Original article in Ukrainian by Yulia Kyseliova, UCIPR (www.ucipr.kiev.ua) analyst, for UP
In political practice of some parliamentary and parliamentary-presidential republics, Government Action Programs are among the most important papers that actually legitimate the government’s work. In some EU member states, this document officially gives a person the green light to become the Prime Minister. For instance, in Romania that has recently joined the EU and is the parliamentary-presidential republic under the Constitution of 1991, after the designation of a candidate for the office of the Prime Minister, the parliament gives him or her a ten-day term to develop an Action Program and form the Cabinet composition. Only then the Deputy Chamber and the Senate discuss the Action Program and the Cabinet composition at a joint session. Hence, the issue of what and how he or she will work is raised first and only then it is discussed with whom.
According to the Constitution of Hungary, the Cabinet of Ministers shall periodically report to the State Assembly on the implementation of its Action Program approved by the parliament. In Lithuania, (under the 1992 Constitution), it is neither the elaboration nor the approval of the Action Program that may serve as a reason for early elections. The President may declare the early elections if the Seimas (parliament) fails either to make a decision on the Government Action Program within 30 days or approve it within 60 days.
In Poland, the Prime Minister shall submit the Action Program to the Seim with a request for the confidence vote not later than 14 days after his or her designation to the office. Otherwise, the Prime Minister is elected by the Seim. In parliamentary-presidential Finland (in compliance with its Constitution of 1999), before electing the Prime Minister, MPs scrutinize the Government Action Program and only then inform the President about results and ask him or her to approve a respective candidate for the office of the Prime Minister.
In Ukraine, Government Action Programs are actually formal documents that do not provide for political responsibility and that are rather declarations of different quality. The status, role and place of the Government Action Program are not enshrined in the Ukrainian Constitution. Specifically, only Article 114 reads, "The Prime Minister of Ukraine manages the work of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine and directs it for the implementation of the Action Program adopted by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine." Neither terms for the approval of the Program nor sanctions for a failure to approve it are set. As evidenced by political practices of the former Prime Ministers of Ukraine, Government Action Programs were viewed, first and foremost, as one-year immunity from resignation and reshuffle because under Article 87 of the Constitution, the Verkhovna Rada may not dismiss the government within one year after the approval of the Action Program.
Also, the Constitution does not provide for a clear form of the government’s accountability on the implementation of Action Programs as well as transparent and stable indicators of the evaluation and sanctions in case of the non-compliance with declared tasks. Yanukovych’s government illustrated that in Ukraine’s political practice, an Action Program is a tool for rather holding and exercising power than carrying out reforms. On March 16, 2004, the Government Action Program "Consistency. Effectiveness. Responsibility" was repeatedly supported by 239 MPs (a semi-sacral figure for the Ukrainian parliament), while a respective event happened a month before the anniversary of the adoption of the previous Program "Openness. Effectiveness. Productivity." Who will now remember these Program names and results and where one can find information about the course of their implementations? These questions are rhetorical enough.
By the way, "the pre-presidential haste" to acquire the government immunity was demonstrated, among other things, by the fact that the then public hearings were scheduled on March 30, halve a month after the approval of the document in the parliament. Forms of a public discussion of the Government Action Program are acute today as before. Specifically, according to the UCIPR’s, public proposals for the Section 1.1 "Civil Society" forwarded to the government before December 27, 2007 were ignored without any explanation. And the very Section was formulated without consultations with the public, which entailed inaccuracies and the absence of directions of legal reform important for civil society institutions.
Other examples were also illustrative. The Action Program of Lazarenko’s government was successfully approved by the Verkhovna Rada on October 15, 1996. Nevertheless, "practical solution of the most acute economic and social problems of Ukraine’s development" just remained on paper. Valery Pustovoitenko, Lazarenko’s successor, has worked without an approved Action Program for two years. In due time, MPs demonstrated their adherence to principles. Yushchenko’s Action Program "Reforms for Wellbeing" aroused the most heated discussion but it was also endorsed in the long run. A then compromise in the government-parliament-President triangle lasted just a year. On April 26, 2001, the Verkhovna Rada expressed no confidence in the "reformist" government, right after the expiration date of the document. A. Kinakh, Yushchenko’s successor, failed to get the desired immunity in the form of the Action Program. Though, V. Yanukovych succeeded on April 17, 2003. The then opposition interpreted that document as a kind of indulgence. In 11 months, the Program was over again.
The Action Program of Tymoshenko’s government (2005) rather reminded a publicist writing. Ukraine got a new President, MPs approved, by a constitutional majority, a new government led by Yulia Tymoshenko and its Action Program "Towards the People" and sometimes supported the Cabinet proposals for the implementation of social policy. These were steps populist in nature, such as maternity benefit or the recognition of the Oshchadbank’s arrears as the state debt. Hence, the idea of savings return is the old subject for Mrs. Tymoshenko, who makes respective steps without an approved Program.
Only after 100 days of its work, Yanukovych’s government (2006) officially stated about the need for the Action Program, its elaboration, discussion and approval, yet this did not happen. The draft Program’s name was "Strategy for Ukraine’s Social and Economic Development for 2007-2011", which means that the government seriously planned to adopt it for long.
The acting government presents its strategy as well. The other day, it made public the Action Program "Ukrainian Breakthrough: for People, not Politicians". The paper sets comprehensive priorities of the government’s work and ways for their attainment in the humanitarian, socio-economic, cultural, security and foreign policy areas. Mechanisms for the implementation of the political, administrative and territorial reforms are declared. For instance, judging from the priority of implementing cultural policy, the "Art Arsenal", the document was evidently agreed with the President.
It is possible to draw a lot of conclusions concerning ways for reforming medicine, information and even a better level of making citizens aware about Euro-integration prospects. By the way, the paper raises questions as to amending the whole body of Ukrainian laws on education, language policy and freedom of conscience, to say nothing about laws regulating relationship between branches of power and broader authorities of local self-government bodies. The matter concerns the reform of Ukraine’s political system. Yet, structural integrity of the Action Program is questionable.
One of the conclusions that can be made from the text of the document – the declaration of the government and the coalition – on the constitutional reform to be carried out not through amending the Constitution in force but through drafting a new wording of the Basic Law. Specifically, it reads that the government shall make proposals for the new Constitution, having provided for an improved mechanism of restraints and counterbalances between governmental agencies, substitution of the institution of "deputy immunity" with that of "parliamentary one", improvement of procedural norms and guarantees of the protection of human and civil rights and freedoms.
As for the public administration reform, the new Constitution envisages limited functions of regional and district state administrations, which, first of all, shall concern the execution, by local self-government bodies, of control over the compliance with the Constitution and laws of Ukraine, resolutions of the Verkhovna Rada, presidential and Cabinet decrees, regulations of other executive authorities as well as civil rights and freedoms.
Meanwhile, the public administration reform "shall ensure the balance of interests of consumers, economic entities and the state in the process of decision-making by regulatory bodies." Except for changes and amendments to laws of Ukraine, the government and the coalition are going "to supplement the new Constitution of Ukraine and the laws "On Amending the Law "On the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine", "On National Executive Authorities" and "On State Service" (the redacted version) with provisions on granting the offices of the minister and his or her deputies the status of political ones, to which the law on state service shall not be applied; establishing the institution of state secretaries as higher administrative offices in the Cabinet Secretariat and ministries, designation to which is in the competence of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine pursuant to the law on state service.
The government and the opposition will have enough votes to approve the Action Program. Though, will it be enough either to implement it or amend the Constitution in force or approve a new one? Will it be a "breakthrough" or yet another "immunity" in the year before the presidential elections?
