the slaughter. We could have opened a second front and changed the course of the war, as it was the case with the Normandy landings. But the situation became more complicated after the first week, which led to huge losses. Neither the weather conditions nor the geography favoured us," Monakh, a marine. 

"I saw people who were heroes," Hans, 35th Marine Brigade. 

One of the least publicised operations by the Ukrainian Armed Forces ended in July 2024: the landing of the defence forces on the left (east) bank of Kherson Oblast. 

Ukrainska Pravda found out about it about a week before it began, at the end of September 2023, and since then has regularly tried to put together, if not all, then at least a significant part of the puzzle of this operation. 

The Ukrainska Pravda team was concerned about two key questions: what was the goal and was it worthwhile carrying out this risky operation?

However, it was not easy to find answers. Experienced officers whom we had previously met at the front refused to comment. 

The first Ukrainska Pravda source, a wounded marine who introduced himself as Monakh (Monk), was so concerned about the privacy of the conversation that he contacted the team from different numbers almost every time before the meeting. 

Access to Kherson Oblast, where the operation took place, was consistently denied to journalists. 

It was only after Ukrainian troops finally withdrew from the left bank this summer that we were able to speak to soldiers, officers, brigade commanders, council members, volunteers and others who were aware of the operation. 

To put this story together, Ukrainska Pravda conducted about 20 long and detailed conversations.

In this article, we recall the role the UK played in the preparations for the operation to land marines on the left bank. We look back at the initial and modified tasks set for the military, and why they failed to achieve them. This article also recounts the story about the Ukrainian marines who sincerely believed in the success of the landing and risked their lives for it.

As is the case with every military operation, its history is written in the words of the survivors.

We decided to tell this story for three reasons. 

Firstly, to draw attention to this difficult and silenced topic. 

Secondly, to emphasise the complexity of the conditions under which this operation was carried out. And also the courage of those who carried it out, and especially those who were killed during its implementation. 

Thirdly, so that the people responsible for subsequent military operations do not repeat the mistakes made in Kherson Oblast. 

We admit that some of the information remains uncovered. And we are ready to give the floor to the military who planned and commanded the operation, in particular to Lieutenant General Yurii Sodol, the former commander of the marines, who has so far ignored our requests for comment. 

The operation to land the defence forces on the left bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast, to capture and hold part of the land there, began in October 2023. And it lasted until July 2024 – that is, almost nine months (almost as long as the defence of Bakhmut, for instance). The Ukrainian forces took the combat initiative only for the first two or three months.

The main forces of this operation on the Ukrainian side were the marines – the experienced 35th and 36th brigades (together with the 137th and 501st separate battalions, respectively) and the newly formed 37th and 38th marine brigades. As well as the 124th and 126th territorial defence forces brigades (the latter is now part of the Marine Corps), and the 73rd Special Operations Forces Centre. 

Some of the units underwent operations training in the United Kingdom. 

Initially, the defence forces tried to consolidate their positions in three places on the left bank, commonly referred to as footholds: behind the Antonivka Railway Bridge, between the villages of Pishchanivka and Pidstepne (the site of a solar farm, nicknamed Kliushka) and in Krynky. 

Initial footholds on the left bank of Kherson Oblast, where the defence forces were to gain a foothold

Approximately a week or two after the start of the operation, the marines abandoned the areas seized behind the Antonivka Railway Bridge and in the solar farm area. They focused on the most successful point at that time – Krynky (and the forest around them). That is why this operation was nicknamed the Krynky landing or Krynky.

Most likely, during the entire nine months of the operation, the village of Krynky never came under full control of the marines. They managed to recapture and hold about half of the village. 

The operation was led by Lieutenant General Yurii Sodol who was then commander of the Marine Corps.

Approximately half of the people interviewed in this text, as well as the commanders of the two units involved in those events, stressed in a conversation with Ukrainska Pravda that it was unrealistic to complete the tasks set within the framework of this operation. One of the interviewees took part in interrogations as part of a criminal case opened against his commander for disobeying an order.

The withdrawal of troops from the left bank was gradual. The 36th Brigade was the first to leave in the winter of 2024. The last, in July 2024, was the 35th Brigade.

