"I don't think NATO countries want to be seen as a part of the conflict" – Swedish general Dennis Gyllensporre
In the new episode of the podcast "(un)Safe Country", its host Alina Frolova talks to Lieutenant General (ret.) Dr Dennis Gillensporre about the prospects of Ukraine's victory, weapons and tactics of war, the United States and Sweden, NATO and its role in the Black Sea region, and the prospects for the deployment of foreign troops in Ukraine.
Good afternoon. This is the (un)Safe Country podcast and me, its author and host Alina Frolova. Just to remind you that here we are speaking about security and defense. Security of Ukraine, of Europe, about the position of NATO, about the legacy and daily security of each and every one of us. Today we will speak about a very interesting angle. Today I will speak with a very interesting guest who is representing the Swedish Defence University, but previously he has a lot of military experience and I will speak later about this. This is Dennis Gyllensporre, Lieutenant General, retired doctor, associate professor in security policy and strategy, former force commander for the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali. Dennis, welcome.
Thank you so much. Thank you for having me.
You are military. You had this experience in stabilization operations. You had experience with NATO. You're writing the books. You are learning the strategy. Let's start from the most interesting, maybe, questions. How do you evaluate everything that's going on in the war in Ukraine, and do Ukraine have a chance to win this war?
Well, thank you. To start with your last question, I definitely think that you have a good chance, and I'm convinced that Ukraine will be successful eventually, even though there is a difficult road ahead. And reading and following news on what's happening on the ground, obviously, many units find themselves in a very difficult situation with shortage of personnel and ammunition and air defense. I think the static situation on the ground is contrasted by the dynamic development in Black Sea where Ukraine has in many ways seized the initiative, being innovative and finding new ways to counter threats and being able to change the dynamics on the ground and at sea. And of course the deep operations now have also, I think, made a big impact on what's happening. So to me, as a spectator, it's a very complex conflict, which includes the most modern aspects of warfare with AI, with unmanned systems in various mediums, as well as attrition warfare. And I think this is a war that most people in this profession look at now and try to both make sense of in terms of the end of the conflict, but as much trying to draw conclusions for their own national armies to reprioritize and to make adjustments based on the experience that Ukraine has.
About the adjustments, you are co-author of the military strategy of small states, the book which is named so, responding to the external shocks of the 21st century. Yes, Sweden is like a smaller state, yes, and smaller political nation, but Ukraine in comparison with Russia is also a smaller state. and you propose some way of changing the strategy, how to win the war against the enemy, or how to deter the war of the biggest enemy. What are your recommendations and did everything you recommended in your book fit in the model which we have now?
Well, thank you. The book was published a few years ago. It looked at small states in a sense that most of the theories and how we understand strategy is based on how, in particular, the U.S. and other great nations have chosen to develop their strategies and priorities. So small states in some cases have a different dynamic. They have, for sure, different options, more constrained options, that are sometimes between a rock and a hard place so the equation looks different and that's what this book is exploring. One of the things that I think relates very much to Ukraine is the ability to be asymmetric, to be successful as a defender against a superior aggressor requires an asymmetric approach. And asymmetric approaches in history have been very successful. Small countries have indeed been very successful against more resourceful aggressors. So asymmetry is important, And I firmly believe that Ukraine has adopted that in many ways, but it has to continue to evolve because the warfare evolves and Russia changes its tactics and operations. So the asymmetric approach needs to be a constant priority in order to avoid a situation where the resources themselves become the determining factor. And I would argue in some cases this is happening now. But it's also in some cases unavoidable. But as much as possible small states should try to prevent those situations.
You know, we are choosing now between the like many, I mean not Ukraine only, but many European countries were and are dependent on the United States from the supplies of the weapons, supplies of some kind of components, also the presence of the force on the ground. And this is the question. So if we have this trouble with the United States and we need to think about some kind of autonomy, what should it be? I mean, can we really build up the system if we invest too much in the defense industry? Yeah we have a lack of resources for the economy and all the other social components but if we do not invest we can be a target for the next attack of Russia or someone else who decided to do so. Where is this balance and what we should choose now?
