Waiting for a counteroffensive. How the Ukrainian Armed Forces are preparing to liberate the territories and how the Pentagon document leak affects Ukraine's plans
The Ukrainian Armed Forces' counteroffensive has been among the main topics in both the Western and Ukrainian media since the end of autumn 2022.
It became particularly prominent after an interview with Valerii Zaluzhnyi, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, in which he told The Economist what weapons the Ukrainian army needs in order to reach the contact line as of 23 February 2022.
Throughout the winter and early spring, the media and military analysts were first discussing the Russian offensive in the Donbas and then the upcoming Ukrainian counteroffensive.
Various military experts have been appearing daily on TV, YouTube and online media outlets, making predictions about when it would begin, drawing dozens of maps with arrows and talking about where and how the Ukrainian Armed Forces would attack.
Representatives of the military and political leadership are emphasising that all this talk is nothing more than reading the tea leaves.
According to Oleksii Danilov, Secretary of the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine, no more than five people on the entire planet have information about where and when the Ukrainian army will launch a counteroffensive.
In view of the above, Ukrainska Pravda will not predict how the Ukrainian Armed Forces will act. We will focus on how preparations for a counteroffensive are going, what weapons are needed to carry it out, and how the recent leak of Pentagon documents, which often mentioned Ukraine, affects the future actions of the Ukrainian army.
In the course of preparing this material, Ukrainska Pravda has spoken to several dozen sources in the government and military. The information gathered in this text in no way reveals Ukraine's plans for an offensive (Ukrainska Pravda is not aware of those plans) and does not harm the Ukrainian army.
Pentagon document leak and prospects for a counteroffensive
In early February 2023, leading representatives of Ukraine's military and political leadership held several non-public briefings for G7 diplomats.
Obviously, the main issue during these conversations was the prospect and timing of a major Ukrainian counteroffensive.
According to sources among diplomatic circles present at the meetings, the most commonly heard words during those conversations were "April" and "May", after the words "the beginning of the counteroffensive". It was this timeframe that was considered by cautious Ukrainian speakers to be the most likely for the start of large-scale actions on the front.
In early April, there were indeed significant events directly related to the Ukrainian army's counteroffensive. However, their epicentre was not in the east or south of Ukraine, but in the United States of America.
Confidential Pentagon documents were made public on gaming servers. Some of them were obviously falsified, but others, according to most experts, looked quite authentic.
The question immediately arose whether there was a Moscow trace in this leak, since the figures for military losses, for example, were clearly fabricated in favour of Russia. Most of the military and political leadership in Kyiv is inclined to believe this version.
In particular, Kyrylo Budanov, Chief of Ukraine’s Defence Intelligence, has stated that it was an information operation by the Kremlin to damage relations between Ukraine and the United States.
Some of the sources in the Ukrainian military establishment interviewed by Ukrainska Pravda have a slightly different view of the "leak".
They say that whoever was behind this event, even if it was really just a very expensive "black swan", the United States will benefit the most from it: both Kyiv and Moscow could see that Washington has a wide range of data on their forces.
Most importantly, the leaked data does not seem to offer any strategic advantage to either side. In this way, the United States is supposedly sending a signal to both Russia and Ukraine that neither side is currently in a position to win a war on the battlefield.
In the end, whatever and whoever was behind the leak, the main question for Ukraine was whether this American negligence could jeopardise the counteroffensive that was being prepared.
Officially, in the words of Oleksii Reznikov, Minister of Defence of Ukraine, Kyiv declared that the published documents would not have any impact on the preparation of a counteroffensive by its Armed Forces, since the data, though accurate, "is no longer relevant".
Unofficially, Ukrainska Pravda’s sources at Defence Forces Command also do not believe that the US leak could have disrupted the Ukrainian Armed Forces' plans.
"This data leak will not affect the counteroffensive in any way. There is not a word about our real plans. But we have plans, they have been approved by the General Staff, and we are advancing slowly. The next couple of months will be difficult," warned a senior Ukrainian security official off the record.
Nevertheless, in conversations with Ukrainska Pravda, the above-mentioned "arithmetical average" – meaning the prediction of when counteroffensive actions will start – has shifted to May-June. But the reason for this change is not the leaked documents, but rather nature and Ukraine’s partners.
