Infantry war at Pokrovsk: why Ukraine's key eastern front started (and continues) to crumble

This is a long article, so I’ll keep the introduction brief.

This is the story of how within six months, the Russian army has advanced 30 km from Avdiivka towards one of the largest and most strategic cities in Donetsk Oblast, one that until recently was far removed from the war: Pokrovsk.

We’ll ask whether this advance could have been prevented and what role Ukraine’s Kursk offensive has played.

The names and positions of most of the sources cited in this article have been omitted at their request. Only a handful are rank-and-file soldiers; the majority are officers, battalion commanders, and deputy commanders.

This article is written with respect and gratitude towards every soldier, and especially every infantryman and woman, who defended the Pokrovsk front, and in the hope that the mistakes made there will never be repeated.

The Pokrovsk front: a timeline

The Pokrovsk front didn’t just crumble overnight. Since 15 February 2024, when they withdrew from Avdiivka, Ukraine’s defence forces have been retreating towards Pokrovsk – sometimes faster, sometimes slower – almost every week.

The first difficulties arose when the 3rd Separate Assault Brigade, which had been holding the line in the vicinity of Orlivka and Semenivka (not far from Avdiivka), was replaced by the 68th Separate Jaeger Brigade. The rotation of military units is one of the most vulnerable defence areas in general, and for the Ukrainian army in particular, and the Russians took advantage of that.

Vitalii, a crew member who operates a large attack drone, tells Ukrainska Pravda that he was deployed in the area in March, and that the Russian attacks started even before the 68th Brigade could take up its positions.

"We met guys from the 68th who had only just taken up their positions and were forced to retreat immediately because of the FPV drone attacks. When a brigade leaves, they take all the electronic warfare equipment with them. This is typical on this front: they [the Russians] advance the most during rotations. The occupiers take advantage of those times."

"The night we replaced the 3rd Separate Assault Brigade in Semenivka, the enemy attempted to carry out an assault operation. The meat-grinder attacks haven’t stopped since then," an Ukrainska Pravda source in the 68th Brigade confirms.

Throughout March and some of April, Russian forces gradually advanced west towards Umanske, Yasnoborodivka and Netailove. Then, in mid-April, they chose a route that was particularly advantageous for them: north from Avdiivka along the railway line. This tactic helped them to capture Ocheretyne, Prohres, Zhelanne, Novohrodivka…

There are densely planted trees and shrubs all along the railway line, making it easier for the Russians to amass larger units there prior to launching assaults. The foliage made it more difficult for Ukrainian forces to detect these build-ups of Russian troops and deploy artillery or drones to neutralise them. Given that the Russians mostly deployed infantry in the area, it was the most effective tactic they could have chosen.

"In order to stop the Russians as they advanced along the railway line, we should have set up barricades and rigged those areas with explosives. We should have cut down the dense woods to create clear lines of sight. We didn’t start doing that until around Zhelanne! But by then it was no use, because the front was crumbling too fast. We had the time and the opportunity to do it, but someone decided to ignore the situation. The top brass were getting reports that we were doing great," a source in the 47th Separate Mechanised Brigade familiar with the situation tells Ukrainska Pravda.

Another major turning point that marked the undoing of the Pokrovsk front was the Russians’ sudden breakthrough in Ocheretyne, a relatively large, urbanised town on the railway with industrial facilities, and therefore a particularly useful defence position. Russian occupation forces entered the town in mid-April.

Ukrainska Pravda has previously outlined two possible reasons for the Russians’ rapid advance: either the abrupt withdrawal of Ukraine’s 115th Separate Mechanised Brigade from Ocheretyne, or the unsuccessful rotation when the 100th Separate Mechanised Brigade replaced the 115th.

While working on this article, we received further evidence – from an officer in a brigade stationed nearby at the time – to suggest that it was the first of these reasons that facilitated the Russians’ advance.

"Before the offensive, I received intelligence that the Russians were going to assault Ocheretyne, where we had no troops at the positions," the officer says. "I passed this information on to my commanders straight away, but the commander of the brigade stationed there [the 115th Separate Mechanised Brigade – ed.] responded: ‘We have forces there, they’re all there.’