I think that's a very pertinent question that also applies to the US because the US has also challenges when it comes to the security of supply. When it comes to, for instance, rare earth elements, critical elements to produce high-tech microchips and so on. So everybody needs to look at the supply chain and the production capacity. And the European Union has recently adopted its first defense industry strategy that calls for more procurement within the European Union and more cooperation. And I think that the defense industrial base in Europe is now being bolstered, and it's necessary. So from a European perspective, we need to do more. And I think the lack of munition now, and the lack not only of munition, but the capacity to produce munition for Ukraine, but also for the national armies, is a case in point and a wake-up call for many nations now that we have neglected an important aspect. So more needs to be done. And ideally, some of these efforts will be of dual use, in particular when it comes to technology. And I think that Ukraine has shown the way in a number of areas where you apply artificial intelligence, where you use drones in certain applications that have a correspondent use on the civilian side, when that situation becomes more relevant.
But this is some kind of characteristic of this war because many historians said that this war is very close in its tactics to the First World War.
I would disagree with that.
And at the same time, we have all these technologies which take out this fog of war because you cannot operate when the drones are watching everywhere, you cannot hide, you need to plan an operation in a different manner, understanding that the enemy sees every move on the front line. So where are we coming with the next one? What would be the next type of war? Or what this war will transform into? So we still need to have hundreds and thousands of tanks or we don't?
When it comes to the first world war and this is often made and again I disagree with it because it may be applied in certain areas locally but it doesn't represent the conflict as a whole, that's my view on it. And on the question of where things are going I think this conflict and this war is now providing another sort of mutation or development step in how military operations will be fought in the future and the understanding of it. And one of the revelations now in Europe is that quantity and quality, the mix that we've had between quantity and quality has been wrong. We have had an over-reliance on quality and high-tech equipment. We also need volumes in terms of soldiers, munition and spare parts and all that and different platforms. So there is a shift now in Europe that has just started looking at reintroducing conscript systems and procuring systems that are off the shelf and not so expensive to assure volumes. Where this is leading now is very interesting because there is no conceptual development that is spearheading this, as we had earlier with the Revolution of Military Affairs that the U.S. has led. What is now the source of inspiration is the way Ukraine is fighting, and to the degree you are successful. So you have, I think you are the tip of the spear when it comes to the evolution of military capabilities and how militaries are organizing themselves and making natural priorities.
Let's speak a little bit about the strategy and strategic planning, how it is done in NATO, in Europe, in Sweden. Because for many people still in Europe, this invasion was a surprise. Although all the signs that invasion will be, they were on the plate. So we all saw that starting from the 2021 Russia accumulated forces, they said that this is like training, exercising. But if you accumulate forces on the borders, then you just redeploy the troops, but you leave all the equipment. It's quite unobvious in that situation that there would be an invasion. There were a lot of other signs, a lot of notes from the intelligence services that the invasion is on the go, but for many politicians and for many maybe strategy planners, it was a surprise. And there were no plan A and plan B, so okay, if invasion happens, what do we do? And that was like a critically necessary but there were no plan B. And do you see some changes in this? I mean that does NATO in Europe recognize this problem, do they just some kind of reshuffle their strategic thinking strategic plan? Because still what we discuss also and give the like context to our listeners that we are at the second Black Sea conference which takes place in Sofia these days but what we discussed that still there is no plan B. I mean that everyone is moving just like with like a very short period of planning. Do we have ammunition for now? Don't we have ammunition for now? What should we do in one or two months? But I don't believe that the war can be won without the strategy. What's about the strategy?
