Occupied Donbas: Dark territories on the brink of extinction, where normal life is gone for good – Denys Kazanskyi
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For ten years, Ukrainian blogger and journalist Denys Kazanskyi has been closely monitoring and analysing Russian propaganda on a daily basis, tirelessly exposing its fabrications.
"I’m probably their most loyal viewer, their most disciplined fan," Kazanskyi jokes. "Honestly, no one watches as much of this content as I do. I've seen every single interview with Strelkov. No other 'admirer' of Girkin would do that, I'm absolutely certain of that, and I’d like to emphasise that." [Igor Girkin (aka Strelkov) is a former Russian intelligence officer and one of the key figures in the early stages of Russia's war against Ukraine, known for his role in the occupation of Donbas – ed.]
Born and raised in Donetsk, Denys has an intimate understanding of the region, which he has explored in detail in his books, Black Fever and How Ukraine Lost Donbas.
When Russia’s aggression began in 2014, Kazanskyi was forced to relocate to Kyiv. Despite this, he continues to closely monitor life in the Russian-occupied territories and in his hometown.
How has the Russian occupation reshaped the elites in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts and impacted the region’s development? What are the narratives that Russian propaganda feeds to its audience? And how can anyone study Russian media in depth without going crazy – or even starting to believe it?
Ukrainska Pravda discussed all these issues with Denys Kazanskyi. This is an abridged version of our conversation – the full interview is available on Ukrainska Pravda's YouTube channel.
"I study delusional Russians"
You are one of the few people who meticulously track and analyse Russian propaganda. How many hours a day do you spend watching this content?
Probably more than eight hours a day. It’s a significant part of my life.
Fortunately I’ve found some people to help me now. For instance, there’s a young woman who reviews the content I ask her to and cuts it down into clips.
If it weren’t for Russia’s constant aggression, I’d probably focus on something entirely different: perhaps I’d be a science populariser or a literary critic, run a history blog or write about intriguing facts. But instead, I’m compelled to study delusional individuals. That’s just the reality we live in.
How do you manage to watch Russian propaganda without losing your mind or starting to believe it yourself?
I’m often asked: "How have you not gone mad from all this?"
But no matter how much I’ve watched or listened, the only thought I ever have in my mind is: "How on earth can anyone believe this? How can anyone fall for it? What, for heaven’s sake, could possibly be appealing about it?!"
It's just one long stream of filth and insults. They’re constantly trying to dominate, humiliate, force people into submission, or strip people of their rights. When I look at figures like Dugin or Malofeyev, it's just a grotesque blend of bigotry, hatred, antisemitism and Ukrainophobia. You'd have to be completely out of touch with reality to believe it or find anything appealing in it. [Aleksandr Dugin is an ultranationalist Russian philosopher; Konstantin Malofeyev, the "Orthodox oligarch", has been a major funder of separatism in Ukraine – ed.]
It seems to me this propaganda is aimed at life’s underachievers – people who have failed to accomplish much in life and need something to gloat over to feel better. It shouldn’t work at all, and yet, somehow, it does.
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What’s the most absurd fake story you've come across in Russian propaganda?
The one about "combat locusts" has to be one of the best.
They [the Russians – ed.] captured a fish farm somewhere in Luhansk Oblast. The farm bred fish, so naturally they had some feed, including locusts. In the footage you can see loads of dead insects scattered all over the floor, and a woman in a balaclava is explaining that they are "genetically modified combat locusts" that were "specifically bred" to "march towards the Luhansk and Donetsk People’s Republics and Russia to destroy crops". It was an absolute masterpiece of absurdity!
There was another story where a woman from the occupied territories was describing "a Ukrainian pilot bombing civilians in Donbas". She said: "I saw the plane flying, and the pilot was laughing. Can you imagine? He was smiling at me and firing on us." I mean, they describe things that are physically impossible! It’s just blatant lies.
