special project: "challenges of european integration"

How to Ensure Capacity for
European Integration

19 MARCH 2025
01
Chief Negotiator of Poland’s EU accession (2001-2003), Jan Truszczyński
02
Former Prime Minister, Ex-Minister, and State Secretary of the Ministry of Agro-Politics of Latvia, Laimdota Staijama
03
Former Director for EU Affairs at the State Chancellery, Estonian Ambassador to Ukraine,  Gert Antsu
04
Project Manager for Supporting Public Administration Reform in Ukraine at EU4PAR, Former Head of the Planning Department at the Bureau of European Integration of Latvia,  Ugis Sikss

Перемовини вже тривають.
Кому потрібно готуватися до вступу в ЄС?

Ukraine has set itself an extraordinarily ambitious goal – to join the European Union by 2030. Behind this deadline lies an enormous amount of work for the government, various state institutions, local authorities, as well as businesses, public organizations, and society as a whole. Alongside the vast array of European integration reforms that Ukraine must implement, there is also a huge body of work addressing internal challenges and carrying national significance for winning the war, rebuilding, and developing the country.
In this context, not only political will and consensus on state priorities come to the forefront, but also the capacity of public administration to implement them. In addition to having strong, capable institutions, a cornerstone will be their ability to cooperate and coordinate their work with one another.
Typically, such coordination is facilitated by the "government center", which is responsible for strategic alignment among ministries as well as ensuring the quality and consistency of the policies and laws proposed by the government.
This means that the role of the government center will continue to grow in coordinating the implementation of government decisions and the country’s political priorities, ensuring their systematic integration into state administration.
We spoke with representatives from other countries that have already embarked on their European integration journey to learn from their experiences. Each of these countries had a separate government body responsible for coordinating the efforts toward EU accession, as well as for overseeing and monitoring the process domestically.
Read more about how to coordinate the efforts of various stakeholders and set priorities in the process of European integration in the full article.
Тема спроможності державного апарату та підготовки до переговорів та безпосередньо членства в ЄС буде неодноразово поставати в найближчі роки, а тому ми поспілкувались з представниками інших країн, які цей шлях проходили, щоб врахувати їхній досвід.
Ключовим завданням є створення потужної інституційної спроможності, здатної забезпечити ефективне виконання вимог ЄС та загалом відповідність законодавству ЄС, яке є спільним для всіх держав Євросоюзу. Це потребує зусиль на всіх рівнях: від удосконалення законодавства до підготовки держслужбовців, які мають бути здатні працювати в нових умовах. Крім того, необхідно чітко визначити пріоритети, до яких країна повинна прийти на шляху до Євросоюзу, зокрема щодо економічних реформ, інфраструктурного розвитку та підтримки малого і середнього бізнесу.
Завдяки ретельній підготовці Україна має можливість не лише виконати умови вступу, але й отримати максимальну вигоду від членства в ЄС, що в свою чергу, сприятиме розвитку та процвітанню країни на глобальній арені.
І хоча "скопіювати" досвід інших країн Україні не вдасться, розуміти, кому і як потрібно готуватися до вступу вже зараз – необхідна умова для успіху. Адже вступ до ЄС стосується всіх, від кожної громади до центральної влади. Досвід інших країн, які через багато років можуть озирнутися назад та визначити власні помилки, допоможе Україні уникнути аналогічних помилок на шляху до Євросоюзу. У матеріалі читайте про досвід країн-членів ЄС, які вже пройшли цей шлях і діляться своїм досвідом.

Хто ж саме має активно готуватись?

Щоб ефективно підготувати органи державної влади, необхідна чітка координація між міністерствами та місцевими органами управління, що забезпечить оперативне виконання завдань, пов'язаних з адаптацією до європейських стандартів. Важливими є також реформи в системі державного управління, особливо щодо підготовки держслужбовців, здатних ефективно працювати у нових умовах. Ключовим аспектом є англомовна підготовка та внутрішня координація, адже без належного рівня інституційної спроможності реалізувати євроінтеграційні зобов'язання не вдасться.
Місцева влада відіграє важливу роль у виконанні зобов'язань ЄС, зокрема у розподілі європейських коштів. Тому важливим є навчання та підготовка кадрів на місцях, щоб забезпечити ефективне управління проєктами на регіональному рівні. У Польщі та Латвії місцева влада активно брала участь у процесі євроінтеграції, що забезпечило успішний розвиток регіонів.
Як показує досвід Польщі та Латвії, парламент має визначати основоположні засади інтеграції та довірити повноваження для розробки підзаконних актів уряду. Мікроменеджмент парламенту може бути шкідливим для процесу євроінтеграції, тому важливо зберігати баланс між загальним керівництвом та деталями. Втім, важлива роль парламенту у процесах, таких як скринінг, що забезпечує ефективність і своєчасне виконання вимог ЄС.
Важливо залучати бізнес до процесу євроінтеграції через асоціації для забезпечення обміну інформацією та оцінки можливих економічних наслідків. Бізнес має бути обізнаний про перехідні періоди, нові правила та стандарти ЄС, а також про довгострокові вигоди та виклики. Успішна співпраця між державним і недержавним секторами допомагає виробити оптимальні умови для бізнесу в умовах євроінтеграції, включаючи адаптацію до нових регуляцій.
І останнє, але не найменш важливе, – підготовка суспільства. Громадяни мають бути готові до змін у повсякденному житті, зокрема у сферах права, економіки та соціального забезпечення. Розширення знань про ЄС, зокрема через державні ініціативи та освітні програми, допомагає забезпечити підтримку громадянського суспільства і створює соціальний консенсус щодо процесу інтеграції.