Well I think there are two aspects to your description that I want to comment on, which I agree on, by the way. The first aspect relates to the perception of Russia itself, and I think it's fair to say that most commentators and perhaps also nations, underestimated the Russian ability or ability to take political risks. And at the same time overestimated the military capabilities of Russia as we saw them at the initial, the first phase. And so there's a learning process now that takes place in terms of getting a more nuanced understanding of the Russian apparatus from the political level to the units and how the war affects it. And I think that many nations put a lot of attention to this, and are trying to understand. But it is something that needs constant attention and also constant and continuous feedback from the battlefields in Ukraine. The other aspect is on a more principle level, as you alluded to, that there was no plan B because it was such a difficult and perhaps inconceivable scenario that nobody really wanted to pay too much attention to it. So that relates more to the strategic culture, and that takes a longer time to change. We have now a new strategic concept of NATO that was, as you well know, adopted shortly after the war started. So that gave a new impetus on thinking differently about defense. And I would argue that a lot of things have happened in a good way. But it's piecemeal, as you rightly point out. It is piecemeal, and it lacks a coherent planning with efforts being synchronized so that it will provide the best possible support to Ukraine. I think that many nations now are gradually implementing the understanding that this war will be a long war, and the efforts and the support to Ukraine needs to be a long-term commitment. Norway was one of the first countries that I think stepped forward and took a long view in their commitment to support, and this is now becoming more the common approach, but it takes time. And from one perspective, things are moving very quickly now in Brussels, from a Brussels perspective. But from a Kiev perspective, it's certainly not quick enough. So there are sort of different perceptions. Those that work in Brussels, I think they see themselves in a wind tunnel now of policy changes and things like that. But it's not keeping up with the realities on the ground in Ukraine. So that's the other part of the reality. And this needs to be reconciled. And conferences like the one I've just enjoyed here, I think, are critical to maintain a sense of reality on what's happening in Ukraine to feed into the policy processes in Brussels. Because they're not configured to be rapid or decisive. That's not the way it's been developed.
One of the discussions we also had within the panels of the conference was about Russia declaring that they're fighting with NATO. Yeah, we do understand why they said it, because they started to fight with Ukraine, and they thought that that would be a very short campaign and very successful. And that's quite strange for President Putin, so-called President Putin. To declare that, yes, we're still fighting with a weak Ukraine. So for them it's easier to say that we are fighting with NATO. But they are declaring this, and they actually make a lot of steps. They use these missiles which are entering the space of the NATO countries, like targeting Ukraine. And this is like some kind of actions which are also testing. They test NATO in many other directions. But what we've heard from today's panelists and UK representatives said, no, we don't not percept the day of fighting with NATO. And I think that this is some discrepancy, that still the Western world is living in their perception of this war. They percept it not like an enemy percept it. So you cannot build up your strategy without understanding what's in the mind of Putin. No one believed that Putin would attack Ukraine. Now some countries believe, but this is mostly Poland and Baltics who are under the threat that Putin can attack NATO. And do you think that NATO is ready to change this perception of the non-apart of the conflict?
I don't think they want to be seen as a part of the conflict. And I don't think that that's perhaps helpful either. I think the important part is for them to be committed to setting conditions for Ukraine to be successful and provide the support needed. Uh, and that is a, uh, process that has taken a lot of time. And, and, uh, I, from where I stand, I see also in this area of progress, but, I mean Ukraine is in an urgent situation now for additional support. And again, the process is the decision-making has perhaps not kept up with what is needed in support of a successful Ukrainian campaign.
Sweden is one of the maritime states. Yes, like the sea is principal for you. And the same with Ukraine and with Black Sea. We have a very complicated situation here in Black Sea. From one point Ukraine stabilized the situation and suddenly could oppose and detour Russia. At the same time, we cannot rely on the increasing presence of NATO countries because of the non-literal states here cannot pass the Bosphorus. We discussed different dimensions here, like air patrolling, using Danube. But what would be your recommendation to Ukraine, and not only to Ukraine, but maybe to the Black Sea, from the point of view of this big experience of the maritime nation? What could be the focus? Where we should put the attention? What we should do to reach more progress here?