Next morning the Russians started to walk into [Ocheretyne], moving through what were officially minefields – but in fact there were no mines there. After we surrendered Novobakhmutivka, Ocheretyne and Soloviovo, the front started to collapse at the rate we’re seeing now."

"When the Russians captured Ocheretyne, there was no stable contact line as such," Vitalii the drone crew member adds. "No one knew where the front was. Soldiers in the villages of Sokil, Yevhenivka and Voskhod were walking around with guns in their hands, asking each other for passwords to figure out if they were dealing with one of us or the enemy."

The village of Prohres, which is also located on the railway line, was the third and final settlement that contributed to the domino effect on the Pokrovsk front. In late July, Ukrainian forces in Pokrovsk ended up in an encirclement, news of which was leaked to the public.

Around 50 soldiers from the 31st Separate Mechanised Brigade ended up squeezed in between Prohres and Lozuvatske, two villages on the railway line. The Russians broke through the first line of defence, manned by the 31st Brigade, and then the second, which due to personnel shortages was held by the then newly formed and inexperienced 151st Separate Mechanised Brigade. The Russians were thus able to approach the Ukrainian forces from behind.

At the time, DeepState analysts said that Colonel Andrii Usanov, the commander of the 31st Separate Mechanised Brigade, had not issued an order to withdraw, so his soldiers decided to break out of the encirclement on their own. However, one of the battalion commanders from the 31st Brigade told Ukrainska Pravda that this was not the case. He said Usanov had personally approved an exit plan devised by the commanders of the 1st and 3rd Battalions and provided them with artillery cover.

The battalion commanders’ rescue plan was brilliant. All 46 soldiers, including several who were wounded, were able to get out of the encirclement overnight by crossing a field. This is one of the few examples of a truly well-planned operation on the Pokrovsk front.

Yet Usanov was removed from his post, despite an appeal his soldiers recorded in his support (their video has since been deleted from the brigade’s website) – apparently for his "failure on the Pokrovsk [front]". The brigade was transferred to another front.

A commander from the 31st Separate Mechanised Brigade describes the planning behind the operation to get the soldiers out of the encirclement between Lozuvatske and Prohres:

"The plan was devised in 6-7 hours. By then, our soldiers had spent 5-6 days in near-encirclement, and one day fully encircled by the enemy. All of the Starlinks had been destroyed; radios were the only source of communication. We used Mavic drones to drop batteries off for the radios.

We’re used to fighting exclusively in wooded areas; that’s where we can move and where our positions are. Here, however, we couldn’t exit [the encirclement] through wooded areas, because there were enemy forces there, so we decided that people should leave through an open field. Forty-six soldiers from two battalions were encircled. We deployed every Mavic crew at our disposal – six of them in total – to oversee the group’s progress.

The Cargo 300s [wounded soldiers – ed.] posed the biggest challenge because they couldn’t walk. We knew they wouldn’t be able to cross the anti-tank ditch. We got them out first to figure out how much time it took: 40 minutes. The soldiers were supposed to leave in small groups, one after another, so they wouldn’t be spotted by a [Russian] drone. At some point, however, we realised we were running two hours behind, and the sun would rise before everyone was able to leave.

That’s when we decided that the next group would start moving as soon as the previous group reached one of the four points we’d marked along their way. All of them got out alive. Not a single one came under fire."

After capturing Prohres, the Russians advanced even more rapidly along the northern part of the Pokrovsk salient, capturing Zhelanne and Novohrodivka. At the same time, at a slower pace, the Russians were capturing the central part of the salient and moving south from the railway line towards Memryk and Ukrainsk.

The Russians are now 8-10 km away from Pokrovsk, the last major city before Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. They are 4 km from Pokrovsk's neighbour, Myrnohrad, and 5 km from the Pokrovsk-Konstiantynivka road. They are literally on the administrative border of Selydove, having captured a 200-m-long spoil tip that gives them a view over the town. And having seized part of Ukrainsk, they are now resting against Hirnyk.

The Russians will likely try to encircle Ukrainian forces once again by bringing their units together near Hirnyk and the meandering ridge above Krasnohorivka.

Over the past six months, the Russian army has created, developed and, worst of all, held a huge salient – 30 km long and 20 km wide – between Avdiivka and Pokrovsk. On a map of the front, it immediately catches the eye.