Chief Negotiator of Poland’s EU accession (2001-2003), Jan Truszczyński

Jan Truszczyński
In Poland, the key role in the process of European integration was played by the Committee for European Integration, a governmental decision-shaping body which included all line ministries, agencies, and independent institutions such as the National Bank and the Statistical Office.
To support the Committee, a special administrative body – the UKIE Office (Urząd Komitetu Integracji Europejskiej) – was established. This Office engaged young specialists – university graduates with a strong demonstrated interest in European integration and a clear understanding of how the EU functions. Predominantly, these were highly motivated young people who had not been influenced by Soviet-era public administration practices, and who were empowered to drive the coordination of European integration efforts at all levels of central government.
Along with the political and organizational preparation, efforts were concentrated on developing the National Programme of Preparation for (EU) Membership. This program combined measures for harmonizing Polish legislation with EU law, strengthening the institutional adaptation and capacity of the public administration, and continuing economic reforms.
It also included initiatives designed to enhance Poland’s potential in the EU single market—even if those measures were not directly related to legal harmonization, they were aimed at strengthening the economy.
Each task within the Programme was formulated and implemented using a project-based approach with a designated project manager and team. Every project had a detailed multi-year budget, broken down into budgetary funds, reserve funds for unforeseen expenditures, and "pre-accession" funds allocated by the EU. EU financial instruments constituted the majority of the project budgets, increasing gradually to around 1 billion euros per year in the last few years before accession.
On one hand, there was ongoing debate over whether those working on European integration should be paid more or receive additional bonuses. On the other hand, it remained clear that this was not the proper way to structure the salaries of civil servants, as it would be difficult to draw a clear line between those responsible for European integration and those who were not.
Overall, by my own estimates, there were over 2,000 public servants at various levels within the central government working full-time or part-time—that is, dedicating a significant portion of their work hours exclusively or directly to European integration issues. Nonetheless, the practice was to offer these employees the highest possible salary within their respective pay scale.
We also had a predecessor to UKIE – the Government Secretariat on European Integration. This body was tasked with coordinating the financial needs of all ministries and discussing how to meet various requirements so that the expenditures matched the total funds provided by the European Union.
Naturally, there were disputes. Every year, there were very complex discussions about how to identify the most urgent needs that should take priority, how to address the requests submitted by different ministries, and how to "squeeze" everything into the amount of money that was actually available.
It was extremely important that no one received undue advantages or priorities. The allocation needed to be transparent, and decisions had to be backed by solid arguments explaining why one matter was prioritized over another for a given period.
Transparency was paramount. Discussions on how to allocate funds and where to direct them always took place in the presence of all relevant state agencies, allowing everyone to voice their opinion and contribute to the overall debate.
A significant part of the European integration efforts was concentrated at the local government level – specifically, within the 16 provinces. From the very beginning, we decided that a large share of the EU funds allocated for accession preparation would be distributed regionally. Initiatives were planned to train public servants already working in the state administration system at the regional level, especially those involved in economic planning, regional development programs, and inter-agency cooperation. New specialists were actively recruited and immediately trained. At that stage, we also ensured a clear division of responsibilities between the central and regional levels of public administration. Regional specialists, just as in central government, had access to consultants who assisted them in their European integration efforts.