The Krynky operation was preceded by several months of raids by the 124th and 126th territorial defence forces brigades, Special Operations Forces and Defence Intelligence brigades on the left bank. The most famous raid took place in August 2023 and was called the landing near Kozachi Laheri. 

The role of the UK, preparation and the Katran Group

The landing operation on the left bank of Kherson Oblast took place with the participation of the United Kingdom, which is perhaps Ukraine's most active and determined ally in the war against Russia. However, Ukraine still retained the key political initiative. 

From the very beginning of the full-scale invasion, as a well-informed source close to the marines tells Ukrainska Pravda, the UK, as a naval power, advocated that Ukraine should pay more attention to the south. In particular, they said Ukraine should start using a powerful branch of the armed forces, such as the marines, for their intended purpose, i.e. for waterborne operations and deceptive manoeuvres. 

The UK ultimately counts on the work performed by Ukrainian marines when it comes to protecting the coastline of continental Europe and critical water infrastructure.

Together with stakeholders on the Ukrainian side and the marines, the UK has been promoting the idea that the marines should leave the wooded areas in Donetsk Oblast and start conducting operations on the water. 

To this end, in February 2023, the then Prime Minister Rishi Sunak publicly announced that London was expanding its training programme for Ukrainian military personnel to include fighter pilots and marines. Shortly after this announcement, the first battalion of the newly created 38th Marine Brigade, led by Hero of Ukraine Yevhen Bova, left for training.

Nevertheless, the idea of transferring the marines to the water did not resonate with either the then Commander-in-Chief Valerii Zaluzhnyi or President Volodymyr Zelenskyy for a long time. Then the UK took an even more radical step, and an official delegation arrived in Kyiv in early 2023 to meet with Zaluzhnyi. 

At this meeting, which was also attended by Navy Commander Oleksii Neizhpapa and the then Marine Commander Yurii Sodol, Ukraine was trying to convince the UK that they could not let marines carry out waterborne operations because they did not have any equipment for this. 

To which the UK delegation replied with surprise that Ukraine had not asked the UK for anything for their marines since the beginning of the full-scale war.

"The British said: you need to show that you are preparing several battalions of marines to cross the Dnipro River, so that the Russians would start scratching their heads. Even the preparation for such manoeuvres would send a serious message to the Russians," a source close to the marines told Ukrainska Pravda.

Nevertheless, the British team persuaded Zaluzhnyi, and he said: that's it, we're creating the Marine Corps. The source added that these words made Sodol happy and angered Neizhpapa at the same time. 

The latter was afraid that in doing this, the marines, who are the backbone of the Navy, would be taken out of the Navy. 

But no one backed down. A few months later, on 23 May 2023, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy officially announced the creation of the Marine Corps in the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

At that time, the 37th and 38th newly formed marine brigades had been training in the UK for several months. Each battalion had five weeks of training in turn. During this time, British and Dutch instructors taught the Ukrainians how to overcome water obstacles: to cross a river, land on the shore and conduct operations on land. They also taught them how to properly plan headquarters work and task implementation.

The marines who completed the training told Ukrainska Pravda that they realised they were being prepared for something big and different from their previous tasks during their stay in the UK.

"We understood that after the training we would sail to the Kinburn Spit [its liberation would allow Ukraine to unblock Mykolaiv ports – ed.], or we would push on to the Dnipro River, or to Crimea – we had various guesses. And when we were told about the operation three weeks before it was to take place, we were aware of what we had to do. An operation to overcome water obstacles always involves losses of 70-80%. No one refused," says Monakh.

"The British gave us the same kind of area to train in as the one where we actually ended up performing the tasks, from the Kinburn Spit to Kakhovka," says a marine officer in one of the brigades, who asked that neither his name nor alias be mentioned.

The General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine announced the end of the exercises in the UK in mid-August 2023. It said that more than 900 marines had been trained in small-boat landing operations and amphibious assault.

Two marine officers who spoke with Ukrainska Pravda believe the landing on the left bank was originally planned for summer 2023, right after the newly formed brigades completed their training. However, the operation had to be postponed after the Russians destroyed the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant (HPP) in early June, which caused extensive flooding and erosion of the islands and riverbanks.