And honestly, this astonishes me. They could always come up with something that’s at least somewhat believable – something that might actually have happened. But sometimes it feels like they’re deliberately mocking you and just making things up for a laugh.
One of the objectives of Russian propaganda is not only to create such narratives, but also to generate noise to drown out the successes of the Ukrainian army in the Russian media landscape.
[Ukraine’s] operation in Kursk Oblast, the attack on the Kerch Bridge, strikes on military and industrial facilities in Russia, the assassination of Russian military leaders – how did Russian propaganda respond to these actions?
I wouldn’t say they tried to suppress them. On the contrary, they don’t gloss over events like these because it’s impossible to hide them – everyone writes about them and the videos go viral on social media. So instead, they focus on finding scapegoats for these incidents, presenting the news to their audience in a way that deflects any blame away from Putin.
For example, when Ukrainian drones hit Russian oil refineries, [the Russian propagandist Vladimir] Solovyov would rage that "the blame lies with the scum who own the oil companies". He’d yell: "Why don’t you buy air defence systems and install them at your refineries and protect yourselves?!" So to them, the strikes on the refineries were the oil depot director’s fault for not buying a Buk missile system and shooting down all the incoming aerial targets himself.
They couldn’t conceal what happened in Kursk Oblast either. So who did they blame? The conscripts who fled. Not Putin, not Gerasimov for failing to anticipate the Ukrainian advance, but the conscripts who surrendered without a fight. Some Russian patriots even posted videos claiming, in all seriousness, that those soldiers shouldn’t be exchanged because they were at fault.
Russian propagandists treat Ukrainian traitors like dirt
Viewed from the outside, how does the Russian propaganda machine function?
Russian propagandists can be divided into two broad categories: official "court" propaganda – the "guardians" who serve the Kremlin directly and are funded from the state budget – and "turbo-patriots", who are financed by other "Kremlin towers" (factions).
The first group insists that the authorities and Putin are always right, that everything they do is correct and anyone who criticises them or expresses dissatisfaction is an enemy. The second group is critical – but not of Putin himself. Instead, they point fingers at various officials: "You are discrediting Putin! You’re hiding the truth from him! Putin doesn’t know how things really are!"
The "guardians" and the "turbo-patriots" frequently clash with each other, though both are committed to promoting war. The "turbo-patriots" advocate for a radical war in which no rules apply, while the "guardians" champion the war "as directed by Putin".
Russian propaganda narratives aren’t just spread by Russians, but also by Ukrainians who have switched sides like Oleh Tsariov, Tetiana Montian and Yurii Podoliaka. Which camp are they aligned with now, and what role do they play?
Fate has scattered them across different camps, and they often find themselves in conflict – even with each other.
If you watch Solovyov’s shows, you’ll see many of our former MPs: Ihor Markov, Volodymyr Oliinyk, Spiridon Kilinkarov. Here, they were once influential politicians; over there, they’ve turned into clowns paid US$5,000-10,000 [per appearance – ed.]. The "turbo-patriots" sneer at them, saying: "Who are you to lecture us? You failed in your own country!"
Solovyov particularly despises Tetiana Montian and dedicates entire tirades of hatred to her. He insults her in every possible way, calling her a "shaggy monster" and a "madwoman". He constantly shames her on national Russian television, dragging her name through the mud as if she were nothing more than a floor cloth. He criticises Tsariov in a similar fashion: "Oleh, you failed your country and ran away to Russia, and you still dare to open your mouth? Sit down and shut up."
That’s how they’re treated there. They’ve all become semi-marginalised figures to be mocked and ridiculed. It’s a pitiful spectacle.
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Another pro-Russian politician who ended up in Russia after a prisoner swap is Viktor Medvedchuk.
In Ukraine, he controlled a media empire that spread pro-Russian narratives. Is he engaged in similar activities now in Russia?
He founded an organisation called Drugaya Ukraina (Another Ukraine). It’s a quasi-party through which he occasionally makes statements. Sometimes Russian state media broadcast them, or interviews with him. However, it’s clear he no longer has a media empire like the one he once controlled in Ukraine.