Former Prime Minister, Ex-Minister, and State Secretary of the Ministry of Agro-Politics of Latvia, Laimdota Staijama

Laimdota Staijama
Preparation for EU membership was a complex and creative process.
It was clear that one could not join the European Union merely by formally adopting the Union’s laws and acceding to its treaties. It required many years of deep and constructive adaptation of institutions, economic sectors, and society as a whole.
Initially, our integration process was not successful. In 1997, the European Commission published an EU enlargement strategy that included conclusions regarding the accession applications of all candidate countries. The number of shortcomings and delays in Latvia was very large. Latvia was not among the first five candidate countries with which accession negotiations were initiated. This “cold shower” mobilized the integration process, and in the following years, Latvia achieved and even surpassed some of the countries that had started the integration process earlier.
A number of changes were made to the organization of the EU accession process. Specific high-ranking officials were appointed in the ministries to be responsible for this process.
Cooperation among state institutions on EU matters was ensured by the Council of Senior Officials, in which all ministries involved in the integration process were represented by high-level officials, usually deputy state secretaries. The Council’s work was chaired by the deputy state secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
It was very important that the meetings of these high-ranking officials were open to representatives of social partners and non-governmental organizations. By that time, organizations such as the Latvian Association of Local and Regional Self-Governments, the Council for Cooperation of Agricultural Organizations of Latvia, and various councils representing other sectors of the national economy had already been established.
Based on our experience, I would highlight the following key aspects for ensuring the process of European integration:
There must be a vertical decision-making structure; the preparation process should not be fragmented
In addition to political coordination, close cooperation at the public service level among the involved ministries is essential
It is crucial to clearly define and prioritize national interests by focusing on a small number of the most important issues. Our sectoral ministries developed their own lists of priorities, sometimes merging the most important with secondary ones
The capacity of public administration is critically important – a deep understanding of the content and proficiency in English are required
Subsequently, in 1999, Latvia was invited to begin accession negotiations, after which a negotiation delegation was established. State institutions responsible for 30 chapters of negotiations were identified and involved. The delegation was headed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, with Andris Kesteris, deputy State Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, serving as the chief negotiator and deputy head of the delegation. The personality of the negotiator is of great importance in subsequent negotiations. He must be well-versed in EU issues, fluent in languages, and capable of cooperating and finding solutions in very complex situations.
The following year, the Saeima (Parliament) approved the Integration Strategy of the Republic of Latvia. The objective of this key document was to achieve a unified understanding among state institutions and society regarding EU issues. The strategy emphasized strategically important areas of integration such as social integration, economic integration, sectoral, environmental and regional development, welfare, justice and internal affairs, culture, and education.
When accession negotiations began, working meetings of the delegation were convened under the chairmanship of a negotiation participant. These meetings were held behind closed doors.
The procedure for approving negotiation positions involved state institutions responsible for the respective negotiation chapters drafting and submitting their proposals and justifications to the Delegation. These institutions coordinated their projects with other sectoral bodies and non-governmental organizations.
Today, Latvia's EU coordination system is based on principles established in 2003 and updated in 2009. The central coordinating body for EU-raleted matters is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In addition, Latvia's permanent representation to the EU – the country's lagest diplomatic mission abroad – employs over 60 diplomatic mission abroad – employs over 60 diplomats and staff.
Each ministry has its own internal EU coordination system, which typically includes an EU department or several EU divisions, as well as an internal system for disseminating EU documents. Ministries are responsible for coordinating national position papers among the relevant institutions and NGOs, and for working closely with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Social partners and non-governmental organizations actively participate in the preparation of these national positions.
The government plays a decisive role in coordinating EU activities. It approves national priorities based on the program of each EU Presidency, endorses documents presenting Latvia’s national position at meetings of the European Council and the Council of the EU, and appoints a responsible representative at each ministerial meeting of the Council.
The Saeima, Latvia’s Parliament, also actively participates in EU affairs. Once a year, it holds debates on foreign affairs and EU issues. The European Affairs Committee handles the Saeima’s daily duties related to the EU and approves national position papers before Latvia’s stance is presented in EU discussions. For issues of particular importance to Latvia, the committee’s approval is required before they are discussed in EU working groups.

Former Director for EU Affairs at the State Chancellery, Estonian Ambassador to Ukraine, Gert Antsu