Another source involved with the marines and the operation’s preparations shared a slightly different account. They said that after the destruction of the Kakhovka HPP, Ukraine’s allies questioned why the marines weren’t seizing the opportunity, asking: "Where are your marines? Why aren’t they capitalising on the fact that the Russians’ first line of defence on the left bank has been washed away and launching an offensive?"

The marines did not proceed with an offensive as they were redeployed to Donetsk Oblast. This decision by the Ukrainian command can be seen as a strategic move to "break in" the new brigades on land before engaging them in a water-based operation.  

Between June and September 2023, the marines achieved notable success near Velyka Novosilka, on the border of Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk oblasts, outperforming neighbouring units in Robotyne. The offensive was led by Lieutenant General Yurii Sodol.

Sodol was later appointed to lead the temporary Katran operational and tactical group, formed to coordinate the landing operation on the left bank.  

One of the commanders told Ukrainska Pravda that Colonel Dmytro Palas had a notable influence on Sodol’s decisions. Palas was reportedly known for his urgency, often pressuring others to act with remarks like: "How come it’s morning, and no one is assaulting anything yet?"

The operation's plan and its feasibility

The operation, named the "Krynky landing", was clearly not aimed solely at capturing Krynky – a small, long village with a pre-war population of just a thousand.  

Two well-informed sources – one from the 36th Brigade command and another from the parliament’s Defence Committee – say the main objective of the operation was to push toward Crimea, reaching all the way to the Perekop isthmus.

To accomplish this, the marines would have needed to cover a vast distance – 80 kilometres into territory that had been under occupation for a year and a half by that time.

"The ultimate goal was almost impossible: reaching Crimea. We were told we only needed to break through the front line, which ran through the settlements closest to the coast – from Korsunka to Oleshky (40 kilometres along the Dnipro River – Ukrainska Pravda). And there was no second echelon. They were all spread out in a single line," a source from the 36th Brigade command explains to Ukrainska Pravda.

"The objectives are always set to the maximum in military operations. In this case, the goal was to reach the isthmus," confirms a source in the Defence Committee.

A more practical and straightforward objective was the second task set for the operation – to widen the front in Kherson Oblast and draw Russian forces away from the Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk fronts.

Essentially, the south was meant to continue serving as a diversionary front, as Ukrainska Pravda reported in September 2023. However, this time Ukraine significantly raised the stakes: instead of just two Territorial Defence brigades and a few special forces and military intelligence units diverting Russian forces from the east, the entire Marine Corps was deployed to take on this task.

"Our command realised that when we simply held our positions on the left bank without engaging in active combat, the Russians left behind their National Guard and other less essential forces on the right bank. At the same time, they redeployed their paratroopers, infantry, and marines to the Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk fronts. That’s why the command made the strategic decision to launch the attack from here," explains a source in the Defence Committee.

The most motivated and dedicated marines, particularly those who had trained in the United Kingdom, believed in the operation so strongly that they referred to it in conversations with Ukrainska Pravda as a potential game-changer for the entire war. They saw a clear parallel to the Allied landings in Normandy in 1944, which opened a second front in Western Europe.

"If we had been able to secure larger footholds at the designated points and unite them into a single line, it would have drawn significant enemy forces away from the Robotyne front and could have changed the course of the war," a marine sergeant known by the alias "Monakh" (Monk), who had high hopes for the operation, shared in a conversation with Ukrainska Pravda.

"The movement of Russian personnel would have taken weeks, possibly even months. This would have severely disrupted their logistics, weakened their operations, and allowed us to push them towards Armiansk," says Monakh.

In September 2023, the Marine Corps was withdrawn from the offensive near Velyka Novosilka and redeployed to the south, to Mykolaiv and Kherson oblasts. There, both the units that had trained abroad and those already engaged in combat in Ukraine had several more weeks for preparation, coordination and reconnaissance.

The Krynky operation was not hastily planned. However, as will be explained below, it wasn’t fully thought through in every aspect.

Some of the pilots of the boats assigned to cross to the left bank had prior experience in waterborne operations. In particular, the drivers from the 36th Brigade had previously transported soldiers from the Special Operations Forces (SOF) and Defence Intelligence of Ukraine (DIU) along the Dnipro River for attempted landings in the occupied city of Enerhodar.

