When we regain Crimea, the Crimean Bridge will cease to exist – Kyrylo Budanov, Ukraine's Intelligence Chief

In the course of the full-scale war, Kyrylo Budanov, Head of Defence Intelligence of Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence, has surely become one of the most authoritative security officials in the country.

It’s obvious why journalists would be interested in Budanov - his directorate is involved in secret special operations, prisoner swap negotiations, and intelligence gathering and analysis.

Ukrainska Pravda requested an interview with the head of Ukrainian intelligence following the massive rocket attacks across Ukraine on 10 October and accusations from the FSB that Budanov was involved in blowing up the Crimean Bridge.

The country's intelligence chief is, however, undeniably busy, so two weeks went by before we managed to meet.

In this interview with Ukrainska Pravda, Kyrylo Budanov talks about the Russians' targeted attacks on civilian facilities and their use of Iranian drones, predicts what will happen to the Crimean Bridge, and explains what is currently going on in Kherson and at the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant. He also reveals who in Russia wants to replace Vladimir Putin, assesses the threat of an attack from Belarus, clarifies where Viktor Medvedchuk is now, and reassures us that there will be no nuclear strike in the near future.

"The Russians aren’t hitting military targets now. Only civilian ones"

- We’ve seen a new intensity in the attacks on Ukraine over the last two weeks. The Russians are making extensive use of Iranian-made combat drones and missiles. What is the ultimate goal of these attacks: to leave us without electricity or heat, to sow panic?

- Everything that Russia is doing now is an act of terrorism. You have correctly observed that the most important goal is to sow panic, fear, uncertainty about the future. Panic and fear are the main weapons of terror.

Now let’s talk about the practical steps, how exactly they try to do this.

Firstly, they are trying to cause serious damage to our energy sector, and secondly, they are trying to stop electricity exports from Ukraine in order to inflict an economic blow as well.

In general, as they say, their dream is to plunge Ukraine into total darkness and a cold winter. But believe me, this is not going to happen: all our services are operating as they should, and their dreams are not going to come true. There are indeed complications, but nothing critical yet.

By the way, an interesting point: the whole time up to now, the Russians mostly hit military targets, with a smaller number hitting civilian targets.

And now they’re not hitting any military targets at all, only civilian ones. This is further confirmation of my assertion that Russia is a terrorist state and uses terrorist methods to achieve its goal.

In addition, even the very name of the Iranian-made drone, Shahed-136 [meaning "martyr"], is all about that. They love symbolism, and they are using a symbol of terror.

- How long can the terror last on the scale that we have seen throughout the country in the last two weeks?

- The Shahed terror could actually go on for a long time. But the missile terror won’t, because their reserves are almost exhausted. They have about 13% of their Iskanders left [mobile short-range ballistic missile systems], about 43% of their Kalibr-PL and Kalibr-NK missiles [long-range cruise missiles, also known as SS-N-30], and about 45% of their Kh-101 and Kh-555 missiles. It’s generally very dangerous to fall below 30%, because those are the emergency reserves.

Russia used up its emergency stash of Iskanders long ago, but they’re still trying to somehow stay within the limits of their norms in terms of the Kalibr, Kh-101 and Kh-555 missiles.

The shortage of missiles and their low efficiency and accuracy has forced them to use Iranian-made drones: Mohajer-6s, which we have not really seen here, and Shahed-136s. They’re using a huge amount of Shaheds here.

- How many Iranian-made drones do they have left?

- This is not the right question to ask, because they order them all the time. As of 22 October, they had used about 330 Shaheds. As far as I remember, 222 were shot down.

The rest of the Iranian-made drones reached their targets to some extent - not always the targets, sometimes somewhere nearby, but 30% of the drones do reach their targets. A one-off batch delivery contains about 300 units.

- How many such batches have there been so far?

- The second batch is now being deployed.

- And are the Russians going to continue buying them?