On the one hand, excessively wet weather with floods is complicating military logistics and the movement of heavy equipment. On the other hand, our partners' delays in transferring weapons mean that much of this equipment is not yet in Ukraine.
"Coordinators for of the counteroffensive"
"The world loves winners. Understand that if we demonstrate success and the ability to win in the course of a counteroffensive, this will be key to our partners' willingness to continue to help us. Without victories, it will be very difficult to maintain support. Therefore, we must win," one source close to Andrii Yermak, Head of the Office of the President of Ukraine, explained to Ukrainska Pravda off the record.
The further course of events in many respects depends on the success of military operations: from the very existence of Ukraine within its borders and its place in the geopolitical game to purely internal political schedules.
One interesting non-public meeting held at Bankova Street [Kyiv street where the Office of the President is located - ed.] at the beginning of April attests to how seriously Zelenskyy takes the need to win anything.
More than ten people were invited by Yermak to the meeting: several deputy heads of the Office of the President, heads of law enforcement agencies, top managers from the state banking and energy spheres, and several ministers and deputies who have showed their effectiveness during the full-scale war.
For obvious security reasons, UP decided not to publish the names of those present so as not to expose them to additional danger.
At the meeting, the head of the Office of the President of Ukraine told the audience that there is a significant personal task for each of them from the president: Zelenskyy decided that these tried and tested people should deal with the task of equipping new brigades for the counteroffensive.
After Yermak's short speech, his adviser Daria Zarivna handed out to all present several sheets of paper with infographics about the needs of their brigades.
The Office of the President staff themselves decided who to assign to which brigade. The participants in the meeting were responsible for a quick response: the person put in charge is responsible for finding out what the crews need. It does not matter how or where, but the issues must be resolved.
"This is a good idea on the part of Zelenskyy. These are his people, and they can quickly assist the military. Moreover, this gives the president another direct channel of communication with the brigades, so no soldier or official can report to Bankova that everything is fine when in fact there are real problems. You cannot even imagine what a great thing this is," one of the members of the president's team explained to UP.
As our interlocutors at the President’s Office assured us, this approach to the staffing of brigades in no way indicates distrust of the military; on the contrary, it should help them as much as possible.
"Many officials and managers know exactly how to correctly and quickly adjust the supply chains of what the brigades need here and now. You understand that we often talk about political connections inside the country and abroad. All this should speed up the equipping of fighters and create a parallel channel of communication for ordinary soldiers," explains UP’s interlocutor on Bankova street.
What weapons does Ukraine need for an offensive?
In the above-mentioned interview with The Economist in December 2022, Valerii Zaluzhnyi outlined the urgent needs of Ukraine: 300 tanks, about 700 infantry fighting vehicles and around 500 howitzers.
At the same time, Minister of Defence Oleksii Reznikov explained that the figures announced by the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces reflect the army's needs for a specific operation. For the complete liberation of occupied Ukrainian lands, much more equipment and weapons are needed.
Throughout the winter and early spring, Western partners actively worked on the supply of weapons to Ukraine. Despite several breakthrough decisions regarding tanks and anti-aircraft systems, many issues remained subject to debate, and there were still shortfalls.
In particular, there is insufficient supply of modern Western F-16 aircraft, ammunition, heavy weapons and mortars.
An interlocutor in the Armed Forces who is directly involved in the supply of weapons told UP that one of the most problematic points at the moment is also the quality of what is given to Ukraine.
"What the politicians stated and what was ready are different things. Their equipment was also often stored under the open sky, and what looks cool on paper is much more complicated on the ground. This is why the speed of delivery is slow," said the interlocutor.
His words were confirmed by state leaders in their public speeches.
On 25 March, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said that the Armed Forces of Ukraine had yet to launch a counteroffensive planned for spring, due to a lack of weapons.
Here is a short list of what is most urgently needed for the counterattack:
- In order to break the Russians’ logistics lines and destroy their rear, Ukraine needs long-range artillery, particularly HIMARS with long-range GLSDB projectiles (hit range – 150 km).
The Ukrainian army needs to disrupt the occupiers’ logistics, which runs from the territory of Russia to occupied Crimea. Doing so will cut off supplies to the Russian group in Crimea, including their missile-carrier ships.
Long-range artillery can also be used to destroy the invaders’ air defence systems.