"Our personnel trained in the UK and other countries, but the best preparation for overcoming water obstacles came here in Ukraine. We were able to assemble our assault group and work out every detail: who’d be the medic, who’d be the machine gunner, and who’d be the grenade launcher. We trained on the boats every day for nearly a month," says Hans, a fighter from the 35th Brigade who led a small assault group, in an interview with UP.

"We didn’t go abroad for training. Instead, experts from the Special Operations Centre and SOF came to us in Kherson Oblast to teach boat handling, what to do if it capsized, how to disembark, spread out along the shore, and launch an assault. Some were trained for combat operations, others for boat navigation. 

Overall, it was effective training. For many of the conscripted marines, this was their first experience working in water," says the commander of the reconnaissance platoon in the 501st separate battalion of the 36th Brigade, who prefers to remain anonymous.

Landing operation begins, focus shifts to foothold at Krynky

The combat order to carry out a landing on the left bank was given to the marines in early October last year, just a few days to a week before the operation. Initially, as one officer from one of the marine brigades recalled, the order was met with the attitude of "at least we can try". However, when the timeline and execution plan were revealed, the military's attitude shifted.

Rank-and-file soldiers, those who would have to carry out the operation first-hand, didn’t hold back in their conversations with UP, using strong language to criticise the command's plans. They expressed concerns like: "We’ve already lost a lot of people on the Zaporizhzhia front, on land – what's going to happen on open water in Kherson Oblast?"

Their command allocated 3–4 days for the three marine brigades to capture a wide 30-kilometre stretch of dry land, from the Antonivka Railway Bridge to Krynky, and advance towards the M-14 road. This would require pushing another 5–7 kilometres into occupied territory. In military terms, this was a substantial distance to cover.

"The order seemed insane to everyone at the time... Initially, three brigades – the 35th, 36th, and 38th – were to be deployed, with the 37th in reserve. We were tasked with capturing and securing several settlements, crossing all the trenches and fortifications. And we were to do this on foot, without any heavy equipment, using units already exhausted from fighting in Donbas. Perhaps the plan could have been realistic if we had had three to four times as many people," says the marine officer mentioned earlier.

"Everyone thought it would either be a massive failure or a major success. But in the end, it turned out to be neither," he adds.  

"So, what did happen?" we ask for further clarification.

"We managed to significantly reduce the enemy's manpower, but we also lost a considerable number of highly valued personnel," he responds.

The operation to land on the left bank began around 10–16 October 2023.

Each brigade had its own designated route along the 30-kilometre stretch that needed to be secured. The 36th Brigade advanced along the Antonivka Railway Bridge, the 38th headed towards the solar farm between Pishchanivka and Pidstepne (the Kliushka area), and the 35th Brigade focused on Krynky.

In the early days, thanks to the element of surprise and the fact that Russian forces were relatively weak, things went smoothly. The 36th crossed the Antonivka Railway Bridge (notably, the first assault group of the 36th was made up of a military band) and captured the village of Poima. The 38th secured part of the solar farm, while the 35th began advancing towards Krynky.

However, almost immediately, the operation’s biggest flaw – its planning – began to work against the marines. The 36th Brigade was the first to suffer. Its assault units, which had been advancing successfully along the railway bridge, quickly found themselves without the means to resupply ammunition, food, and, most critically, without any cover.

Here is a direct quote from a source in the command of the 36th Brigade:

"The railway bridge is just three and a half kilometres of embankment through marshland, leading directly to the settlement of Poima. On both sides, there’s nothing but swamp. We knew it was a one-way street with nowhere to hide. 

We asked for at least a basic logistics chain to be set up – 10 to 15 observation posts, so we could stockpile ammunition, food, water, medical supplies, and have an evacuation route between them. But there was no logistics support at all!

"We warned that it would be a massacre, but we were told to keep pushing towards Poima. We sent another battalion there, but around the 19th [October], the Russians hit us with Iskander missiles near the railway bridge. First, two or three Iskanders hit us, then they finished the job with airstrikes and tank fire. We lost 90 men, either dead or wounded."

The Iskander strike on the troops from the 36th Brigade gathered near the railway bridge, which the Russians featured on their Telegram channels in October 2023, was the first significant loss for the Marine Corps in this operation.