- They’ve ordered about 1,700 drones of all types, and so far the second batch has arrived. You have to understand, they may have ordered 1,700, but the drones still need to be manufactured.

So there are certain problems there too. And as you can see, the anti-aircraft defence system is working well: 70% of them are being shot down.

- The other day, the General Staff made a disturbing statement to the effect that the threat from Belarus is growing, and that the area of the offensive may move to the west of the Belarusian-Ukrainian border. So will the Belarusians go to Volyn?

- Can I just remind you that this story about a Belarusian attack on Ukraine has been appearing in our media since April. About once every six weeks, they claim that these terrible legions of Belarusians are going to attack tomorrow.

But the reality is a little different, and I have debunked these myths many times. Is there a potential threat from Belarus? Potentially, yes. That’s no secret to anyone.

The Russians are now concentrating a certain number of units there. But what they say and what they are actually moving there are completely different things.

There is currently no indication that any kind of strike force is being formed. As of now, the Russians have moved about 3,200 men there.

- But they say there are thousands of them there...

- You can say whatever you like. But they have no heavy-duty equipment. On the contrary, Belarus is sending all its equipment from long-term storage bases to Russia.

So physically, what will they fight us with now? I don’t understand. And they don't either.

- Many people are also worried about whether there will be another attempt to attack Kyiv in the coming months.

- As of now, no. Is it theoretically possible to do this? Yes. It would require about two, two and a half weeks to transfer the troops. That’s not happening.

"When we regain Crimea, the Crimean Bridge will cease to exist"

– On 10 October, there was a huge attack on the entire territory of Ukraine...

- Just to jump in here. It wasn’t huge, but it was the first of its kind in a long time. Remember the early days of the full-scale war, when Kyiv was also hit. Russians love numerology and everything related to it: 10.10.22.

- Alexander Lukashenko, the self-proclaimed president of Belarus, said this was the Russians' response to the Crimean Bridge explosion...

- Let me ask you a rhetorical question: why didn’t they respond on the 7th or 8th [of October]?

The things you are talking about are not really connected to each other, because some rockets hit Kyiv, and all the others hit energy infrastructure facilities.

– One landed on Volodymyrska Street, next to the Mykhailo Hrushevskyi monument. Am I right in saying that the Russians were aiming the missile at the Security Service of Ukraine (SSU)?

- I think it was targeted at the SSU as well. But my point is that in reality, Russian missiles turned out to be nothing like as accurate as they had all dreamed of.

That’s to say, plus or minus 500 metres for their missiles is normal now. This was about 800 metres out, and that is within their TTC [tactical and technical characteristics, or functional capabilities - Ukrainska Pravda].

They claim that the TTC is plus or minus 50 metres, but we see the reality.

- Can I ask you, as chief intelligence officer of this country, what happened to the Crimean Bridge? Did "the submarine sink"? [The phrase "The submarine sank" was used by Putin in an interview with Larry King, when he was asked what happened to the Kursk submarine in which 118 people died.]

- That will be a difficult question to answer. Let's talk about it some other time.

All I can say is that the Crimean Bridge was seriously damaged. This bridge is one of the symbols of the "Russian world". ["Russkiy mir" is an idea used by Russia to justify a "protective" role towards Russian-speaking minorities especially in former Soviet Union states - "mir" in Russian can mean "world" or "peace".] The Moskva cruiser sank to the bottom of the sea, and the Crimean Bridge actually went down too. These are all signs that this regime does not have much time left.

- We heard what Zelenskyy said about the Crimean Bridge - "we definitely didn’t order this." But the Russians immediately accused Ukrainian intelligence of orchestrating the explosion and said that you were personally involved in blowing up the bridge. How do you feel about such accusations?

- Personally? (He laughs.) You know, I don't take it all that seriously. I can't remember the exact name, but one of the largest print publications of the Chinese Communist Party published an article saying that Russia is blaming Ukraine for this, with a very high level of scepticism about these accusations.