The soldiers half-jokingly refer to such salients as "pisiuns" (penises) between themselves, Vitalii tells Ukrainska Pravda.

"What the Russians do is to advance a kilometre in one place and form a pisiun, then [do the same] a little to the right/left, [to form] another pisiun. Then they bring in infantry and weapons, and then they lock in those who are between these two salients.

Their typical tactic is: cut off – close in. And these salients have to be cut off immediately, at the root. Due to insufficient military assets and communication between [Ukrainian] units, this was not possible."

Why the Pokrovsk front started to crumble

1. Russia’s superiority in terms of manpower, artillery and guided aerial bombs

Before we talk about the problems in the planning and conducting of defensive actions by Ukraine’s defence forces, it’s worth noting that the main reason why the Russians have advanced on the Pokrovsk front is their superiority in terms of resources, both human and munitions.

This is the main front on which the Russian army is attacking, and as of the end of June, it had amassed up to eight of its assault brigades there.

The Russians are advancing on Pokrovsk with infantry, either in small groups of 5-7 people or in larger groups of 10-30.

A position held by four Ukrainian soldiers can be attacked by up to 80 Russians per day, says Serhii Filimonov, commander of the 108th Da Vinci Wolves Separate Battalion of the 59th Brigade. Since August, his unit has been stationed south of Selydove, where one of the most challenging sections of the Pokrovsk salient is now, and regularly takes prisoners.

The most common injury suffered by Filimonov's men is bullet wounds, i.e. an injury sustained in close firefights. This is further confirmation that the war on the Pokrovsk front is largely an infantry war. It is physically demanding and extremely exhausting. Worst of all are the numbers of casualties.

"I remember my guys would say: ‘That's it, Commander, I give up!’" says a commander in the 31st Brigade, formerly stationed along the railway line in Prohres. "Then you start talking to him, persuading him, and he takes his assault rifle and goes off to return fire. It was a superhuman effort."

The ammunition to stop the Russian infantry ran out during the battles near Avdiivka in March 2024. A source in the 68th Brigade says that while each 120mm mortar would receive 50 shells per day in March, they got far fewer in September.

"That’s a drop in the ocean for the defence of an area like this. We need to talk about this. Our commanders like to read us the field manuals, and there are standards for combat operations – we don’t meet them, and that means we can’t perform tasks effectively. And then they ask why we are losing Donbas," the soldier says. His voice betrays his indignation and months of fatigue.

"The Russians use guided aerial bombs more often than we use mortars," he adds.

This is confirmed by an Ukrainska Pravda source in another brigade that has already been withdrawn from the Pokrovsk front. A battalion in this brigade would receive three mortar bombs per day for a 120mm mortar – in fact, these were just for finding targets, not for firing on them. The guys were saved by the slightly smaller 82mm mortar bombs, which were given out in larger quantities – 40-45 per day.

Some types of weapons have been out of ammunition for a month. FPV drones provided by volunteers are helping.

In addition to their superior artillery, the Russians also strike Ukrainian positions with guided aerial bombs, which the Ukrainian army cannot counteract in any way.

2. The lack of soldiers, especially experienced, trained and motivated ones

"The first problem on the Pokrovsk front is personnel numbers, the second is their level of training, and the third is the skills of the unit command. And then we run into the defence-related issues – tactics, measures, and so on." This, a soldier from the 47th Brigade tells Ukrainska Pravda, is the order of priority of the reasons for the Russians’ super-fast advance.

The massive shortage of personnel, especially infantry, has been a huge problem for the defence forces on the Pokrovsk front. Another soldier who spent six months on the Pokrovsk front recalls that "the lack of soldiers was always and immediately felt," as understaffed brigades were sent off to the battlefield.

For example, the 110th Mechanised Brigade was called in to stop the Russian advance in Ocheretyne just two months after its withdrawal from Avdiivka, where it had been on the defensive for almost two years, including the last six months repelling the Russian offensive with equipment and infantry. Two months was obviously not long enough to replenish the 110th and recruit new personnel.

With the return to the east, the brigade's staffing situation has deteriorated even further. As of July 2024, the 110th's infantry was less than 40% staffed. The brigade is still at the front.