There are a number of objectives to look at, and one of them is, of course, freedom of navigation and ensuring export would be one. But the other one would be to have Crimea reinstated under full Ukrainian control, which is also obviously integral to maritime security in the Black Sea. There could be more cooperation in the Black Sea and to safeguard the transportation escort and making sure that any violation of the freedom of navigation comes with consequences. And I think that has not been so visible. The other part is of course, capabilities, to muster more capabilities. And Ukraine has demonstrated, well, Ukraine has written military history in the Black Sea in terms of the naval warfare. And more needs to be done in this regard. And support from others could come in this direction also. Not just from nations, but I think that technology in different ways can be provided by companies. So cooperation does not necessarily mean that it has to be nations. It could be companies with the right profile that can make a difference, make something that contributes to peace and security, and at the same time making use of their capabilities and technology. Some companies have already been involved, but I think more companies could potentially make a good contribution in this effort.
That's a very good idea. We do remember how Bayraktar in the beginning of the war changed the situation very much. That was a personal position of the founders, that they are not selling to Russia the same pieces and that played very good. And what about Sweden? Do you feel that Sweden is ready to join some kind of efforts in the Black Sea, whatever it could be?
I think I'm certainly out of the policy loop and the Defense Commission...
But you have a network of friends, you have the feeling of what's going on there.
Well, I have been involved in earlier decisions and deliberations. The Defense Commission is issuing its recommendations for the defense reform in late April. And this is the long-term sort of vision for the defense, and the government and the parliament needs to adopt it. But my point is that soon I think we will have more clarity on what Sweden has in mind. And having said that, the public support for Ukraine in Sweden has only increased since the conflict, and it is very much on the agenda, very much discussed in general amongst the population, because we see ourselves in you. And the fear is also that we will end up in the same situation or could potentially. Now, the Black Sea and the commitment to the Black Sea, I think, would be a challenge now because the first priority will most likely be the Baltic Sea region and the high north or the Arctic region. But having joined NATO, Sweden is an ally and Sweden is and will be committed to defending and promoting security in other regions also. So it has to open up and be involved in other areas. But I think it's safe to assume that the priority will be in the North, in the Baltic Sea and in the High North area.
What are your expectations from NATO for Sweden? So yeah, we know that Sweden declared that because of the joining NATO now, for example, it can more provide assistance to Ukraine and transfer some equipment, which will be in no use within the NATO component, but is there any some specific expectation except the Article 5 that can improve the readiness of Sweden to potential risk situation?
So, first of all, now we've just recently joined, and the next crucial step for both NATO and for Sweden is to do operational planning, to see how the northern part of the alliance will be defended together with allies, including Finland, Norway, and so on and so forth. And that will be the kind of commitment and contract. What will NATO and the allied countries contribute? What will be Sweden's role in this? And subsequently, NATO, we expect, will articulate capability goals to tell Sweden that you need to develop certain areas, certain capabilities and so on. And from that point, I think one would know whether there are some spare capacities or resources that we could divest. But it's probably too early at this point to speculate on what that could be. And one of the discussion points now is for Sweden to be a staging area or use basis for logistic support, for supply of different kinds. And the requirements that are associated with those kind of commitments I think are by and large unknown at this point. So it's a very early step in the process. But at some point this will be clear and there is a willingness I think in general and principle terms to make sure that others would benefit from the Swedish capabilities. If you look back in history, when the Baltic states became free countries, Sweden supported them with defense equipment at that time, and also with training in different kinds. So we tried to help out, and there was not just support of the Baltics. There was a mutual value of doing that, and Sweden has a good experience of that kind of support because it connected the countries, and we received a lot of good feedback in different ways. So if that could be done with Ukraine, I think that would be something that would be very beneficial.
You were leading a stabilization mission in Mali. One year ago it was a very popular idea in Ukraine that it could be some kind of stabilization mission in Ukraine. It was considered as one of the variants of how to end up this war. We're not discussing it now, but we do understand that even after we reach the border, we restore, let's say, the integrity of the territory, we still will have a lot of problems. We have a huge border. I mean, that Russia won't disappear and in other Russia won't disappear. And we will have a border. We will have part of the population who was under the long control of occupational authorities and who just like can be not so loyal to Ukraine. So we will have a need of a lot of forces to be present on the ground in Crimea, in Donbass, on the border probably with Belorussia. Do you think it's realistic to discuss such a scenario of stabilization operation in Ukraine? Maybe not now, maybe on later stages.