After this event, the 36th Brigade continued its mission to secure the left bank. First, they moved toward the previously designated Poima, then, together with the 38th Brigade, captured Kliushka and the solar farm.

"We were promised artillery preparation, heaps of support that would work in our favour: ‘HIMARS will fire like machine guns!’ But we were deceived in the end," a source in the 36th Brigade’s command adds.

"Who promised you that?" we ask.

"The commander, General Sodol," the soldier replies.

Around late October to early November, unable to hold three bridgeheads simultaneously, the marines withdrew from two of them, the area around the Antonivka Railway Bridge and the Stick, concentrating their forces on Krynky.

At that point, Krynky became the most successful area for advancing on the left bank, likely due to the larger number of soldiers deployed there, including the 35th Brigade.

The 36th and 38th brigades regrouped at Krynky after suffering losses at their previous bridgeheads. The 38th Brigade, according to Ukrainska Pravda, was the only one to transport equipment across the left bank.

Road to Krynky and the situation there

The central challenge of the operation to seize the left bank, which just weeks after its launch had narrowed to the area around Krynyky, was the journey to that very bank. The route was fraught with immense technical difficulties and relentless Russian attacks.

To reach Krynyky, the marines had to swim across the vast Dnipro River, land on islands, trek a few kilometres on foot through them, often waiting in makeshift shelters, holes in the ground, before crossing additional rivers, such as the Konka or Krynyka. The journey from one bank to the other could take anywhere from several hours to a full day.

"Have you ever watched the movie Anaconda? That’s what it felt like, the only difference is gunfire from every weapon imaginable. And it seems like there’s twelve and a half kilometres to swim" one fighter from the 35th Brigade tells Ukrainska Pravda.

It was impossible to establish a foothold on the islands. They resembled a swampy area riddled with craters from shelling and fallen trees. Digging in was not an option: as soon as one attempted to dig a few spadefuls into the "ground", the potential shelter would immediately fill with water.

As a result, craters from shelling often served as cover from artillery fire. According to marines, "shelter" from drones was sometimes provided by wreckage caught in the trees after the floodwaters from the destruction of the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant receded.

Some intentionally "got lost" on the islands to avoid crossing to the left bank.

The two heroes of this text, one of whom is a drone operator, received orders to set up positions on the islands to be closer to the Russians. However, they refused to act on these orders from their commanders, as doing so would have been suicidal.

The route from the controlled bank of Kherson Oblast to Krynyky became continuous and significantly shorter, taking only 40–50 minutes, starting around December 2023, after the smaller rivers were cleared of mines.

However, this brought only partial relief for the marines, as one of the key drawbacks in planning the operation was a severe shortage of boats and electronic warfare equipment installed on them.

Some of the vessels for the operation were provided by the Ukrainian Navy, but most were acquired by the brigades themselves, primarily thanks to volunteers’ help. For instance, the 36th Brigade had only eight boats of its own, while the 38th borrowed them from the local Territorial Defence Forces, which was already navigating the islands and the left bank, at the beginning of the operation.

Not all made it to the left bank and not all who did returned.

Among the most tragic stories shared by the heroes in the text were ones about having to return to the right bank on car tyres because there were no boats, drinking water directly from the Dnipro due to a lack of logistics, and wounded soldiers resorting to committing suicide because there was no evacuation.

"We had boats at first, but we started losing them quickly. Initially, they could carry 8–10 people, but we used boats that could take three people after all those were destroyed. For example, it took three boats to get me out when I was injured," Hans from the 35th Brigade said to Ukrainska Pravda.

Boats were available for purchase but were expensive. For instance, the cost of one inflatable boat provided to the marines by the Serhiy Prytula Charity Foundation was 388,000 UAH (approximately US$9,413).

"Not every unit had its own boat. There was a designated boat with a driver. I remember the chief of intelligence from the 38th Brigade calling me and asking if we had a boat because theirs broke down and they needed to evacuate an injured soldier. Of course, we couldn’t say, ‘We won’t help.’ We went because we had to get our people. 

By the way, we didn’t have just any old fishing boats. We had good US ones reinforced with inflatable pontoons. They wouldn’t survive a direct hit from an FPV drone, but it could still make it to shore if a shell landed in the water and only shrapnel hit the boat. The pontoons would automatically inflate if damaged.