And it must be understood that what is printed in a publication of the Communist Party of China is agreed upon by everyone - it’s the official position. And they so gently pushed the idea that Russia, in principle, likes to do similar things itself so it can accuse someone else of doing them, and then that supposedly gives it free rein.

Once again, I repeat that this is an official publication that is linked to China’s top military and political leadership. If even they doubt it, then you can draw your own conclusions.

- Volodymyr Zelenskyy has hinted to foreign media that the Crimean Bridge incident could have been the result of a conflict between the Russian secret services and the military.

- That's right. I can't add anything else here. But I will say something else: the Crimean Bridge is a symbol that will be destroyed.

When Crimea is regained, this bridge will cease to exist. Nobody really needs this transport artery.

"Surovikin is laying the groundwork for the surrender of Kherson"

- The media also associates the high intensity of attacks on Ukraine with the recent change in Russia’s military leadership. I have some questions about Sergei Surovikin, the commander of Russia’s joint group of forces. He previously led the Russian forces in Syria and has been accused of personally terrorising the Syrian population. Is Surovikin currently supervising the attack on our country?

- He does not supervise, he leads - these are two different things. He is the person who has been officially appointed to lead the so-called "special military operation in Ukraine".

That is, he is the only person from a legal point of view who is personally responsible for this. This is his order, and it has to be signed by him.

- Could he somehow seriously influence the change in the course of the war? Is Surovikin a big threat to us?

- This should be neither underestimated nor overestimated.

It won't change anything, I can tell you that directly. You won't surprise anyone with brutality now. If this had been done in the early days of the full-scale war, it probably would have had results. Not now.

Too many people have been killed, too much time has passed, people have got used to explosions, killing and death. They’re used to all that. It won't work like that here.

- Surovikin recently said that "difficult decisions may be taken" in Kherson. What did he mean?

- They realise that Russia is going to lose both globally and locally.

Surovikin might be able to say that the global loss is "nothing to do with him", but he will be responsible for the local loss.

He’s laying the groundwork so that if the decision is made to surrender the city, or they are simply kicked out, the groundwork will have been laid and somehow it will all be smoothed over.

But at the same time, I can’t tell you that they are fleeing from Kherson right now. No, that’s not happening.

- We have also heard the occupation authorities say they are going to "evacuate" the population to the left bank of the River Dnipro. What is happening in Kherson now?

- In many ways, this is an information operation and manipulation. There are certain facts. For example, Promsvyazbank and other financial structures that the Russians brought there are being withdrawn.

Moreover, as they are being taken out - the cash, the servers are being taken out - the so-called occupation authorities are being taken out. They’re transferring all the disabled people, seriously injured people are also being taken out, they try to discharge anyone who can walk from hospital as soon as possible, and they’re conducting this crazy information campaign, saying "We care about people" and so on.

In other words, they are creating the illusion that all is lost. And at the same time, on the contrary, they’re bringing in new military units and preparing the streets of the city for defence.

That is, they realise that if we take control of the Kakhovka dam at least, which is the only transport artery that is fully functioning now, they will have to make a decision very quickly.

Either they leave the city very, very quickly and get out, or they risk ending up in the same situation that our units in Mariupol found themselves in earlier. The situation is a little different, but conceptually it will be very similar.

And realising all this, they are laying the groundwork so that if necessary, they can get out of there very quickly. However, they are not preparing to flee now: they are preparing to defend [the city].

- You mentioned the Kakhovka dam. There are constant reports that it has now been mined. How likely is it that the Russians will launch a terrorist attack there?

- It is partially mined, that's true. Well, it is very difficult to evaluate the stupidity of Russians with any logic.

I will say this: blowing up this dam would definitely result in an environmental disaster, that's a fact. There are various considerations. First of all: why do it - what would they lose, and what would they gain?