The situation was somewhat different for the 68th Brigade. They were removed from the Kupiansk-Lyman line and sent to the Pokrovsk front in March 2024, without having rested but with relatively good numbers of personnel. In the village of Semenivka, a couple of kilometres west of Avdiivka, the unit suffered significant losses.

"The backbone of the brigades was lost during the battles near Avdiivka, and the replenishments that arrived later left a lot to be desired," says a source from the 68th, explaining the shortage of motivated people. "The mobilisation failed. Let's be honest – each subsequent replenishment was less motivated and trained. So they could not reliably hold the defence.

In Semenivka we had about 90% experienced people in the unit and 10% newcomers. Now we have about the same ratio, but the other way round. And the average age of the newcomers can even be 55+, not 45+."

The staffing situation was much better in the newly created brigades, such as the 151st, but their lack of combat experience worked against them.

The Pokrovsk front is the most striking example of how the state and society failed to cope with mobilisation in the third year of the full-scale war. And the new mobilisation law proved not to hold out a lifeline.

3. Faulty fortifications 

When Ukrainska Pravda asked the military about fortifications – in this case on the Pokrovsk front – we were told for the first time in nearly two and a half years of the full-scale invasion: "A hell of a lot’s been dug here!"

Bunkers and connected trench lines were indeed built on the Pokrovsk front – but there’s a catch. Many of these fortifications are unsuitable for serious defence. They’re frequently located in the middle of fields, which makes them visible to the enemy and difficult for the  defence forces’ personnel, ammunition and supplies to reach.

"When [Ukrainian MP Mariana] Bezuhla posts photos of empty trenches and asks why nobody was defending them, I know exactly why. Because it’s stupid to sit in a hole in the middle of a bare field. Sooner or later an FPV drone will fly right into your face," Vitalii tells Ukrainska Pravda angrily. 

Serhii Filimonov, commander of the Da Vinci Wolves, says that even when there are pre-prepared fortifications, most of the positions are dug by the soldiers themselves.

"On the Pokrovsk front, trenches and dugouts had been made right in the middle of fields, making logistics impossible. They dug anti-tank ditches that led directly from enemy positions to our rear positions, and it’s impossible to monitor them. These fortifications help the enemy advance more than they help us defend.

To occupy the dugout strongpoints on the Pokrovsk front I’d need to deploy an entire platoon, which I just don’t have.

It's one thing not to have a good observation post. It's quite another to leave positions in front of you that you’re unable to occupy, while the Russians have four alternatives with overlaps that allow them to move to the rear of your positions. I think the individual responsible for these fortifications should face criminal charges."

The Khortytsia Operational Strategic Group and the Donetsk Operational and Tactical Group, which are in charge of the Pokrovsk front, declined to respond to Ukrainska Pravda's queries about the Russians' rapid advance.

Lieutenant General Yurii Sodol, originally the head of the Khortytsia Operational Strategic Group during the defence forces' retreat from the Pokrovsk front, was abruptly relieved of his duties at the end of June. The second and current commander is Brigadier General Andrii Hnatov, a highly-regarded former marine.

The first leader of the Donetsk Operational and Tactical Group was the little-known Major General Eduard Moskalov, who, according to one Ukrainska Pravda source, was favoured by Commander-in-Chief Syrskyi. He oversaw the defence of Avdiivka and was in post when the Russians stormed Ocheretyne. He recently became the head of the Ukrainian military commandant's office in Russia's Kursk Oblast.

The second and current commander of the Donetsk Operational and Tactical Group is Colonel Oleksandr Lutsenko, a Hero of Ukraine who came to replace Moskalov from the Kupiansk front, where he directed a tactical group. He formerly served as brigade commander of the formidable 79th Separate Tavrian Air Assault Brigade of Mykolaiv. Two Ukrainska Pravda sources who worked with Lutsenko describe him as a competent and tough leader who is both humane and conservative.

Pokrovsk & Kursk

On 6 August, the offensive operation in Kursk Oblast became the diametric opposite of the Pokrovsk front.

Every other plea to the General Staff to pay attention to the Russians' rapid advance towards Pokrovsk – both military and civilian – was accompanied by a dig at the victorious news from Kursk Oblast. People questioned why Ukraine was deploying all of its forces in Russian towns if they were unable to preserve their own, such as Novohrodivka near Pokrovsk, previously home to 14,000 people.