- Ukraine needs HARM anti-location missiles to destroy Russian air defence systems. These fly in the direction of Russian radars, independently targeting and destroying them. The air defence system without radar becomes "blind". HARMs are designed for F-16 aircraft but can be launched from Soviet MiGs.
The HIMARS can also destroy Russian air defence.
- Ukraine needs long-range air defence systems and many missiles to destroy Russian planes and helicopters. These include Patriot, NASAMS, and IRIS-T systems.
- After suppressing Russian air defence, Ukraine can use guided aerial JDAM bombs ("smart bombs") more freely. They will help destroy warehouses, command and control centres and armoured vehicles.
JDAM bombs are dropped from aircraft, after which their wings open and go straight to the target.
- Ukraine also needs tanks: Abrams, Challenger, Leopard, etc., to support the infantry and destroy Russian firing points and fortifications. The Ukrainian army are expected to receive about 100 Western tanks - this is not very much. However, in addition to those, Ukraine also has Soviet and Polish PT-9 (modernized Soviet T-72 tank) tanks.
- A significant number of Humvee-type vehicles are also required to transport infantry.
- There is great need for artillery, in particular NATO 155-calibre. As regards howitzers, the Ukrainian army currently has mainly the M777S.
- According to approximate estimates, about 500,000 shells will be delivered to Ukraine for the counteroffensive. If the active phase lasts a month, the Ukrainian army can fire approximately 20-25,000 shells daily.
Currently, the Armed Forces are mainly on the defensive. To understand the army's needs for the counteroffensive, you can compare the use of shells by the invaders during the active phase of the offensive against Ukraine. From March to August 2022, the Russians fired approximately 50,000 shells daily.
Offensive Guard in the limelight, Ukrainian Armed Forces’ covert preparations,
and potential pitfalls of the counteroffensive
New equipment and the overall circumstances of the counteroffensive require a large number of well-trained military personnel.
Ukraine is training more than a dozen newly formed Armed Forces and National Guard brigades to take part in the major counteroffensive. According to publicly available information, there are at least 16 such brigades (a total of around 40–50,000 personnel).
Recruitment for the Offensive Guard – eight new assault brigades formed within Ukraine’s National Guard – has been highly visible, thanks to billboards, TV commercials, and catchy slogans. The Khartiia brigade, formerly the Kharkiv Voluntary Territorial Hromada Formation, which was part of the 127th Territorial Defence Brigade, has recently joined the Offensive Guard, becoming its ninth brigade.
The first thing to know about the Offensive Guard is that, for all its recent promotion, it did not in fact entail forming entirely new units but rather regrouping existing forces and additional recruitment into existing combat units.
This is somewhat good news, because it means that at the core of the new brigades are units with combat experience.
For example, the Rubizh (Frontier) brigade was formed on the basis of the 4th Operational Brigade, which was already quite well-known. The Burevii (Hurricane) brigade was formed on the basis of the 1st Presidential Brigade. Both fought in two of the most difficult defensive operations in eastern Ukraine, in Sievierodonetsk, Lysychansk and Bakhmut.
"We thought that the Offensive Guard was pure marketing to recruit more people for the National Guard of Ukraine. Military enlistment offices send newcomers to the Armed Forces of Ukraine by the bucket – meanwhile, only 150 people joined the National Guard’s N Brigade. This doesn’t even begin to cover the number of casualties and fatalities," a commander of a National Guard reconnaissance unit told Ukrainska Pravda. He was transferred to the Hurricane brigade several months ago.
Kostiantyn Vakhramieiev, commander of a Hurricane battalion, told Ukrainska Pravda that his battalion, which counts up to 700 personnel, is composed of 80% active military personnel and guardsmen who were transferred from non-combat units. Only 20% of the battalion are newcomers who joined after having seen the Offensive Guard commercials.
Everyone joining the Hurricane brigade has to undergo a 45-day training, which covers basic military training, combat coordination, and includes classes with instructors for different specialisations (machine gunner, grenade launcher, UAV operator, and so on).
Combat medics, sappers and sergeants are trained abroad, in Poland, the UK, and Germany.
In a 700-strong brigade, 400 people are assault infantry, and the other 300 are artillerymen and support personnel.