There were hardly any electronic warfare systems on the boats. There was a general large EW system that was used to protect landing points for the troops," the reconnaissance platoon commander from the 501st Battalion explains.

The landing points on the left bank, according to Ukrainska Pravda’s sources, were among the most dangerous locations where Ukrainian soldiers frequently sustained injuries or were killed, because the Russsians immediately targeted them with artillery.

Every second mattered during landings. For example, reconnaissance troops from the 501st Battalion, who had trained to disembark in full gear and life jackets, abandoned the use of life jackets during the actual operation.

"Detaching a life jacket on shore takes about half a minute, and there may be casualties during that time," the reconnaissance platoon commander of the 501st Battalion says.

Small groups of marines, nicknamed "camels" or "logisticians", often waited near the shore. Their job was to help orient those who had just arrived by boat.

A source connected to the marines and the preparation of this operation told Ukrainska Pravda that allies were ready to provide everything needed for the marines – from boats to life jackets. However, the failure lay on Ukraine's side. The higher military command, which reportedly received a list of everything required from the marines in late spring 2023, did not pass these lists on to Ukraine's partners.

According to military hierarchy and bureaucratic rules, the Navy, commanded by Vice Admiral Oleksii Neizhpapa, was supposed to act as the intermediary between the marines and the higher military command.

When contacted by Ukrainska Pravda, the Navy's press service stated by phone that Neizhpapa was practically uninvolved in the operation. They suggested directing all inquiries to the General Staff of Ukraine.

​​The General Staff, when asked by Ukrainska Pravda who was responsible for ensuring the operation's supplies and other questions, responded that this information "is a state secret and is not subject to public disclosure".

Two unrelated sources interviewed for this article mentioned strained relations between Neizhpapa and Sodol.

Krynky still resembled a village at the beginning of the operation, in October–November 2023, according to soldiers from the 35th Brigade. The houses had not been fully destroyed and even had roofs. In one of them, the soldiers indulged in an almost unheard-of luxury for military conditions – sleeping in an upstairs room.

Civilians had already left Krynky by the autumn of 2023. The only inhabitants were cats, dogs, chickens, coypu and one horse. Hans from the 35th Brigade, who led his assault group into Krynky for the first time on 27 October 2023, recalled that day vividly.

"I panicked a bit on 27 October, but I tried not to show it. We landed on the shore, fell into the silt and I lost my sleeping bag and mat, left with just my rifle. We were supposed to have a guide, but he wasn’t there. These things happen [laughs]. I saw a bed of reeds with a path running through it, so we ran along it looking for cover.

Our platoon’s senior sergeant, Yudzhyk, got stuck waist-deep in the mud. I ordered another soldier, Anton, to pull him out. Anton replied he didn’t have the strength, we were already exhausted. So I took Anton’s gear and he managed to pull Yudzhyk out with less weight on him. After leaving them in a basement, I returned to the shore and shouted [to the next crews arriving in Krynky] to follow my voice. The boat was supposed to carry three people, but there were 13 of us in the group.

We settled in abandoned Russian trenches near the shore and guided the others as they arrived. Our strongest unit, the 137th Battalion, advanced into the centre of Krynky ahead of us. We moved closer to Kozachi Laheri. We were pushing the Russians out street by street. We were proud of ourselves."

In Hans' group of 13 people, there were no fatalities throughout the operation, which he is immensely relieved about. However, all were injured, three of them seriously. 

One of those seriously injured, a 42-year-old soldier, aka Yazva, sustained an injury to his arm in December 2023. He attempted to leave Krynky by boat twice, but a Russian FPV drone struck the boat during the second attempt, injuring Yazva in the side as well.

He managed to get to the island, swimming with just one arm – and then spent six hours walking back and forth on the shore, soaking wet, for six hours – from midnight until 06:00 on 11 December – to avoid freezing to death. His brothers-in-arms later found out that Yazva survived, though he lost his arm. It was amputated in Kherson. Yazva has since left the army.

Most marines from Hans’s group have transferred to different units after rehabilitation.

Two unrelated sources told Ukrainska Pravda that Lieutenant General Sodol, who oversaw the operation, went out to Krynky during the operation’s early phase in autumn 2023 to show rank-and-file soldiers and their commanders that it was possible to do what he was asking them to do.