Gert Antsu
In 1996, Estonia established an office within the government secretariat to coordinate work related to EU issues – the Office of European Integration.
This small team, consisting of about 10 people, worked on coordinating and executing the "homework".
The Prime Minister held the highest authority and bore the political responsibility for the integration process into the EU. The negotiation aspect was handled by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
At that time, one of the biggest challenges was coordination and planning. When transforming society and preparing to adopt all EU rules, the process had to be planned several years in advance.
On an institutional level, we also had the Council of the Senior Civil Service. At that time, there were 13–14 ministries, plus the Bank of Estonia. They met every two weeks, providing a forum to discuss issues and plan ahead.
On a day-to-day basis, one of our tasks was to coordinate work on the national plan or national program for legislative adaptation. The ministries were responsible for drafting the adaptation program to EU standards, but it was our task to ensure that all necessary items were included in the plan. For example, to check whether promises that could not be fulfilled in one year were incorporated into the plan for the next year, or whether obligations arising from the screening process during negotiations – similar to what is happening now with Ukraine – were included.
Of course, it was ultimately the ministries’ responsibility to include all these tasks in their work plans, yet it remained the coordinator’s duty to verify that the plan contained everything it should. Once the annual plan, and subsequently a more general multi-year plan, were adopted, it was our job to ensure their implementation.
At that time, we operated with two plans: the first was a comprehensive key plan for European integration, and the second was a plan for all the laws the government intended to pass within the year and submit to the parliament.
In general, the European integration processes were carried out using state funding. Administratively, we had support from the EU and its member states, some of which sent advisors to various ministries.
Regarding the role of business, communication was mostly conducted "top-down" in the form of consultations.
We informed them of upcoming changes; the government engaged in discussions with employers, organizations, and chambers of commerce.
The internal market is at the heart of the European Union, and you simply must adopt market rules. When discussing possible exemptions or transitional periods, these measures had to be very well justified.
Overall, I cannot overstate that political will is the key factor, along with the readiness of political authorities to ensure that progress is continuously made. Ukraine has set very ambitious goals, so it is crucial to ensure that the pace of implementation is equally rapid. Obviously, Ukraine is at war, which significantly complicates the task, but given the ambition, external monitoring will also be in place.
My second point is that there are no shortcuts. There is no alternative but to adopt all EU rules, implement them, and then demonstrate this to the EU—not only to Brussels and the European Commission.

Project Manager for Supporting Public Administration Reform in Ukraine at EU4PAR, Former Head of the Planning Department at the Bureau of European Integration of Latvia, Ugis Sikss

Ugis Sikss
The first context, and an extremely important one, is the political sphere. Politicians must have a strong desire for European integration.
A key factor in European integration was that all politicians in Latvia agreed that EU accession was inevitable. This consensus had a major impact on the legislative process, which is critical for accession. Everyone agreed that the government should work on legislation in collaboration with stakeholders.
The parliament, for the most part, had great trust in what the government was doing. The European Integration Committee in parliament served as an important coordination center, but it did not attempt to take over management. The idea was simply to ensure that what was coming from the government was positive, and that the government had at its disposal all the specialized personnel.
Of course, one cannot simply copy another country’s experience. Ukraine will be unique. However, there must be a unanimous political decision regarding the chosen course and the rules of the game well before accession.
Once this was agreed upon, the process became much easier. At different times and under different governments, the responsibility for European integration and the coordination of the Bureau’s work fell either to the Deputy Prime Minister for European Integration or to the Prime Minister. In principle, there were governments both with and without a Deputy Prime Minister. The Bureau operated in various configurations and alliances, primarily ensuring the continuity of its work. It served as a very strong center of expertise, mainly engaged in planning the process, coordinating activities to ensure smooth operation, and resolving inter-ministerial or intersectoral conflicts. By "conflicts", I mean not only differences in viewpoints but also the frequent need to define who is responsible for what.
Thus, the Bureau functioned as a sort of gatekeeper – we were closely connected to the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister. This was very important, as the political figure responsible for coordinating European integration needed to have the authority to seek alternative opinions before making decisions. Another role of the Bureau was to ensure continuous operation; its leadership and team remained intact through successive governments throughout the accession process.
It is important to reinforce the strategic element by clearly understanding all requirements and anticipating what comes next, setting priorities, and considering the specific conditions of the European market.
First and foremost, very strong ministries and central executive bodies are needed – especially in key sectors – as well as close inter-agency cooperation and coordination.
The next crucial point is ensuring that ministries and key departments have stability in terms of personnel: hiring people who can speak the "language" of the EU. This means not only proficiency in English but also an understanding of how processes work and an appreciation of their underlying philosophy.
The will and confidence in this capacity are essential elements. This brings us back to the overall issue of public administration reform.
There is a reason why the accession conditions now have new fundamental principles (fundamentals) that were absent in our case.
They have emerged from considerations of capacity, as well as the democratic and judicial systems. In some of the newer member states, it was evident that their capacity was lagging behind, particularly in the management of funds.
Much depends on stronger institutions, especially at the level of ministries and central executive bodies, which in turn requires greater trust, cooperation, and coordination.
It also depends on how to work with stakeholders, since not only ministries will be joining the EU, but the entire country—every business, every region, every local authority.
Success only comes when, in the end, all stakeholders benefit from the process. It is not that everything starts working perfectly as soon as you gain access to the market; rather, you are simply opening a new level of opportunity.
Whether you capitalize on these opportunities more effectively than others depends largely on the potential of your public administration. In a broader sense, I am referring not only to local self-government but also to the central level.
The views and opinions are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union or the Delegation of the European Union to Ukraine.
Read also the previous material of the special project "Challenges of European Integration" about why is it crucial for Ukraine to start preparing for EU membership now.
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