"We focus on assault troops because the task we have is to go somewhere and push out enemy forces; then the Ukrainian Armed Forces will follow us and consolidate our gains. In terms of equipment, we have armoured personnel carriers and mortars," as Vakhramieiev explained the tasks a battalion might have to carry out.
The commander who was transferred to the Hurricane brigade told Ukrainska Pravda he believes his unit is 75% ready for combat. They still have a month of training ahead of them.
"One of the disadvantages of their training is the lack of strategy. Obviously, no one knows what is being planned for the counteroffensive. Don’t tell me when or where it will take place, but tell me what drones we will use, Mavics or Lelekas. What will we use to intercept Russian communications?" the commander shared his concerns.
Another thing worth noting about the Offensive Guard is that some of its personnel are already fighting. The Hurricane brigade, for example, is currently holding positions on the Luhansk Oblast front. These are not some "mothballed" brigades.
"If we are ordered to take part in the counteroffensive, we will go on the offensive, but for now what is needed is holding the enemy at bay in the east. Who will fight if all nine brigades are biding their time in expectation of the counteroffensive in the vicinity of Kyiv?" Vakhramieiev says.
Unlike for the Offensive Guard, recruitment and training for the new Armed Forces brigades is taking place under the shroud of secrecy. These brigades are set to receive Western tanks and long-range weapons, and will therefore likely form the backbone of the offensive.
According to publicly available data, the newly formed 47th Separate Assault Brigade will operate Slovenian M-55S tanks and the 49th Separate Artillery Brigade has been equipped with Turkish TRG-230 multiple-launch rocket systems (with a 20-70 km range). Several other mechanised brigades have also been formed, including the 21st, the 33rd and the 118th brigades.
New Marine brigades – the 37th and the 38th – are also being formed. Yevhen Boba, the former commander of the 1st Marine Battalion, which defended Mariupol, will head one of the newly formed brigades.
The available information appears to suggest that some new brigades within the Ukrainian Armed Forces will be formed from scratch. This calls into question the extent of their combat readiness and cohesion (though it is worth noting that hardly anything is known about the training the Ukrainian Armed Forces brigades are undergoing).
It is entirely possible that more experienced Armed Forces brigades will take part in the offensive, though it remains unclear which brigades these will be, or what their ratio to the newly formed brigades might be.
An experienced and respected battalion commander in the Armed Forces of Ukraine told Ukrainska Pravda, on condition of anonymity, that it would be a mistake to deploy only the newly formed Ukrainian Armed Forces brigades in an operation as important as the counteroffensive. After all, most of these soldiers will be able to gain experience only on the battlefield.
"It would be better to pull out active combat units, replenish them, supply them with new equipment, ensure they’re well coordinated, and so create a real offensive cluster. It could then be effectively deployed on any front. And what are we doing instead? We are deploying new units on the offensive. Some of them will definitely flee and surrender their weapons – after all, these are people who were for the most part recruited from the street," the battalion commander mused.
"Combat experience is the most important thing during a war. Newly formed units have no combat experience and no officer core, though some people have been transferred there," he added.
The same battalion commander said that during the great counteroffensive, as during all nine years of the war, the Ukrainian army will face all the usual problems, including poor conscript training, mismanagement, and a lack of cohesion. This could be a greater challenge than the lack of weapons and ammunition.
A Ukrainska Pravda source in the General Staff said that such criticism could be explained by a lack of information [about the preparations for the counteroffensive] among the military at the lower levels of command.
"There are always risks – this is war. There are problems everywhere, but they are not that significant. Whether new or old brigades will be deployed, and who will be deployed where and how – these are all questions for the top brass. Don’t rush to conclusions. Everything’s going according to plan," he assured us.
***
The majority of sources Ukrainska Pravda journalists spoke to while working on this story agreed on one thing: the counteroffensive should begin when the Ukrainian Armed Forces are ready, not when it seems politically most fortuitous.
"The course of a war is always affected by many different factors, from politics and diplomacy to the effectiveness of the lines of communication and the motivation of the military personnel. If all of these factors come together in an optimal way, then the Ukrainian Armed Forces can do their job," as a source in the General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces puts it.
Yevhen Buderatskyi, Olha Kyrylenko, Roman Romaniuk and Roman Kravets
Translated by Myroslava Zavadska, Yelyzaveta Khodatska and Olya Loza
Edited by Monica Sandor