If I were Putin, I’d have executed Medvedchuk for what he did. I can’t comprehend how anyone could still trust that man. He had vast resources, enough to achieve practically anything – money, a political party, TV channels, assets – and he lost it all. You couldn’t invent a bigger failure than Medvedchuk.
Russian patriots in Russia view him as a fraudster and a habitual liar who has "utterly betrayed both Putin and Russia". Yet for some reason, Putin continues to support him – perhaps because he's his man. Putin gives him money, though I think most of it is simply stolen along the way.
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"Through Telegram, Russia seeks to influence Ukrainians as well as Russians"
Where is Russian propaganda more effective now: on TV or on Telegram?
They try to spread it wherever they can. It’s just that there are some platforms where they’re banned – like YouTube, for example, which has blocked many of their radical propagandists who were constantly pushing hatred and violence. But they haven’t touched Solovyov’s show.
Either way, most of the content is pure Russian pro-war propaganda, full of outright hatred. The point of it is to keep stirring up anger in Russian society, making people clench their fists as they watch. And we remember that in 2014, it was after watching TV that people signed up to be mercenaries and went off to Donbas to fight.
They’re now trying to use Telegram channels to influence Ukrainians as well as Russians. That’s why they’ve set up channels like Resident and Legitimny (Legitimate). These channels are full of lies, and it’s easy to spot because their predictions never come true. Yet they still have a large audience. Some people in Ukraine read them and still believe they’re really Ukrainian channels with real insights.
Some Russian Telegram channels are run by so-called military bloggers (milbloggers). Who do they report to now, and has the tone of their messages changed since the death of Yevgeny Prigozhin [the late financier of the Wagner Group]?
Some milbloggers are more or less official – those who work for, say, registered federal media outlets – and they’re regularly invited to meetings with the Russian Ministry of Defence, for example, or with Putin, and often appear on Russian TV channels.
And then there are the unofficial ones. They tend to be more oppositional and often provide more objective information about losses and problems within the Russian military. Naturally, because of this, they’re not invited to any official events.
When Prigozhin was still alive, he had his own network of milbloggers, supported by his holding company, Patriot. They didn’t hesitate to criticise the Ministry of Defence and [former Defence Minister Sergei] Shoigu, and they often hailed Wagner as "the pinnacle of the Russian military".
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But after Prigozhin's death, they went looking for other masters. For example, there is now a milblogger community run by the Orthodox oligarch and hardcore monarchist Konstantin Malofeyev. It was Malofeyev who financed Strelkov and Borodai back in 2014 [Alexander Borodai was the prime minister of the self-proclaimed Russian-backed "Donetsk People's Republic" ("DPR")]. In other words, he actually funded the beginning of the war in Ukraine. Malofeyev owns a semi-opposition channel called Tsargrad: it does broadcast criticism, but not of Putin.
The Akhmat special forces unit loyal to [Chechen leader Ramzan] Kadyrov also has its own milbloggers who post slogans like "Akhmat is strong" and "Akhmat is great". It’s clear that these bloggers are on Akhmat’s payroll.
How has the war impacted Russia's leading propagandists, such as Solovyov and Margarita Simonyan, in terms of their wealth and influence?
Their viewership, audience and credibility have all taken a hit. For example, Solovyov’s programme has fallen out of the top 50 most popular shows in Russia, apparently for the first time in a long while.
As for their income, wealth, and influence within the Russian government, I assume all of these have actually increased.
Occupied Donbas is a region without elites
Russia doesn’t just create propaganda for its domestic audience, but also for people living in the occupied Ukrainian territories. Is there a difference between these two types of propaganda?
Russia doesn’t restrict its television or federal media in these regions, so people there watch them just like in Russia. Of course there are some local media outlets, but they generally present the same picture.