While carrying out the assault on Krynky, the marines were also trying to recapture the woods on both sides of the village, stretching out towards Kozachi Laheri and towards Korsunka. But it was difficult to do this in a dense forest where you could hardly see your opponent; and besides, the Russians had sound logistics infrastructure in the area. And with the onset of the cold, it became more and more difficult to hold the defence while holed up in the woods, with only a cover of branches for warmth – and occasional visits to the village to warm up. Some spent up to two months in the forest.

Meanwhile, the forest was strewn with the bodies of Russian soldiers, according to the marines’ testimonies. The plan to draw the enemy forces away and grind them down worked. The Russians were being killed by Ukrainian artillery and drones.

The longer the operation lasted, the more the Ukrainian forces’ supply line, which stretched across the river and had not been thought through during the operation’s planning stage. Marines brigades turned to the Serhiy Prytula Foundation for help, Andrii Shuvalov, the foundation’s director, told Ukrainska Pravda.

"We searched for ways to transport cargo – ammunition, food, water, everything – across the river. Together with the marines, we found a hexacopter that can carry up to 20 kilograms. The firm Khomka gave us seven million hryvnias [US$169,790 – ed.] and we bought eight hexacopters and 40 Mamonts, or 10-inch FPV drones, that could carry cargo. We gave two hexacopters and 10 Mamonts to each of the four brigades: the 35th, the 36th, the 37th and the 38th," Shuvalov explains. "That worked, and the guys were really grateful."

The drones were used to deliver all sorts of things to the left bank, even blood for transfusions, according to combat medics from one of the marines’ units.

Most Ukrainska Pravda sources say winter 2023–2024 was the time when the situation on the left bank started to really deteriorate. That was when the Russians transferred lots of their assault forces there, deployed glide bombs to destroy a large part of the village, and figured out how best to target Ukrainian forces’ river routes, especially at the turns, where the boats had to slow down, and landing points.

The Ukrainians’ manoeuvres slowed down and Krynky stood cratered like the moon.

"Each time our battalion entered [Krynky], the situation got worse and worse. People got there, only to die. We had no idea what was going on. Everyone I knew who was deployed to Krynky are dead," an aerial reconnaissance officer from the 36th Brigade who conducted reconnaissance in the vicinity of Krynky for six months tells Ukrainska Pravda.

"From late winter or early spring, things really took a dark turn. The boats could no longer reach the left bank. Entry points where the Konka merges with Dnipro were being fired at [by the Russians]. Boats were shot at on approach – or a boat would manage to get [to the left bank], pick people up, and then get destroyed as it tried to exit," a marine officer says.

He continues: "At some point, no boat could get through. And everyone realised that we would no longer be able to get our people out of there. We dropped vests from drones to the last of our troops who remained there and they had to swim back."

In winter 2024, Ukrainian forces started to gradually withdraw from the left bank, while the Russians were bringing in reserves. By May, the situation was a disaster. The last of the marines, from the 35th Brigade, withdrew from the left bank in July 2024.

Most people we spoke to for this article are convinced that the operation dragged on for at least several months longer than it should have.

"We had to withdraw in spring at the latest, during the foggy season. We could have got all of our soldiers out at that point. It would’ve saved people’s lives. But instead we waited until nothing could be done any longer. Until the very last moment," a marine officer says gravely.

The operation’s aftermath

Unfortunately, the landing operation on Dnipro’s left bank did not help the Ukrainian army advance towards the Crimean isthmus or even the M-14 highway 5–7 kilometres inland.

Ukrainska Pravda sources in the defence committee, as well as officers and soldiers who took part in the landing operation, say that the operation’s major achievement was the large number of Russian soldiers killed there, and the fact that Russian troops had to be withdrawn from other fronts and deployed there.

An aerial reconnaissance officer from the 36th Brigade says that Ukrainian forces were destroying modern Russian T-90 tanks in Korsunka, a village to the north of Krynky. 

While the left bank operation lasted, the rate of the Russians’ advance in Donetsk, Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhia oblasts really were slower than now, when two fronts at once are on the verge of collapse, the Pokrovsk and the Kurakhove fronts. However, it is unlikely that this is solely due to the fact that Russian forces were syphoned off to Kherson Oblast.