I think it makes sense to do so. And with the situation as it is right now, it seems like an impossible mission, but things change. And at some point there needs to be some practical work on the ground, based on a ceasefire at least, ideally a peace accord or a political settlement. And I think it makes sense to look at it now, even though there are no political possibilities time to envisage that the Security Council will be able to agree on anything. But the discussion, I think, needs to be there, and the ideas need to be cultivated. And there are some practical things that could be done and looked at. The UN Secretary General has the mandate to dispatch fact-finding missions to look at what's happening on the ground and report to New York. And that could be sort of one area to build up the knowledge. And as you know better than me, after the illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, there was a military-to-military technical arrangement between Russia and Ukraine to discuss practical aspects. It was not a top-down arrangement. It started from the ground and it worked for some time because it was necessary from both parts, even though there was not a political agreement on it. And I think that doing explorative missions like that and seeing if there are certain areas that could be conducive to some kind of transparency would be a first step. And then this could then be a stepping stone when there is a peace and when there is a well-defined need for a stabilization mission. And of course OSCE has a role possibly to play here and others also, but I like the idea of having the United Nations involved in such a huge commitment.
The problem is that the United Nations has a very bad reputation now in Ukraine, and I'm not sure how it will be at some period. But about the ideas that need to be cultivated, President Macron put this idea of possibility of the presence of the French troops on the ground. And there were a few ideas discussed in Ukraine afterwards. I don't know whether they were based on the French insights or it was like a Ukrainian dimension, because someone said that President Macron meant Odesa as the possible way of deployment of some training personnel, something like that. But that was also a discussion that in case that France or some other countries will deploy the troops on the Ukrainian part closer to Belorussian border to control and monitor the border without active operations. In such a case, they can release Ukrainian troops, which actually spend the time there and do not take part in action. Is this idea now discussed within the EU NATO expert community academics? Is this idea cultivated now after President Macron starts this conversation?
It is. And it's one of those issues that is discussed more intensively than others. And I think you make a point there on where and what kind of support this will be. I think logistical support, field hospitals and other kinds of enablers could be a first step in such an endeavor. And obviously there are different views now, but this is the way the policy process works. And somebody needs to step forward like President Macron did, and others have to sort of react and respond to it. And hopefully there will be a concrete outcome of this sooner rather than later.
I hope toо. We have a time limit, so we need to end up. But for the last question, I would like to ask you, how do you see the end of this war? What is the winning and how it can be reached?
Well, I see the full sovereignty of Ukraine being restored as the end state, the end state that we should not deviate from, as we as the international community. Ukraine is a sovereign nation and it has to regain its full control of its territory. How can it be achieved? We need to be committed for the long haul and have a long-term strategy for this. And more countries than Europe need to be, and the U.S. and some other, I think, more countries around the world need to be involved. Europe needs to step up much more. We have an election in the U.S. coming up with the associated uncertainty of support. So it's more in the interest of Europe, and Europe has to take more responsibility for security in Europe. Europe. And I think a part of this end state would also be an accession of Ukraine to the European Union as a further integration.
And NATO someday.
And NATO someday also, yeah.
Okay. Thank you so much for this conversation. It was my pleasure to talk to you.
Thank you so much.
Just to remind you that we spoke today with Dennis Gyllensporre, the Lieutenant General retired of the Swedish Army, and you were in podcast (un)Safe Country with me, its author Alina Frolova. This podcast is a joint project of the Center for Defense Strategies, Ukrainska Pravda and Media Center Ukraine. And you can find us on all the resources of Ukrainska Pravda, as well as the other largest podcast platforms, Apple, Google, Spotify, and others. Don't forget to subscribe. Safe and safe country. It depends on each of us how soon the prefix "un" will disappear.
Listen to the audio version of the interview.