Their main job is to show how everything is being "rebuilt" and how Russia is fixing what’s been destroyed, in Mariupol for example. But this picture is totally false. A lot of buildings might look as if they’re being repaired, but when you go inside, locals say, "They took the roof off and threw it away, and now it’s leaking." In other words, these "repairs" are frozen.
The houses that are actually being built there aren’t for the people of Mariupol who lost their homes – they’re for sale. So these people are left with nothing. Of course no federal channel is going to tell them that. At best they get some meagre compensation, but it’s nowhere near enough to buy a decent apartment.
If you follow life in the occupied Ukrainian territories on TikTok or Instagram, you’ll often come across videos from bizarre bloggers like Miss DPR, Yevgeny Vasiliev from Makiivka, or Kirill Sirius from Donetsk.
Are they a true reflection of the audience living there now, or are they just an exception, with their popularity coming from their specific style?
They’re a reflection of what Russia’s done to Donetsk. When you look at them, it feels like you’re seeing a post-apocalyptic territory where all sorts of freaks and weirdos have ended up.
Kirill Sirius is a Donetsk estate agent who originally did property reviews but later shifted to reviewing street kiosks, shawarmas, and fake sneakers.
Yevgeny Vasiliev has a genetic disease. His videos are tough to watch because most of his vocabulary consists of swear words. Plus, he has no teeth. This dude from Makiivka has become the face of these grim territories.
This whole phenomenon also demonstrates the poverty of cultural and political life there.
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What does the so-called "elite" of Russian-occupied Donbas look like now?
I'm not sure the word "elite" is applicable in this case, because how can an occupation administration be an elite?
During the Grey Zone period [2014-22], local thugs and militants sought to push out the previous elites and take control of their assets.
[Alexander] Zakharchenko [the Russian-installed "head" of the "DPR" from November 2014 to August 2018] tried to act like he had some authority, even though his intellectual capacity was pretty low. Maybe he actually thought he was in charge, the real leader of the "republic".
One of the things Zakharchenko focused on was creating his own military force – the so-called "Republican Guard" – which wasn’t under Russia’s control. He funded it by extorting money from local businessmen, and it answered to him, not his FSB handlers. On top of that, Zakharchenko was working on building his own business empire.
Now there’s [Denis] Pushilin [the second Russian-controlled "head" of the "DPR"], but he’s a nobody – just a slug. He’s a person of minimal significance, not responsible for anything, with no influence whatsoever. He isn’t building his own army; he doesn’t take anything for himself without being ordered to.
Most of the people in these territories aren’t even locals anymore, but Russians. Russia is no longer hiding it and is openly sending its own people there.
These are people who have nothing to do with Donbas but are trying to rule it. Are they local elites? It's hard for me to say, because I think the word "elite" implies some kind of agency.
Do these puppet rulers have any real influence? Can they make decisions on their own, without instructions from above? I don’t think so.
That's why I believe these territories are now a region without elites.
What about the ordinary people who remain there? What does the average resident of the Donetsk or Luhansk "People’s Republic" look like?
After 2022, some locals created a meme that sums up the current state of these territories: "WPR" – the "Women's People's Republic". In other words, it’s mostly women there now, many of them middle-aged, approaching retirement, or even elderly. This shift happened after the mass mobilisation of the local male population.
This territory has gone and is still going through a humanitarian disaster. The areas where the Russians have been fighting since 2022 are deserts: cities are turning into villages, and villages are vanishing altogether. The areas Russia captured before 2022 are being depopulated, because it’s clear to everyone that there will be no normal life there whether they’re part of Russia or part of Ukraine, no matter how bleak that may sound.
It was a depressed mining area even before the 2014 war, but there was still a chance it could have been saved. Now, though, the region has become a grey zone where everyone who was able to leave has done so, regardless of their political views.
I can't see any factors in the short term that will dramatically change life in these areas or bring about any improvement. These are dark territories that are on the brink of extinction.
Sofiia Sereda, Ukrainska Pravda
Translation: Anastasiia Yankina, Artem Yakymyshyn
Editing: Teresa Pearce