No data on the numbers of Russian soldiers killed or Russian equipment destroyed on the left bank has been disclosed in the 10 months of the operation, in contrast to the ready availability of such numbers for the Ukrainian offensive in Russia’s Kursk Oblast. When asked, the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine said this information "constitutes a state secret and is not subject to public disclosure".

Military and political leaders, who should be boasting about this operation to Ukraine’s allies, are not particularly vocal about Krynky, preferring to remain silent on the issue. Valerii Zaluzhnyi, who was the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine at the time, has never issued a public statement about the operation. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy limited his comments to something about "securely holding the bridgehead".

Meanwhile, think about how much has been said about Bakhmut.

Last summer, Slidstvo Info investigators said, with reference to the Ukrainian police, that 788 Ukrainian soldiers went missing in Krynky between October 2023 and June 2024. This information caused a stir. Ukrainska Pravda has found out that one of the marines brigades lost around 700 personnel (dead and injured) during the operation.

Is it possible to say whether the operation was warranted and justified? Not without data.

Was it possible to better plan this operation and ensure the Ukrainian forces had better access to resources? Absolutely. Ukraine could have asked allies to help with boats and vests, and secured supply lines.

Was it possible to keep attacking Russian forces on the left bank without a landing operation? Many people interviewed for this article said on multiple occasions that the Russians suffered the majority of losses on the left bank from Ukrainian artillery and drone strikes. Close-range firefights largely took place during the operation’s first and second months.

The marine officer often mentioned in this article is convinced that if the Ukrainian army did not land on the left bank, Russia would not have transferred its reserve troops there, so there would have been no one to grind down. Firing on the Russians from the Ukrainian-controlled right bank would not have had the desired results.

Was it possible not to aim for Krynky at all? In theory, yes. In practice, people have different opinions on this, depending on their role in and proximity to the operation.

An Ukrainska Pravda source in the defence committee – not in the Marines, but highly informed about the operation and the overall situation on the front – is convinced that given the lack of personnel and ammunition it faces, Ukraine cannot just remain on the defensive forever. The defences will eventually crumble, like what is currently happening in Donetsk Oblast.

Ukraine’s defence forces are forced to take risks and regain the initiative.

"There are many ways and methods to achieve victory at war, but not in individual battles," the officer says.

Another source, the commander of one of the brigades that took part in the operation, likens it to a stillborn child. He says that even if the marines were able to secure the three bridgeheads on the left bank, they would not have had enough troops to hold them.

"If I were him [Lieutenant General Sodol], I wouldn’t have undertaken this operation. Even if we were able to do what we wanted, we still would have gained nothing. Because then we would have had to [get more forces to those bridgeheads]. But how could we do that? We only have brigades that have been drained of their life force. Where are the reserves? But it didn’t come from Sodol, it came from political leadership," the brigade commander says.

Marines from Hans’s 35th Brigade group whose stories we recounted above asked us to mention that they hoped that the Krynky operation would make the state realise the marines’ contribution to this war. And that civilians keep supporting the Ukrainian army.

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Lieutenant General Yurii Sodol, the former Marines commander who oversaw the Ukrainian landing on Dnipro’s left bank in Kherson Oblast, has seen the message from the Ukrainska Pravda journalist asking for his comment about the operation. But he has not replied. On 1 November, it became known that Sodol had been dismissed from the Armed Forces following the outcome of a military medical exam.

Valerii Zaluzhnyi, who was the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine at the time of the operation, is now serving as Ukraine’s Ambassador to the UK.

As of late 2024, all of Dnipro’s left bank in Kherson Oblast is under Russian control. The Defence Forces of the South say that some of the islands between the two banks are controlled by Ukrainian forces.

"Just as we had a bridgehead in Krynky several months ago, so the enemy keeps trying to possibly gain a similar foothold on our right bank," Vladyslav Voloshyn, spokesman for the Defence Forces of the South, has recently said on the national 24/7 newscast.

Brigades of marines are now fighting on the ground, on the Pokrovsk and Kursk fronts. The war is ongoing.

Olha Kyrylenko, Ukrainska Pravda

Translation: Myroslava Zavadska, Sofiia Kohut, Tetiana Buchkovska and Olya Loza

Editing: Susan McDonald