And secondly: you can partially blow up the dam, or you can blow it up completely. The work required to blow it up completely has not been done. Mining is being done partially, for partial destruction if necessary. To destroy a structure of this size, you need dozens of tonnes of explosives, correctly placed. You can't put a KaMAZ [a large Russian truck] somewhere nearby, it won't help.

- If Ukrainian troops start to enter Kherson, could the Russians use the opportunity to blow up the dam?

- Let's look at this the other way round. If the dam is completely destroyed - if they launch all the missiles they have, lay a bunch of explosives, somehow try to do it - what would they gain?

They would get continuous flooding of the left bank of the Kherson region. They would lose, even theoretically, the ability to supply water to the North Crimean Canal and to Crimea until we rebuilt the dam, and that would take a very long time. It wouldn’t be realistic.

And the most interesting thing is that they would destroy any possibility of the Zaporozhzhia Nuclear Power Plant existing, because the plant is inextricably linked with the dam. Well, of course, they would make it difficult for us to advance for a certain period of time. Which, by the way, is not a very long time - it would be somewhere around two weeks.

But they would be forced to retreat straight to Crimea. In other words, if you destroy the dam completely, that’s the scenario. Are they ready for that? I think not.

- What if they decide to destroy the dam partially?

- They would disable the lock section, the engine rooms. That is, they would make the dam unsuitable for its intended use. But the North Crimean Canal would be preserved, water would leak, but it would not be so terrible. And they would make it difficult for us to advance.

So I don't think they intended total destruction. In addition, we do not see any signs that the dam has been completely mined.

- Do you think they might go the way you described?

- The dam has been partially mined. But it should also be understood that it was mined back in April.

- One last question to finish this part: will we regain Kherson by the end of the year?

- I think so.

"Kiriyenko sees himself as Putin's successor"

- We watched the ceremony that legalised Putin's annexation of four of our oblasts. We looked very carefully into the faces of the people who were in the hall...

– (Budanov smiles.) No one was happy. I'm telling you this, despite the fact that I don't like Russia. But I can't say they are all idiots - that’s not the case.

- How did Russia’s political elite react to another annexation?

- This is a disaster for them, they know that very well. They realised even more that this was the end. This is the end, and they have to look for ways out.

- And how are they looking for these ways out?

- The senior military and political leadership began to carry out massive strikes - which is an act of terrorism - in order to force negotiations. They see it that way. It won't work.

Others have rushed off to negotiate, as they put it, with Western countries. How do they negotiate? They say, "We're nothing to do with this, it's not us. And we're ready for change - all of this has to be stopped."

- Has anyone from Russia’s political elite attempted to make contact with the Ukrainian authorities in the same way, behind the scenes, saying, "Let's talk, we have to carry on somehow"?

- I won’t answer that question, I'm sorry, it's not time yet.

- OK, let's skip that question. People in political circles are saying that since the annexation of the four Ukrainian oblasts, the struggle for the throne has intensified in Russia. What information do you have about this?

- It’s definitely got worse. Do you realise what they did? They annexed new territories for themselves, and the very next day they began to lose them.

Many people in Russia said, "This can’t be done: let’s give them conditional independence there, create a so-called "KPR" [Kharkiv People’s Republic] and a "ZPR" [Zaporizhzhia People’s Republic] of some kind there, or join them to the "LDPR" [self-proclaimed Luhansk and Donetsk People’s Republic] - whatever, just don't make them part of Russia."

Because if it becomes necessary to either negotiate, or withdraw, or they’re just driven out, it will be a disaster for Russia. How can they explain to an ordinary Russian that Ukraine took a city from Russia?

All that happened even when Izium, in Kharkiv Oblast, was liberated [from the Russian army]. That shocked [Russian] society.

When we regain control of Kherson - the capital of Kherson Oblast, which they just annexed so dramatically, saying, "That’s it, Kherson is forever with Russia" - what will happen next?