And there are several elements in this generalised remark – some purely emotional, some practical – that should be discussed.

First, Ukraine’s defence forces did not send all of their soldiers to Kursk Oblast. None of the brigades defending the Pokrovsk front were relocated to Russia during the Kursk campaign.

The one exception, as Ukrainska Pravda recently discovered, is the third battalion of the 80th Separate Galician Air Assault Brigade, which had been holding the defence of Krasnohorivka until the Kursk offensive began. But although some consider Krasnohorivka to be part of the Pokrovsk front, it is (both officially and in actual fact) on the Kurakhove front.

Would the units that went to Kursk have saved Pokrovsk?

The mighty Air Assault Brigades – the 80th Galician, 82nd Bukovyna and 95th Polesian – which were and still are at the heart of the Kursk operation could theoretically have slowed the Russians down as they advanced in the east. But first of all, given the lack of a stable front line and proper fortifications, plus Russian air superiority, it’s hard to say that this would have made sense. Secondly, these are Ukraine’s most formidable offensive – rather than defensive – formations, and from a personnel management standpoint, they should be deployed as intended at least on occasion.

Another point is that one of the stated aims of the Kursk operation was to draw Russian forces away from other locations where Ukraine was struggling due to a lack of weaponry. Ideally, one of these areas would have been Pokrovsk.

However, the first month of the operation showed that Putin, despite facing defeat on his own turf, did not adhere to the Ukrainian rules of the game. Russia did not withdraw its main forces from Pokrovsk. The Russian army continued its advance towards Hrodivka, Novohrodivka, Selydove and Hirnyk, advancing 6 to 12 km in the month after the Kursk operation began.

Another figure – the official number of combat encounters reported by Ukraine’s General Staff – confirms that Russian infantry attacks on the Pokrovsk front have continued, and have in fact slightly intensified. We analysed the number of combat clashes on the Pokrovsk front before and after the Kursk operation began and found that it had increased significantly – on average from 40 to 52 per day.

Russia clearly did not withdraw any troops from the nearby Kurakhove front, where the number of clashes per day rose from 14 to 20. Assaults on the Kupiansk and Lyman fronts also increased.

Oddly enough, the number of combat clashes on the Toretsk front – currently regarded as the second hottest after Pokrovsk – has remained almost unchanged. It’s only on the Kharkiv front, where, as the Economist recently reported, Russia has retained some of its forces, that the ferocity of Russia’s infantry attack has diminished.

Nor, unfortunately, has the opening up of the Kursk front decreased the amount of artillery attacks and guided aerial bomb strikes on the front line as a whole. On the contrary, their number, just like the combat clashes, has slightly increased. There are an average of 4,500 to 4,600 artillery attacks per day, with the number of guided aerial bomb strikes ranging from 97 to 105.

So despite facing a new front on its own territory, Russia, with its military, artillery and guided aerial bombs, has been fighting with the same vigour for a month already – pushing into Ukrainian territory, villages and spoil tips.

Sadly, the Kursk operation has not yet aided the defence forces in Pokrovsk, although it’s unlikely to have weakened them either.

It’s worth noting, however, that Russia will undoubtedly require additional reserves to mount assaults on major settlements like Selydove, Myrnohrad, or Pokrovsk itself. It is these reserves that the defence forces are currently attempting to hammer in Kursk Oblast.

***

Is there any chance that Pokrovsk could be saved?

Several officers told Ukrainska Pravda they believe the city will suffer the same fate as Bakhmut: several months of intense fighting that will raze another of Donetsk Oblast’s settlements to the ground.

A few, particularly Serhii Filimonov, Commander of the Da Vinci Wolves Battalion, remain more optimistic, convinced that even in these conditions there is room for manoeuvre. One option – by no means the only one – is to cut through the Pokrovsk salient on two sides and encircle the Russian group.

"There are weak points where enemy units have been hammered. It’s clear where these are, where they are building up forces, and what their next steps will be. There are a lot of prisoners, and everything is known. The question is assets and personnel," Filimonov believes.

Olha Kyrylenko, Ukrainska Pravda

Translation: Yelyzaveta Khodatska, Olya Loza and Theodore Holmes

Editing: Teresa Pearce