How are they going to explain that to an ordinary Russian who lives there in (excuse me) his own shit and believes that he has the best missiles in the world - "We will destroy everyone!" And then boom, it’s the other way round! It will blow his mind.

- What could that lead to?

- It could lead to a loss of trust in the authorities and weaken the top-down command structure. And that’s all that the Russian leadership governing Russia is based on.

- Is it true that Dmitry Medvedev and Dmitry Patrushev, Nikolai Patrushev's son, who is currently the Minister of Agriculture, are secretly fighting for the right of succession to become the president of the Russian Federation?

- Medvedev has no chance. As for Patrushev's son, it’s primarily his father who wants to see him as president. He’s the main person who wants that. Does Patrushev have a chance? Hypothetically, yes, he does. But he’s not the only one.

- Who else is there?

- [Sergei] Kiriyenko sees himself [as the successor].

- Is Kiriyenko the deputy head of the President’s Administration who has been helping Putin carry out the occupation?

- Among others, yes. He sees himself as the successor if there is a more or less peaceful handover of power.

- Are there any other candidates?

- Let's stop at these for now. Let's wait a little longer.

- How’s Putin been since the annexation? Has his lifestyle changed in any way? Does he still live in a bunker?

- He has not changed at all; his mind is sick. Some kind of conditional Putin continues to exist.

- Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan recently said that Putin has become "much softer and more open to negotiations". What did Erdoğan mean? What softness was he talking about?

- Of course you become softer when you have 13% of the missiles you had at the beginning of the full-scale war; when you have more than 60,000 people killed and three times as many wounded, when strikes are being carried out, when there is nothing to fight for. When you started a victorious "special operation" for yourself, and then ended up with mobilisation.

When you are no longer accepted anywhere in the world and everyone mocks you: "Ah, so this is the ‘second greatest army in the world’, is it? Interesting..."

- Journalists often ask you whether Putin is alive. And you answer rather cunningly that "you have to wait for the answer to this question". But have you been told that the president of the Russian Federation is no longer alive? Have you received such information?

- We are figuring the whole situation out. Don’t be in a rush. If you know everything in advance, it won’t be interesting to go on living (he smiles).

"Medvedchuk appeared in Moscow. He didn’t get the red carpet treatment"

- Since we mentioned Erdoğan, I want to talk about the prisoner of war exchange. As you know, we do not have any political negotiations with Russia. So the question is: how do you manage to negotiate an exchange?

- I’m not going to answer that. You must understand that, because unfortunately we still have many people in captivity, and we need to somehow secure their release. If I reveal all our secrets to you now, it would be wrong and would ruin all our processes.

- OK, so how did you manage to have the Azovstal defenders released from captivity?

- The only thing I can say is that we all worked on it for three and a half months. That's all I can tell you.

- At a meeting with the Jesuits, the Pope talked carefully about his participation in the prisoner swap. Pope Francis said almost openly that he had a meeting with you, and sources close to the Catholic Church confirm the fact that you did meet the Pope. Can you tell us about your conversation with Pope Francis?

- Let's put it this way: because of my position and my function, I have contact with many authorities and people around the world - this is all totally normal.

It seems to me that it’s slightly inappropriate to ask what I talked about, or whether I talked at all.

- Did the Pope help with the exchange? 

- We ask many people and organisations around the world to help at one stage or another of an operation to secure the release of our people. Did we ask the Vatican? Yes, among others.

When we’ve got everyone out, then we can talk as much as you want.

- Another person who was exchanged was Viktor Medvedchuk. Is it known where Medvedchuk is now, how he is, or whether Putin was happy to see him?

- I can tell you for sure that they didn’t roll out the red carpet for him. Where is he right now? I need to pick up the materials, I can't remember now. But I can say that he’s been taken to Moscow.

- I thought he was taken to Ankara.

- He was taken to Ankara, but he eventually appeared in Moscow, this must also be understood. I know he had to answer a lot of questions from the FSB - not political questions at all, but practical ones.

- "Where’s the money?"

– (Budanov laughs.) That's right. "Where's the money?" - the usual question. So if you think I should be worrying about what they’re asking him over there, what he’s going to report and who to, I don't care at all.

"The nuclear threat from Russia now is the same as it was three months, and eight months, and two years ago"

- In one of your interviews, you predicted that the war could end by the summer of next year. Do you really think so, or is this a psychological operation?

- No. You must understand that I draw my conclusions based on information, not just because I feel like it. I very much hope so.

- There’s a long time to go till summer. What tactics will the Russians use in the near future?

- First of all, they will attempt to hold onto everything they’ve been able to seize, and they’ll attempt to somehow advance in Donetsk Oblast.

Because in fact, none of the strategic tasks that the Russians set at the beginning of the "special military operation", as they called it, have been achieved.

Moreover, now they are losing even what they were able to occupy. And this, again, brings us back to the average Russian watching TV and being told that the Russians have lost this, that and the other, some village over there. It’s a disaster.

They dress it up in different words, like "tactical regrouping", the "occupation of more profitable frontiers" and so on... But everyone knows what they’re doing.

- What should we civilians prepare for in the coming months?

- Nothing new will appear. Everything will be just like it is now. We will move forward gradually step by step, they will lose step by step. They will continue to strike some places with their Shaheds and a smaller number of missiles, because there are not so many of them left.

- So will the terror continue?

- Unfortunately, yes. The entire Russian regime is pure terror - they can’t do it any other way.

- Earlier you told Ukrainska Pravda that the war would calm down a bit in the winter. What should we expect?

- This is logical too, because there will be physical and geographical problems in winter, so to speak. We’re expecting a winter like this, more or less warm, so the soil will be sticky, and even now wheeled equipment hardly works at all on the battlefield, only tracked vehicles.

All this will only get more complicated when the steady rains begin.

- I have to ask about the nuclear threat from the Russian Federation. If the occupiers really do begin to lose Kherson, Melitopol, and other large cities, is there a danger that the Russians will use nuclear weapons against us?

- This scaremongering is so common. Do you remember, about three weeks ago, people even called the dates of when it would be?

My answer is no, they won’t. That’s the first thing. Secondly: can they do it or can't they? In theory, they can.

Will they do it now? They definitely won’t.

Will they do it when they have a total disaster? This is an open question: no one in Russia, or Ukraine, or anywhere in the world has the answer to that.

- Who has the authority to take a decision about a nuclear strike?

- Several people are needed to launch missiles. But the decision must be made from above. It is necessary to give a clear command, and it has to go through, shall we say, all levels.

- What is the current state of nuclear weapons in Russia?

- Are we talking about strategic nuclear forces? Yes, money has been spent on them, they have been maintained, they’ve tried to somehow update them.

If we’re talking about tactical nuclear weapons, then I’m afraid the last time someone thought about them was in the 1980s, and nothing new has been produced. The shelf life of most nuclear warheads of tactical nuclear weapons was 10 years. It has already been 40 years.

- If the order is given, isn't it a fact that it could be carried out?

- If the order is given, they will try to carry it out. But what effect will it have?

- Besides Putin, can anyone else give this order?

- No.

- To end this topic: is the nuclear threat to Ukraine real?

- It is always real, since our neighbour is a little sick and has nuclear weapons. But the threat is the same as it was three months, and eight months, and two years ago. It is identical.

- So Shchekavytsia should be cancelled, right? [On 22 September, Putin's threats to use nuclear weapons on the territory of Ukraine caused a stormy reaction on social media. People began to fantasise about how they would spend their last moments of life. One of the "ideas" that generated a lot of jokes in the media was to hold an orgy in the centre of Kyiv on Shchekavytsia Hill.]

– (Budanov smiles.) If people like the idea, why should you [cancel it]?

Roman Kravets, Ukrainska Pravda

Translation: Elina Beketova
Editing: Teresa Pearce